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Taylor: The Supreme Court, the Individual and the Criminal Process

THE SUPREME COURT, THE INDIVIDUAL
AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
E. Hunter Taylor, Jr.*
"Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example .... If the
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy." From the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
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I.

T

INTRODUCTION

HE sweeping social changes presently occurring in this country
are having important effects on the law. The impact of this
philosophical revolution upon the law is manifesting itself most
directly and vividly in the Supreme Court of the United States where
the entire concept of "individual liberty and freedom" is undergoing
far-reaching change. One of the most important changes is occurring
in the development of constitutional rules of criminal procedure,
particularly those applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Most of the particular longstanding announced aims of
the Court, e.g., protection against the conviction of the innocent and
prevention of governmental infringement of individual liberty and
dignity, are unchanged, but, the scope and relative degree of importance given these aims are undergoing extensive change. An attempt to
describe this change is the purpose of this Article.
While there has been no holding that the Bill of Rights in its entirety is applicable to the states, there has been a marked and continually growing tendency toward absorption of the Bill of Rights
guarantees into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
This process of absorption has reached such a point that the applicability of Bill of Rights guarantees to the states is a reality. Because
of this growing tendency to apply the federal standard to the states,
federal cases are treated in this Article as if applicable to the states,
unless the contrary is indicated. If the federal holding is not now
applicable to the states, every indication is that it will soon be.
II.

ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE1

A. Legality of Search
After undergoing recent major change the constitutional rules applicable to searches and seizures appear to have arrived at a point of
1 The source of development in this area of criminal procedure has been the fourth
amendment which declares: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be %iolated." For an excellent detailed review of this area of law, see LaFave, Search and
Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not ... Run Smooth," 1965 U. ILL. LF. 255.
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stability. The basic rule is that a search is legal, in a fourth amendment
sense, when made in accordance with a valid search warrant, or when
made with the consent of the party whose person or property is being
searched, or when made incidental to a lawful arrest, and in a few
2
instances, when based upon necessity and conducted reasonably.
(1) Incidental to Lawful Arrest
Following a lawful arrest, the time and place of an allowable search
are subject to limitations. The time limitation is rigid. For the search
to be lawful it must be made at the time of and incidental to the
lawful arrest. 3 If the search occurs prior to the arrest it is generally
held to be an unreasonable search unless the searching officer had
sufficient ground for making an arrest at the time immediately prior to
the search in question.4 If, at this time, the searching officer had sufficient ground for making an arrest, the fact that he chose to conduct
the search prior to the arrest, is not viewed as fatal to the legality of the
search. 5 Such strict mediacy is not required as to the allowable place
of the search. The allowable place for a search made incidental to a
lawful arrest is the area within the control of the person who is
being arrested.6 The person of the party being arrested is unquestion2 E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 539 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 831
U.S. 145 (1946); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). But a search without a
warrant, however reasonable, is illegal if the arrest is illegal. See, e.g., Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 864 (1958). If an
arrest is shown only to be a sham to justify the conducting of a search, the search is
illegal even though the arrest was lawful. See, e.g., Taglavore v. United States, 271 F.2d
262 (9th Cir. 1961); see also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931),
3 See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
4 See, e.g., People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950).
5 See, e.g., People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955). The problem with
this outlook of the pre-arrest search being favorable to the individual searched is the
possibility of courts being prone to find grounds present for a pre-search arrest In cases
where the pre-arrest search is productive.
6 See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 576 U.S. 364 (1964); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). The place where defendant is arrested can affect the legitimate
area of search, depending upon the accompanying circumstances. Preston v. United
States, supra at 367. The "immediate area" of an arrest would dearly be "larger" If
the arrest occurred in an alley or in an apartment than if it occurred while defendant
was in an automobile. Compare, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
with Preston v. United States, supra. As to the automobile search cases, if the search
of the vehicle is begun at the scene of the arrest, then suspended for a short time and
then resumed, it has been suggested that the complete search may be viewed as valid.
GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 29 (1966) [hereinafter cited as GEORGE]; cf., Drummond v. United States, 350 F,2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965)
(interrupted search of auto later continued-allowed).
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ably included within the allowable scope of a lawful search.- Beyond
the actual person of the one being arrested, the allowable search area
is unclear. The announced reason for allowing a search beyond the
person of the arrested party is to protect the arresting officer from being
harmed by weapons concealed nearby, to lessen the likelihood of escape
by the arrested person and to prevent the destruction of evidence 8 It
7 This general statement, however, may be subject to certain limitations. The earlier

cases suggested that there is an unqualified right on the part of the arresting officer to
search the person legally arrested, "... to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of
crime." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); see e.g., People v. Chiagles,

237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923) (Cardozo, J.). United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 72-73 (1950), declares that the reason for this rule is the immediate danger to the
arresting officer of concealed weapons or of the possibility of the destruction of evidence
under the immediate and direct control of the arrested person. Id. (Frankfurter, J.)
(dissenting opinion). Chiagles, supra, indicates another, more practical reason in that
once a search for weapons of the accused is permitted, it would be unnecessary for the
enforcement of the fourth amendment's purpose, as well as impractical, to confine the
search to those objects alone. 237 N.Y., at 197-98, 142 NE.., at 584. Compare Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (to prevent escape) (dictum).
However, the Supreme Court may have cast some doubt upon the rule of the Chiagles
case which permits objects other than weapons to be seized at a lawful arrest. The
Court recently stated that, "Whatever the validity of these [Chiagles] considerations in
general, they have little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond
the body's surface." Schmerber v. California, 384 US. 757, 769 (1966) (Brennan, J.) 5 to
4 decision). (Emphasis added.) Professor George has taken this language to mean that
a lawful search of the arrestee incident to a valid arrest can be conducted only if "there
is immediate danger of concealed weapons or of destruction of evidence... ." Growcz
at 13. Professor George's interpretation might be a bit strained, but one could argue
that there is nearly always some danger that concealed weapons might be found on the
accused, or that there is usually a danger that evidence on the person of the accused
might be destroyed, and thus the question of admissibility is academic. Of course, a
rule which excluded any evidence other than concealed weapons and evidence reasonably
associated with the purpose of the arrest and which could easily be destroyed, would
clarify the matter considerably. Cf., FED. R. Caw. P. 41(b). As of the date of this writing,
the Supreme Court has not limited the subject matter of a search incident to an arrest
to what can be made the object of a lawful search warrant. Gxogcz at 14. But cf. note 9
infra and accompanying text.
A series of recent Illinois cases shows how this principal is being applied by the courts,
particularly with regard to the automobile search cases. In People v. Thomas, 31 Ill. 2d
212, 201 N.E2d 413 (1964), the defendant, while driving his car, was stopped for a minor
traffic violation, and upon admitting he had no driver's license he was arrested and
searched. The search revealed narcotics, and the court upheld the admissibility of the
search and hence allowed the seized narcotics to be admitted in evidence. Ibid. In a
similar case the defendant was stopped for a minor traffic violation, and after producing
evidence of ownership of the vehicle and his driver's license, he was searched and stolen
money was found on his person. The search was subsequently held to be legal. People v.
Zeravich, 30 Ill. 2d 275, 195 N.E.2d 612 (1964). Carrying this concept to the extreme,
the same court in People v. Watkins, 19 I1. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960), held that a
search conducted incident to an "arrest" for a parking violation was legal.
8 See generally note 7 supra.
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is evident, however, that the area of the allowable search has been
extended beyond the person of the party being arrested both as to the
allowable place for the search and as to the objects which may be seized.9
At present it is not clear whether, and if so when, an individual may
be searched legally because the individual is accompanying a person
who is lawfully arrested. If the circumstances, such as secrecy or some
other suspicious factor, connect the initially non-arrested party to
the one arrested, as for example by indicating that he is an accomplice
or an accessory, this connection may provide a basis for the lawful
9 The trend of this extension began in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927),
noted, 28 COLUM. L. Ray. 383 (1928), where the Court held reasonable a search which
resulted in a seizure of papers in a room adjoining the one in which the arrest was
made. In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), noted, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 128
(1947); 26 TEX. L. Ray. 343 (1948); 22 TUL. L. REv. 212 (1947); 1 VAND. L. REv. 60 (1947),
a five hour search of defendant's apartment without a search warrant was held not to
violate the fourth amendment. Then in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948),
noted, 48 CoLuaf. L. Rv. 1257 (1948); 61 HARV. L. REv. 1452 (1948), the trend appeared
to have been reversed. There the Court required in order for a search without a warrant
conducted incidental to a lawful arrest to be valid that there be an inherent necessity
for the search without the warrant. However, in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950) the apparent countertrend established by Trupiano was reversed. In 1ablno.
witz a one and one-half hour search of defendant's office without a warrant, conducted
following the lawful arrest of the defendant under an arrest warrant was held not to
violate the fourth amendment. But another countertrend may be in the making. In
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), noted, 59 Mici. L. REv. 310 (1960), a search
and seizure of papers in the hotel room in which defendant was arrested and the
adjoining bathroom, in the absence of a search warrant, was upheld as being incidental
to a lawful arrest; however, four Justices dissented, which would seem to suggest that a
retreat from some of the earlier decisions in this area is in the making. In James v.
Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965), the Court held a search of the petitioner's house, two
blocks from the place of arrest, was not incident to the arrest. The Court declared that
a search " '... can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous
with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.'" Id. at 37 (quoting from Stover v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964)).
For an example of an even greater extension of the search area following a lawful
arrest see Kelly v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932), where a search of the
building from which the defendant had fled just before his arrest, and in which the
crime was committed, was held to be legal. In Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C.
Cir. 1958), a search of an upstairs room was upheld even though the arrest occurred
in a downstairs room. In Gentry v. United States, 268 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1959), a search
of a garage was upheld as being incidental to an arrest which occurred in the house.
But see Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (search held illegal where evidence
seized not connected with crime for which the arrest was made); Kremen v. United
States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957), noted, 46 GEo. L.J. 534 (1958); United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). These
three cases, in effect, hold that a general search or rummaging is not an appropriate
type of search following a valid arrest. See also notes 47-49 infra and accompanying text
for related discussion.
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arrest of the initially non-arrested party.10 Where this connection is
present, a search of the initially non-arrested party can be justified.
The problem with the legality of search is encountered when there is
no ground to justify that party's arrest. Can he be searched without
violating the constitutional prohibition against illegal searches and
seizures? Certainly, as a general proposition the answer to this question
is "no." Professor LaFave has suggested a limited retreat from the
"no-arrest-then-no-search" doctrine in cases where a search of the initially non-arrested party is reasonably necessary to insure the safety of
the arresting officers, as for example where the arrested party is armed,
or there is other reasonable grounds to believe that the initially nonarrested party is armed."1
(2) Searches With Consent
A search without a warrant and otherwise illegal does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against illegal searches and seizures if there
is a proper consent to the search. In order for a person's consent to be
effective it must be given voluntarily.'- Voluntary consent may be
given by one in police custody, but in such case, due to likely pressures,
the tendency is for the courts to be somewhat strict in requiring the
3
state to show that the consent was uncoerced.1
As a general proposition, one's constitutional rights cannot be waived
by another, but the consent of the one against whom the search is
directed is not necessarily required. For example, a husband or wife
who is either the joint owner or joint occupant of the searched premises
may consent to the search and thereby prevent the search from being
illegal as to both the consenting and the non-consenting spouse. 14 A
parent may consent to the search of his or her house and by doing so,
preclude an effective complaint of illegality of the search by a child
10 See United States v. Di Re, 332 US. 581 (1948).
21 LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . . Run
Smooth," 1966 U. ILL L.F. 255, 297. Professor LaFave points out that the Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. Bowen, 29 Ill. 2d 349, 194 N.E.2d 316 (1963), seemed to
have indicated a willingness to adopt such a rule in an appropriate case. Ibid.
12 See, e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d
649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
13 See, e.g., Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
14 See, e.g., People v. Perroni, 14 IMl. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958) (joint ownership);
People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616, 217 N.V. 797 (1928) (joint occupancy). But see Kelley
v. State, 184 Tenn. 143, 197 S.V.2d 545 (1945). In Kelley a wife's motive of seeking to
have her husband apprehended for possession of illegal liquor was held to prevent her
from waiving his right to protest an illegal search and seizure. Ibid.
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living in the searched house, even though the search uncovers incriminating evidence or contraband in the child's living quarters. 15 There
is some question as to the effectiveness against an employee of consent
to a search given by his employer or by an agent of his employer. A
majority of decisions, in their result, have given effect to the employer's
consent by holding that the employee lacks sufficient interest in the
searched premises to provide him standing to complain of the illegality
of the search. 16 One court, however, has held a supervisor's consent
to search an area under the exclusive control of the employee, the
employee's desk, was not effective to prevent the employee from complaining of the illegality of the search.' 7 For an employee's consent
to be effective against his employer, the consenting employee must
have had a position of importance. For example, a clerk's, a janitor's,
or a secretary's consent would probably not be effective, while the consent of a manager or other person of importance in the employer's
business would be effective to prevent a subsequent successful complaint by the employer of the illegality of the search.' 8 In order for a
bailee's consent to be effective against the bailor, the tendency is to
require that the bailor have given up control over the bailed property
for something more than a short or temporary period. 10 If something
akin to long-term exclusive control over the bailed property is given
to the bailee by the bailor, the consent of the bailee to the search is
generally held effective. A landlord or innkeeper, even though he may
have a limited right of access to the quarters of the tenant or guest,
cannot consent to a search of the quarters and thereby preclude the
tenant or guest from effectively complaining of the illegality of the
search. 20 Where one has hidden property on the premises of another
15 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964); Tomlinson v,

State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543 (1937); Morris v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 349, 208 S.W.2d
769 (1923); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078, 1081-84 (1953).
16 See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
'7 United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 742, rehearingdenied, 329 U.S. 826 (1946) (consent by office manager held cffective); State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 At. 1046 (1896) (consent of defendant's agent
and servant effective to make search of defendant's office lawful). But see People v.
Weaver, 241 Mich. 616, 217 N.W. 797 (1928) (Griswold expressly rejected); Hays v. State,
38 Okla. Crim. 331, 261 P. 232, subsequent appeal, 47 Okla. rim. 161, 287 P. 746 (1927)
(consent of defendant's store clerk not effective).
19 Compare Von Eichelberger v. United States, 252 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1958), with
Pielow v. United States, 8 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1925).
20 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel guest); Chapman v, United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (tenant).
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without the possessor's permission, the consent of the party with the
possessory interest in the premises is effective so as to prevent the one
2
who hid the property from complaining of the illegality of the search.
(3) Searches Under Warrants
Generally, if a search is to be valid when not made incidental to a
lawful arrest or with valid consent, it must be made in accordance
with a properly issued search warrant. For a search made under the
authority of a search warrant to be valid, the issuing magistrate must
have had jurisdiction over the subject matter, 22 the warrant must have
been executed within the jurisdiction of the judicial officer who
issued the warrant,23 and there must have been "probable cause" for
the issuance of the warrant. 24 As used in this context "probable cause"
has not been dearly defined. It is certainly something more than a subjective "good reason to believe" that unlawful objects, instrumentalities, or papers used in the commission of a crime are located on the
designated premises. 25 Apparently for facts or information to provide
"probable cause," the facts must be of such nature as would lead a
reasonable person to believe that contraband or a criminal instrumentality is located on the premises to be searched. 20 In addition, these
facts and information must be traceable to a credible source before
2T
the "probable cause" requirement is satisfied..
A finding of "probable cause" may rest upon evidence which would
be inadmissible in a criminal trial.28 For example, a finding of "probable cause" based upon hearsay evidence has been upheld in cases
where there was sufficient basis for crediting the hearsay. 2 In order
to credit the hearsay the affiant must, in addition to stating his condusions, reveal the underlying circumstances which produced the
21 See, e.g., United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961).
22 See, e.g., McDonald v. Wilkie, 13 IlL 22, 54 Am. Dec. 423 (1851).
23 See, e.g., Peter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 684, 5 S.W. 228 (1887).
24 US. CONsr. amend. IV; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
25 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Paldo v. United States, 55 F.2d 866 (9th
Cir. 1932); see United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965) (dictum); Draper v.
United States, 358 US. 307, 310, n.3 (1959) (dictum).
26 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-08 (1965); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949).
27 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
28 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Jones v. United States, 862 U.S. 257 (190).
29 E.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 113-15 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-12 (1959).
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conclusions.0 Although not required to have first-hand knowledge of
the circumstances, the affiant must have first-hand knowledge of the
realiability of one with actual knowledge of the circumstances which
provide "probable cause." 31 This approach of allowing hearsay as a
basis for issuing a warrant when the hearsay is derived from a firsthand source has been criticized by Mr. Justice Douglas who has urged
that the person with first-hand knowledge of the circumstances, i.e.,
the person whose information is relied upon, should be required to
present his information to the issuing judicial officer, who would then
determine the credibility of that party in his over-all determination of
whether there was "probable cause" for a warrant to be issued.8 2
30 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109-11 (1965). In Yentresca the affiant
stated that his conclusions were "based upon observations made by me" and "based
upon information received officially from other investigators attached to the Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax Division." This was held to be sufficient. Ibid. In Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 113-15 (1964), the affiant's declaration that his statement of conclusions was
based on "reliable information from a credible person" was held insufficient. Here the
standard for obtaining a search warrant under the fourth and fourteenth amendments
was also declared insufficient. Ibid. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the
afliant's declaration that his source of information had given correct information to him
on previous occasions, and that the same information was received from other sources
was held sufficient. Cf. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). In Giordenello,
an arrest warrant case, the Court, relying on its supervisory power, declared that "... the
complaint contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein; it does not indicate any sources for the complainant's belief; and it does not set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding
of probable cause could be made .... " Id. at 486. The Court, therefore, declared the
warrant to have been issued without probable cause, thereby making the arrest and the
subsequent search illegal.
31 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964); cf. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
32 Jones v. United States, 362 US. 257, 273 (1960) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.).
The basis of Justice Douglas' argument is that the duty of determining the constitutional validity of the warrant is on the magistrate and is nondelegable. By allowing
the police to rely on hearsay evidence, or evidence other than personal knowledge, In
effect, allows the police to make the determination of whether "probable cause" exists.
Ibid.
Mr. Justice Douglas also dissented on the same grounds in Ventresca and Draper.
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 116 (1965) (dissenting opinion); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 257, 314 (1959) (dissenting opinion). The Draper dissent appears to be
the first time Justice Douglas took this position, and his reasoning is most fully explained therein.
In regard to the credibility of informants, Justice Douglas quotes with approval the
majority opinion of the court of appeals in Ventresca as follows:
If hearsay evidence is to be relied upon in the preparation of an affidavit for a
search warrant, the officer or attorney preparing such an affidavit should keep in
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"Probable cause," as used in this context, is undergoing change,
particularly in those cases where information obtained from informers
serves as the basis for a finding of "probable cause." Though still in
effect, the rule which requires "reliable information from a credible
person" but allows the name of the informant to be withheld seemed
to have been potentially undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar v. Texas.34 In that case the complaining officer was
issued a warrant on his request based upon what he said was reliable
information received from a credible informant. Ruling that the
warrant was improperly issued, the Court declared that the issuing
magistrate must not "accept without question the complaint's mere
conclusion . . . [but] must judge for himself the persuasiveness of
the facts relied on by a complaining officer to establish 'probable
cause.' "35 This decision seems to mark a change in the Court's position
on the issue of the potential effect of information received from a
party other than the affiant. Previous decisions upheld the issuance of
warrants where the affiant claimed to have information from a credible
informer. Until Aguilar the requesting officer's statement of the past
credibility of the informer was, in itself, viewed as sufficient to make
the information sufficiently reliable to satisfy the "probable cause"
requirement. 6 The majority in Aguilar limited the effect of that decision by emphasizing that there had been no showing or even an express
claim by the affiant that the informant had first-hand knowledge of
the facts being relied upon.3 7 Still, the spirit of the decision suggested
that the time might be nearing when the informer's identity would
have to be disclosed in order to satisfy the "probable cause" require38
ment.
mind that hearsay statements are only as credible as their source and only as strong
as their corroboration. And where the source of the information is in doubt and
the corroboration by the affiant unclear, the affidavit is insufficient.
United States v. Ventresca, supra at 123, quoting 324 F.2d 864, 869-70 (lst Cir. 1903).
33 See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1964); Jones v. United States,
362 US. 257, 271-72 (1960). In Jones the Court specifically rejected petitioner's argument
that a search warrant was invalid when the informants were not produced or their names
stated. Ibid. The Court indicated, however, that such a complaint might be relevant if

it were alleged that the officers misrepresented to the magistrate the basis for the warrant. Ibid.
34 878 US. 108 (1964).
35 Id. at 113, quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
36 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.. 257 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959).
37 378 US. 108, 113-14 (1964).
38 The majority in Aguilar declared:
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Dissenting in Draperv. United States,89 Mr. Justice Douglas revealed
the direction that the law may be taking on the question of anonymous
informers. There speaking of the "probable cause" requirement, in an
arrest case where the requirement is the same, he stated: "This important requirement should be strictly enforced, lest the whole process
of arrest revert once more to whispered accusations by people ...
[We] risk making the role of the informer-odious in our historyonce more supreme." 40 While this blanket indictment strikes at a
real danger to our society, it goes further. It includes both the "professional" and the simply malicious "stool pigeons" and those citizens
interested in fighting crime, who wish to remain anonymous, which
is understandable in light of the long history in this country of reprisals
taken by organized crime against such citizens. 41 This trend of the
Court toward requiring disclosure of the identity of informers might
have well caused a substantial weakening of citizen law-enforcement
cooperation, which appears to have already become critically weakened
from other causes.
It thus became apparent that the Court would have to choose between two conflicting social interests. On the one hand, the Court
was cognizant of the fact that the police often depend, out of necessity,
on the information given to them by informers. On the other, the
Court was very sensitive to the constitutional concept of informing
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not rcflect
the direct personal observations of the affiant, . . .the magistrate must be informed
of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that
the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need
not be disclosed . . . was "credible" or his information "reliable." Otherwise, "the
influences from the facts which lead to the complaint" will be drawn not "by a neu-

tral and detached magistrate," as the Constitution require, but instead, by a police
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . , as,
as in this case, by an unidentified informant.
378 U.S. at 114-15. While in Aguilar the Court expressly titates that the informer's
identity may be withheld, it was not too difficult to foresee the case where the identity
of the informer could be considered an essential element in the determination of "credibility" and "reliability" which are essential to a determination of "probable cause" by
a neutral and detached magistrate. See Comment, 17 HASINcs L.J. 99 (1965).
39 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
40 Id. at 324 (dissenting opinion).
41 See generally WroYaN, THE HmuE Knas (1963). "Enforcement of discipline, silencing of stool pigeons and frightening of potential informers. These are the most common
causes behind professional killings nowadays ....
" Id. at 17. (Emphasis in original.)
See also Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
Provocateurs,60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951).
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the accused of the identity of an informer, so that it could be determined whether "probable cause" existed such that the warrant should
have been issued. On March 20, 1967, a closely divided Court resolved
42
this issue in favor of concealment of the identity of the informant.
In addition to "probable cause" for the issuance of the warrant, the
fourth amendment requires that the warrant issued must describe with
42 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (5 to 4 decision). AfcCray concerned an arrest without a warrant and a subsequent search (see next section of text, infra) which
revealed the illegal possession of narcotics. The defendant maintained that unless he
were told the name of the informant, he would not be able to determine whether there
was the requisite "probable cause" for the officers to make the arrest and subsequent
search without first obtaining a warrant. The officers, however, testified that they had
received information that the defendant was selling narcotics and could be found at a
certain address at a particular time. They further testified that they knew the informant
for some time, and that he had given the police sufficient information "20 or 25 times"
and that the information was accurate and led to numerous arrests and convictions.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in behalf of the majority of the court, had to reckon with Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), which had held that in an actual trial of a federal
criminal case
the disclosure of an informer's identity . . . is relevant and helpful to the defense
of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege
[anonymity] must give way. In these situations the trial court may require
disclosure ....
353 US. at 60-61. In Roviaro, however, the Court points out that the informer's testimony was highly relevant, in that he might have disclosed an entrapment, cast doubt
upon defendant's identity, etc. Id. at 63-64. Justice Stewart uses Roviaro to show extreme
unwillingness to require an informant's disclosure. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311

(1967).
The dissent, led by Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Chief justice Warren, and Justices Brennan and Fortas concur, view Roviaro as controlling and would require disclosure:
In Roviaro v. United States [citations omitted] we held that where a search without a warrant is made on the basis of communications of an informer and the
Government claims the police had "probable cause," disclosure of the identity of
the informant is normally required. In no other way can the defense show an
absence of "probable cause." By reason of Mapp v. Ohio . . . that rule is now
applicable to the states.
Id. at 315 (dissenting opinion). The dissenters were troubled by the fact that there "is
no way to determine the reliability of Old Reliable, the informer, unless he is produced ....""Id. at 316.
It appears at first blush that the Court is reacting to much recent public criticism

of its libertarian approach to judicially formulating a code of criminal procedure, but
this may not be entirely true. The Court appears to be giving the police more leeway
in obtaining arrest and search warrants, without divulging the names of informants.

The police must, nevertheless, show "probable cause," in that they Xiust show that their
informers are reliable. The Court has thus equated "probable cause" with the "reliability" of an informer. The police still have the burden of showing reliability, and,
hopefully, subsequent cases will help to clarify this matter.
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particularity the premises to be searched and the articles to be seized. 4
The warrant must not leave to the discretion of the officer executing
44
it what is to be taken.
(4) Searches With Warrants, Arrests, or Consent
As a general rule a legal search must be made either incidental to a
lawful arrest, with proper consent, or under a properly issued warrant.
There are, however, exceptional cases in which a search is legal even
though none of these three requisites are satisfied. For example,
where there is reasonable ground to believe contraband is being transported in a moving car or other vehicle in transit, the car or vehicle
may be stopped and searched, even though the search is not accompanied by a warrant, arrest or consent, without violating the constitutional prohibition against illegal searches and seizures. 45 For such a
search to be lawful, "probable cause" must exist for believing contraband is being concealed and illegally transported. 4 It should be
noted that the scope of this type of allowable search is limited to the
vehicle; therefore, a passenger in such a vehicle may not be searched
to
unless properly arrested.4 7 This same limitation is applicable
48
vehicle.
the
of
operator
or
driver
the
of
searches of the person
As a general proposition, a search of a dwelling house without one
of the three above mentioned requisites-arrest, warrant, or consent-is illegal even though there is reasonable ground to believe that
contraband is being kept there, and even though the search proves the
43 The fourth amendment declares, "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
*.

and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to

be seized." U.S. CONsr. amend. IV. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 50 (1950);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1931); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927); cf. FED. R. Clam. P. 41(c).
44 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1950); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
45 See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (automobile), noted, 29
B.U.L. REv. 540 (1949); 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 242 (1950); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559
(1927) (motor boat); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). But see United States v.
Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1960). In Stoffey the search of an occupied automobile
without a warrant was held illegal due to the prior opportunity of being able to obtain
a search warrant. Ibid.
46 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Note, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 950 (1948).
47 United States v. Di Re, supra note 46. The mere fact that one is a passenger in an
automobile transporting contraband does not in and of itself provide the proper basis
for a valid arrest of that person, but not much more in the way of additional circumstances is necessary in order to justify such an arrest. Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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belief to have been well-founded. 49 Where the seized property was seen
by a law enforcement officer from a place where he had a right to be,
the so-called "Plain View Doctrine" allows the seizure of the property
without violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
searches and seizures. Or stated differently, the seizure of this property
without a search does not violate the fourth amendment. For example,
if law enforcement officers enter a tavern and see gambling equipment
or other contraband, this equipment or other contraband may be
seized without violating the constitutional prohibition.6 0 Where an
officer sees from a place where he has a right to be, property in the
defendant's apartment, dwelling, or hotel room, which could be
properly seized, an entry and seizure which immediately follows the
entry is not illegal.5 1 On the other hand, an entry and seizure is illegal
if it results from window-peeking or other spying conducted on the
defendant's premises or from a place where the officer has no right to
be.52 A seizure of property viewed from the street or sidewalk through
the window of a parked car with the aid of a flashlight is not illegal.53
Searches of open fields and similar places are not protected by the
fourth amendment,5 4 since the fourth amendment addresses itself
to "persons, houses, papers, and effects." However, it has been held that
the fourth amendment's protection extends also to places of business 5
and to buildings located near a dwelling. 6
B. What Can Be Seized in a Lawful Search
The fourth amendment protection against illegal searches and seizures is strengthened by the first amendment when the articles to be
49 See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). See also United States v. Jeffers,
342 US. 48 (1951) (hotel room). But see Johnson v. United States, 33 U.S. 10 (1948).
In Johnson, the Court indicates that in exceptional cases searches of dwellings which
are not incidental to arrests, and without consents or warrants might be valid. Ibid.
50 See, e.g., People v. Cattaneo, 6 IIL 2d 122, 126 N.E.2d 692 (1955).
M See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957); Ellison v. United
States, 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
52 See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Brock v. United States,
223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
53 See, e.g., People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943).
54 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
55 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
56 See United States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Hayden,
140 F. Supp. 429 (D. Md. 1956) (garage not connected to residence, but located nearby,
within scope of constitutional protection). But see Carney v. United States, 163 F.2d 784
(9th Cir. 1947) (garage not connected to dwelling not protected by constitutional prohibition against illegal searches).
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seized are books, pamphlets, or other forms of expression entitled to
freedom of speech protection, and the articles are being seized because
of the ideas contained or the expression itself, rather than because
the articles are stolen property.57 For example, in Stanford v. Texas"8
a warrant authorizing seizure of literary materials having to do with
the operations of the Texas Communist Party was held to be a general
warrant prohibited by the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Somewhat less particularity of description is required when the items to be
seized are not within the ambit of the first amendment protection, as,
for example, stolen goods, illegal liquor, illegally possessed weapons,
narcotics, and other contraband or instrumentalities of crime.50
0 which
While long dormant, the rule of Gouled v. United States,1
offers another limitation to searches conducted under the authority
of a search warrant, has shown recent indications of revival. The basis
for Gouled was developed in Boyd v. United States0 ' where the Court
declared:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property . .
Breaking into a house and
opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but
any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of
crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that
judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run
2
almost into each other.6
In Gouled v. United States63 the Court also formulated a rule
57 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 n.16, 486 (1965); cf. A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), 26 Mo. L.
REV. 501 (1961).
58 379 U.S. 476 (1965), rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 926.
59 See note 57 supra.
0 255 U.S. 298 (1921); see generally Shellow, The Continuing Vitality of the Gouled
Rule: The Search For and Seizure of Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964). It should
be noted that the Gouled rule applicable to searches conducted under search warrants
was made applicable to searches incidental to lawful arrests. United States v. Lcfkowltz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932). For discussion of this phase of the rule, see note 66 infra and accompanying text. Because the same rule is applicable in both areas, both search warrant
cases and arrest search cases are included in the following development.
61 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
02 Id. at 630.
03 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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limiting the categories of property which could properly be seized in
a lawful search. In Gouled the defendant was charged with conspiracy
to defraud the federal government and with mail fraud. Certain contracts of the defendants were seized by federal authorities in a search
conducted under a search warrant. The defendant, relying on a theory
of fourth and fifth amendment merger in search and seizure cases,
moved to suppress the introduction of the seized contracts on the
theory that they merely constituted evidence of the offense and, therefore, were not subject to being lawfully seized. The Supreme Court
in holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted,
declared:
Although search warrants have . . . been used in many cases
since the adoption of the Constitution, and although their
...
use has been extended from time to time to meet new cases within
the old rules, nevertheless it is clear that, at common law and
as the result of the Boyd and Weeks cases,... they may not be
used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and
papers solely for the purpose of making [a] search to secure
evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding,
but that they may be resorted to only when a primary right to
such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the
public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized,
or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of
the police power renders possession of the property by the accused
unlawful and provides that it may be taken.0 4
Within a short time after the Gouled decision, the Court began to
limit its effect 65 by a marked tendency toward categorizing seized
64 Id. at 809. The common-law principle referred to by the Court in the above
quotation was probably that one developed in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell St. Tr.

1029 (1765), where a warrant was issued for the seizure of seditious papers. These private papers, which were the personal property of the accused, were held to be immune
from seizure. In Entick Lord Camden explained: "It is very certain, that the law obliges
no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation,
falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust: and
it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There
too the innocent would be confounded with the guilty." Id. at 1073.
65 A clear statement of the categories the Court developed to give itself this choice
necessary in limiting the Gouled rule is set out in the Court's opinion in Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), where the Court declared:
This court has frequently recognized the distinction btveen merely evidentiary
materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized either under the authority of
a search warrant or during the course of a search incident to arrest, and on the
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property as instrumentalities of the crime rather than mere evidence
of the crime. 6 There have been recent indications of revival of the
Gouled rule, and decisions in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia indicate that the rule is being given new vitality
by that court. In Morrison v. United States"7 the accused was charged
with the commission of a sexual offense upon a young boy. The trial
court had incorrectly admitted into evidence over the defendant's
objection a handkerchief. In its opinion the appellate court declared:
The handkerchief was merely evidentiary material. It clearly
was not the instrument or means by which the crime was committed, the fruits of a crime, a weapon by which escape might
be effected, or property the possession of which is a crime ....18
In the recent decision of Osborne v. United States,0 0 Mr. Justice
Douglas unsuccessfully urged application of the Gouled rule to prevent
the admission of evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping.
His thesis seems to be that the electronic seizure of conversation is
a search which by its very nature is so broad as to be a general evidentiary search of the type prohibited by Gouled.7 0 [In Warden, Maryland
other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen
property, weapons by which the escape of the person arrested might be effccted,
and property the possession of which is a crime.
Id. at 154 (emphasis added.)
66 See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Zap v. United States, 828 U.S.
624 (1946); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). In Abel, supra, the Court denied a motion to suppress on the ground that the papers seized in a search which was
incidental to an arrest, rather than under a warrant, were instrumentalities of a crime.
In the Marron case, the Court refused to suppress the admission into evidence of ledgers
and bills which it held were instrumentalities used in the operation of an unlawful
liquor business. Marron v. United States, supra; accord, Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1933). Contra, Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1933); United
States v. Paller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930) (liquor records purely evidentiary and Inadmissible). Compare United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962) (earning records
of prostitutes held instrumentalities of crime and admissible); cf. Landau v. United
States Attorney, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936). In Landau the court said: "The memorandum seized here constituted an exact tabulation of the smuggled merchandise. Some
such list was a necessity in this type of smuggling to be sure that the carrier turned
over all the goods. If papers can ever be an instrumentality of crime, when not consti.
tuting the essence of the crime itself, they are such here. Id. at 287.
67 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
68 Id. at 450-51; cf. Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (observations of searching officer excluded under the Gouled rule).
69 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
70 See 385 U.S. at 340 (dissenting opinion). Justice Douglas also based his opinion
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Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967), decided since the completion of this manuscript, the Court, again with Mr. Justice Douglas
dissenting, seems to have laid the Gouled rule to rest. There the
Court declared: "Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment
supports the distinction between 'mere evidence' and instrumentalities,
fruits of crime, or contraband." Id. at 1647. Then the Court declared:
"The survival of the Gouled distinction is attributable more to chance
than considered judgment .... The Fourth Amendment allows intrusions upon privacy ...

[after fulfillment of the probable cause and.

particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and after the
intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate], and there is no
viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure 'mere evidence' from
intrusions to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband." Id. at
1650-51.]
Any pronounced move to revitalize the Gouled rule and give
it its potential effect is certain to meet strong opposition from both
within and without the judiciary. Opposition to an unfettered application of the rule has already manifested itself, not only among those
generally prosecution orientated, 71 but also among some who are
usually orientated toward the defendant. 72
C. Consequences of Illegal Searches
Until Mapp v. Ohio,73 even though a search by state officers was
found to be illegal and therefore to violate the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the admission of evidence obtained in
such a search was held not to be in and of itself a violation of the
fourteenth amendment 74 The basis for this position was that the
upon the right of privacy as recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
385 U.S. at 341.
71 See, e.g., Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand,

53 J. Cium. I-, C. & PS. 85, 87 (1962).
72 See, e.g., Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties, 53 J. Cpmt. L., C. & PS. 171,
177 (1962).
73 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
74 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US. 25 (1949). Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
somewhat limited the Wolf rule. In Rochin the police had the defendant's stomach
pumped to obtain evidence of narcotics. The evidence obtained was the basis for defendant's conviction for possession of narcotics. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the brutal and coerdve method by which the evidence was obtained made its admission into evidence a violation of fourteenth amendment due process, under the
subjective Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), "fundamental fairness" approach. 342 U.S. 165.
However, in Irvine v. California, 347 US. 128 (1954), the Court limited the Rodsin
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federal exclusionary rule, which in federal cases made inadmissible
evidence obtained in an illegal search, 76 or as a result of an illegal
search, 70 was a product of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over
federal criminal procedure rather than being of constitutional origin.77
Protection of the constitutional guarantee against illegal searches by
state officers was left to civil sanctions, public opinion, and interdepartmental discipline. 7 Then in Mapp, the Court held that where
evidence is acquired by state officers in violation of the standards imposed by the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule is applicable
through the fourteenth amendment and prohibits admission of the
evidence. The majority in Mapp appears to have based its decision
on a two point rationale: First, that without application of the exclusionary rule, the constitutional guarantee against illegal searches is
meaningless, 79 and secondly, the exclusionary rule, which had already
exception to Wolf to situations involving actual physical coercion. In Irvine there were
continuous illegal searches in order to obtain the evidence which resulted in the defendant's conviction. Ibid. And in Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), Rochin underwent what could be viewed as a further limitation. There a conviction of manslaughter
obtained as a result of a blood test, the blood sample having been taken while the
defendant was unconscious, was affirmed. 352 U.S. 432; cf. Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966), discussed infra.
75 Eg., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
76 E.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
77 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf the court declared that the exclusionary rule as formulated in United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), and in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), was a product of the court's supervisory power over
federal criminal procedure rather than of constitutional origin.
78 In Wolf the court stated:
The jurisdictions which have rejected the Weeks doctrine have not left the right
to privacy without other means of protection. Indeed, the exclusion of evidence is
a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises
something incriminating has been found. We cannot, therefore, regard It as a
departure from basic standards to remand such persons, together with those who
emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public
opinion, may afford. Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be
an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches it is not for this court to condemn as failing below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause
a State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be
equally effective.
338 U.S. at 30-31.
79 The Mapp court explained the reasoning behind its decision by stating:
[T]he admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion
of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful
seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
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been applied in federal criminal prosecutions, is really a constitutional
principle required by the fourth amendment, 0 rather than product of
the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over federal criminal procedure,
as it has always been described in the past.8 ' The majority bolstered
its decision by pointing to the close similarity between illegally obtained evisdence and coerced confessions and the fact that the Constitution requires coerced confessions to be excluded from state criminal
proceedings.8 2 The true basis for the decision, however, is necessitythe rest is glitter. The Court realized that without the exclusionary
rule, the constitutional guarantee against illegal searches and seizures
was going unprotected from state abuse. Thus, to protect the basic
right, the Court moved to fill a gap in the coverage of the Constitution, and a new constitutional right was created, that of exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence.8 3
Concurring in Mapp, Mr. Justice Black patterned his opinion so as
to reach the desired result of fourteenth amendment required exclusion, yet to remain basically in accord with traditional notions of
stare decisis and constitutional interpretation. Rather than totally re4 in which he had concurred, Black
jecting Wolf v. Colorado,"
affirmed
his previous position that the fourth amendment guarantee, which he
from the beginning viewed as the same as the fourteenth amendment
standard, contains no mandate of exclusion. But, he went on to declare
his reasoning in Wolf to be incomplete. In Wolf, he failed to read the
fourth and fifth amendments together as is required by their close
inter-relationship to the problem of illegal searches. Black's reasoning
seems to be that both protection from coerced confessions and protection from illegally obtained evidence rest on the aim of preventing
similar types of state infringement upon individual liberty. Due to this
close relationship the two protections cannot be separated effectively.
Therefore, the constitutional guarantees and remedies related to each
must be read and applied together-thus making the fifth amendment
exclusionary rule applicable to fourth amendment illegal search cases.8 5
the exclusionary rule is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way--by removing the incentive to disregard it.
367 U.S. at 656.
80 Id. at 648-56.
81 See, e.g., Wqolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25 (1949).
82 367 U.S. at 646 n.5.
83 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961).
84 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
85 567 U.S. at 662-63 (concurring opinion).
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Four members of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan,
attacked the majority for legislating in the guise of constitutional
interpretation. The dissenters argued that the majority went out
of its way by avoiding a simpler constitutional basis for the decision
in Mapp to make its far-reaching decision. In this connection the dissenters urged:
The Ohio statute which, as construed by the State Supreme Court,
punishes knowing possession or control of obscene material,
irrespective of the purposes of such possession or control ... and
irrespective of whether the accused had any reasonable opportunity to rid himself of the material after discovering it was
obscene, surely presents a Constitutional question which is both
simpler and less far-reaching than the question which the Court
decides today. . . . [J]ustice might well have been done in this
case without overturning a decision on which the administration
of criminal law in many of the States has long justifiably relied.80
The dissenters reasoned in accord with Wolf that the fourteenth
amendment prohibits affirmative state sanctioning of fourth amendment violations; but, beyond this point the states are constitutionally
free to deal with the problem of illegal searches as they wish, subject
only to the requirement that they provide the accused with the "fair
trial" required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7 As to the inter-relation between the protection against coerced
confessions and the protection against the use of illegally obtained
evidence, the dissenters urged that the two rights rest upon different
foundations. They reasoned that the use of a coerced confession, in and
of itself, results in an unfair trial. Its use makes the trial an empty
formality, because the accused has, in effect, already been convicted
in a "Star-Chamber" proceeding conducted during his pre-trial detention, at which time he was forced, in effect, to testify against himself
and thereby, ultimately, to contribute directly to his own conviction.
The use of illegally obtained evidence does not affect the actual fairness of the trial, which is, in the eyes of the dissenters, the primary
right being protected by the exclusionary rule. Instead, according to
their reasoning, the prohibition against illegal searches and seizures is
addressed entirely to pre-trial problems.8 8
88 367

U.S. at 675-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

87 Id. at 678-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 683-86 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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With the exclusionary rule applicable to the states, it should not be
long until the doctrine of Hanna v. United States89 becomes a part of
fourteenth amendment due process. In Hanna Maryland law enforcement officers illegally seized from the defendant evidence incriminating him in the District of Columbia. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held the evidence to be inadmissible at the.
defendant's trial in the District of Columbia, even though federal
officers had not participated in the illegal search.90 If this principle is
applied in state prosecutions to prohibit the introduction of evidence
obtained illegally by law enforcement officers of another governmental
unit, the "state action" required for fourteenth amendment applicability could be found in the state's use of the evidence.9 '
D. Motions to Suppress
A majority of jurisdictions require that effective objections to the
admission of illegally obtained evidence at the trial must be preceded
by a pre-trial motion for the return of the seized property or a motion
to suppress the evidence. 92 This requirement is based on the view that,
89 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
90 Ibid. Contra, Euziere v. United States, 266 F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1959); Rios v. United
States, 256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958).
91 A recent lower-court opinion from Ohio indicates that some courts might be willing
to exclude illegally obtained evidence in civil cases. In Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc.
156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (Ct. of C.P., Clermont County 1966), the court held that incriminating letters written to his wife which were obtained by a divorced husband by breaking
into the wife's car could not be admitted as newly discovered evidence upon a motion for
a new trial for divorce. Ibid. The Williams court stated that the Mapp syllabus which
reads, "Evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures ... is inadmissible in a state
court:' indicates that the Supreme Court's ruling is not restricted to criminal cases. 221
N.E.2d at 625. Cf. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 880 U.S. 693 (1965) (forfeiture proceedings held quasi criminal but civil in nature) (illegally obtained evidence
inadmissible).
Some states, however, have not interpreted Mapp to exclude illegally obtained evidence
in civil cases. In a case which appeared shortly after Mapp, the New York Supreme
Court held in a divorce action with facts very similar to those of Williams, supra, that
evidence gained by an unlawful entry into the apartment of a legally separated wife was
admissible. Sadder v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S2d 61 (2d Dep't. 1962).
One of the major policy reasons which probably influenced the Mapp court is the fact
that it is unlikely that a state prisoner can, as a practical matter, sue the officials who
wronged him by conducting an illegal search and seizure. Therefore, the officials must be
penalized by not allowing them to introduce the evidence they so obtained in the criminal proceeding. Does this policy require a similar result in civil proceedings, where the
aggrieved party is freely able to sue and thus vindicate his rights? At least one writer
answers, "Nol" 31 FoRDHA- L Rav. 390, 393 (1962).
92 E.g., United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 US. 935 (1954);
Williams v. United States, 215 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1954); Garhart v. United States, 157 F.2d
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if possible, the trial court should not be diverted by collateral issues
during the actual trial. A substantial minority of jurisdictions do not
require a pre-trial motion to suppress for an objection at the trial to
be effective. 93 In jurisdictions where the majority rule is adhered to
several exceptions seem to be fairly well recognized. For example, lack
of a pre-trial motion to suppress does not preclude an effective objection at trial if the ground for objection was not known at the pre-trial
stage.9 4 An objection at the trial can be effective even without a
pre-trial motion if the illegality of the search is not disputed,00 or if
the prosecution's offer of the evidence is accompanied by a disclosure
which makes plain that the evidence was illegally obtained. 0 The
majority rule is that when the pre-trial motion to suppress is made, it
is not necessary to object to the admission of the evidence at the trial
in order to preserve the defendant's right to object to the illegality of
the search and seizure on appeal. 97 At least two jurisdictions, however,
require objection both at the pre-trial and the trial in order to preserve
the defendant's rights on appeal.0 8
E. Standing to Complain of Illegal Searches
One of the most important questions in this area of illegal searches
and seizures remains: Who has the right to object to the admissibility
of illegally seized evidence? Or, stated differently: Who has standing
777 (10th Cir. 1946); Hoover v. District of Columbia, 42 A.2d 730 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C.
1945); Fuller v. State, 159 Fla. 200, 31 So. 2d 259 (1947) (motion to suppress must be made

prior to arraignment or right is lost); State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 258 P.2d 1147 (1953);
Chicago v. Lord, 3 Ill. App. 2d 410, 122 N.E.2d 439 (1954), a0'd without discussion of
this point, 7 11. 2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955); Hantz v. State, 92 Ind. App. 108, 166
N.E. 439 (1929); People v. Robinson, 344 Mich. 353, 74 N.W.2d 41 (1955); State v. O'Brlen,
252 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 929 (1953); State v. Marvin, 76 Mont. 66,
244 P. 882 (1926); State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948); State v. Jackson, 61 S.D.
499, 260 P.2d 343 (1953); Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951) (based on
state statute).
oa E.g., People v. Berger, 44 Cal. 2d 459, 282 P.2d 509 (1955); Wathen v. Commonwealth, 211 Ky. 586, 277 S.W. 839 (1925); Miller v. State, 174 Md. 362, 198 At. 710 (1938):
Willaford v. State, 970 Okla. Crim. 247, 261 P.2d 630 (1953); Spencer v. State, 157 Tex.
Crim. 486, 250 S.W.2d 199 (1952); State v. Montgomery, 94 W. Va. 153, 117 S.E. 870 (1923).
924See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Hantz v. State, 92 Ind. App.
108, 166 N.E. 439 (1929); State v. Laundry, 103 Ore. 443, 204 P. 958, rehearing denied, 206
P. 290 (1922); State v. Robbins, 37 Wash. 2d 431, 224 P.2d 345 (1950).
95 See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); State v. Robbins, 87 Wash. 2d
431, 224 P.2d 345 (1950).
90 See, e.g., Glodowski v. State, 196 Wis. 265, 220 N.W. 227 (1928).
97 See, e.g., Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
98 See Robertson v. State, 94 Fla. 770, 114 So. 534 (1927); State v. Lord, 286 S.W.2d
737 (Mo. 1956).
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to invoke the exclusionary rule? Until recently the constitutional
guarantee against illegal searches and seizures was almost unanimously
viewed as a personal right, which could be asserted effectively to prevent the admission of evidence only by the "victim" of the illegal
search. Before one could be the "victim" of such a search, it was
generally necessary that he assert and establish an interest, either
possessory or proprietary, in either the premises searched or the property seized. 9 This requirement tended to put defendants in a rather
difficult position, particularly where the defendant had to allege possession or ownership of contraband, stolen property or instrumentalities
of a crime and then run the risk of having the motion to suppress
denied after having admitted ownership or possession of the incriminating property.10 0 One exception to this requirement of either a
possessory or proprietary interest was developed in McDonald v. United
States. 0 1 In McDonald the Court held that where one co-defendant
had a sufficient interest to complain of the illegality of a search, it
was reversible error to deny the other co-defendant's motion to suppress, even though that co-defendant did not independently have a
sufficient interest to provide standing.
As to the requisite possessory or proprietary interest, one may start
with the basic proposition that generally an owner in possession 02
99 See, e.g., Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955); Wilson v. United
States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1951);
Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945); Mabee
v. United States, 60 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1932); Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So. 2d 164
(1942); People v. Tabet, 402 IlL 93, 83 N.E.2d 329 (1948); Greer v. State, 201 Ind. 386,
168 N.E. 581 (1929) (defendant cannot object to admission of evidence, where he disclaimed ownership and control over seized property at time of search); Lingner v. State,
199 Md. 503, 86 A.2d 888 (1952) (defendant claimed lottery slips seized from car were
thrown there by someone unknown to him and that he did not own the slips) (hdd: no
standing to object to seizure); State v. Egan, 272 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. App. 1954); Rose v.
State, 222 Miss. 699, 76 So. 2d 835 (1955); Allen v. State, 161 Tenn. 71, 29 S.W.2d 247
(1930); Paige v. State, 279 S.W.2d 344 (rex. Crim. App. 1955); State v. Wooten, 44 Wash.
2d 177, 266 P.2d 342 (1954). But see Wood v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 419, 243 S.W.2d 31
(1951). The court in Wood held that the disclaimer of ownership or possession rights destroys the privilege to assert the right only when the defendant is not in possession of
the premises searched and guilt is made to depend upon facts other than the possession
of the premises.
In People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 955 290 P.2d 855 (1955), the court indicated a recognition of the fact that the real basis of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of state misconduct toward the individual, and not simply a remedy for a wrong.
100 See, e.g., Scoggins v. United States, 202 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (1932).
101 355 U.S. 451 (1948).
102 See, e.g., Graham v. United. States, 15 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1926).
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or a rightful possessor' °3 of the property searched or seized has been
considered a "victim" who can successfully object to the unconstitutionality of a search and seizure. An owner not in possession of the
property searched or seized was generally held to lack standing to
object to the constitutionality of the search and seizure; 104 but, the
fact that the owner of the premises searched was not the owner of
the property seized did not affect his standing to object. 10 5 However,
as is the case with rules determining the constitutionality of searches, 100
the standing rule was applied somewhat differently in cases where
moving vehicles were stopped and searched. For example, Hurwitz v.
United States10 7 held that the defendant lacked standing to object to

the seizure in his car of drugs belonging to a third party. Generally,
a possessory interest has been treated as sufficient to provide standing.
For example, lessees have been held to have a sufficient interest to
provide them standing to object to illegal searches and seizures of the
leased property or premises. 08 The lessee has not, however, been able
to complain effectively of a search made of non-leased premises, even
though such premises adjoined the leased premises and were really part
of one whole. 10 9 A licensee could object to the illegality of a search and
the seizure of the licensee's property in cases where the owner or lessee
of the searched premises did not consent to the search." 0
There has been some difference of opinion as to whether a guest
103 See, e.g., United States v. Chieppa, 241 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1957) (borrowed car
searched) (borrower had "at least a possessory interest in the car," and therefore had
standing to object to the admission of the evidence). Contra, Mabee v. United States, 60
F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1932) (possessory interest in truck not sufficient to provide standing to
assert illegality of search); Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955): Wilson
v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955).
104 See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958); Schmitzer v. United
States, 77 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1935); United States v. Muscarelle, 63 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 642 (1933); Nunes v. United States, 23 F.2d 905 (1st Cir. 1928).
But see In re No. 32 E. Sixty-Seventh Street, 96 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1938); Frantom v. State,
195 Md. 163, 72 A.2d 744 (1950).
105 See, e.g., Mathews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943); Cofer v. United States, 37
F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930).
106 See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
107 229 Fed. 499 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924).
108 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 83 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 196); Klee v. United States,
53 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1931); United States v. Esposito, 45 F. Supp. 39 (D.C. Pa. 1942); Ells.
worth v. State, 295 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1956).
109 See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 166 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Hardwig v. United States, 23 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1928); Allman v. State, 107 Tex. drim. 439, 296 S.W. 580 (1927).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
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of an owner or a lessee can object to a search which results in the
seizure of the guest's property. The lower federal courts and state
courts have virtually unanimously held there to be no standing on
the part of the guest to object to the legality of the search."' However,
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, concurring in McDonald v. United
States,112 seemed to say that the guest does have standing in those cases
where the owner or lessor has not consented to the search. Where the
victim of a search is an employee of the owner or possessor of the
searched premises, the overwhelming weight of authority has been
that the employee lacks standing to complain of the illegality of the
search. This was true even if the employee was in charge of the searched
premises or otherwise had custody of the premises searched or the
property seized.1 13 This rule, of course, is not applicable where the
seized property was on the person of the employee and in some cases,
the fact that the seized property was in the employee's desk has been
viewed as sufficient to provide the employee with standing to effectively
14
complain of the illegality of the search.
The standing requirement for objecting to the illegality of searches
in federal cases has been based on Section 41(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. That section provides that
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move
the district court for the district in which the property was seized
for the return of the property and to suppress for the use as
evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally obtained without a warrant, or (2) the warrant
is insufficient on its face, or (8) the property seized is not that
described in the -warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for
believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was
issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall
receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the
motion. If the motion is granted the property shall be restored
111 E.g., Accardo v. United States, 247 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Gibson v. United
States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945); In re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942); Vanover v. Commonwealth, 237 SAV.2d 589 (Ky. 1951); State v. McPeak, 243 N.C. 243, 90

S.E.2d 501 (1955) (guest in automobile); Paige v. State, 279 SAV.2d 344 (rex. Crim. App.
1955).
112 335 US. 451 (1948).
.13 See, e.g., United States v. Messina, 86 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1929); Ludch v. State, 194
Md. 511, 71 A.2d 432 (1950).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Cravens v. United
States, 62 F.2d 261 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 733 (1932).
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unless otherwise subject to lawful distribution and it shall not be
admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion shall
be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity thereof did
not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the
motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion
at the trial or hearing.
"Person aggrieved" is, of course, the key to determining standing to
assert the remedies provided by 41(e). The term, until recently, generally was interpreted to require a possessory or proprietary interest
on the part of the party asserting the section. 115 Until 1960 the Supreme Court refused to specifically approve a standing requirement.
Then in Jones v. United States'" approval of a standing requirement
was extended. Any standing requirement is, of course, a limitation on
the power to effectively assert a legal right. The standing requirement
formulated in Jones was, however, much more liberal than those which
had been adhered to by the lower federal courts. 117 In Jones the Court
declared:
In order to qualify as a person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure one must have been a victim of a search and seizure,
one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from
one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence
gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else. Rule 41(e) applies the general principle that a party
will not be heard to claim a constitutional protection unless the
"belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection
is given." . . . The restrictions upon searches and seizures were

obviously designed for protection against official invasion of
privacy and the security of property. They are not exclusionary
provisions against the admission of kinds of evidence deemed
inherently unreliable or prejudicial. The exclusion in federal
trials of evidence otherwise competent but gathered by federal
officials in violation of the Fourth Amendment is a means for making effective the protection of privacy.
Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who
seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis of suppres115 See notes 99-114 supra and accompanying text.
116 562 U.S. 257 (1960).
117 See notes 99-114 supra and accompanying text.
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sion relevant evidence that he allege, and, if the allegation be
disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an
invasion of privacy... 118
The Court further stated:
No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous
enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing
that anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs
may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when
its fruits are proposed to be used against him.'"
In light of the tendency toward eventual applicability of federal
standards to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 2 0 there seems to be little doubt that the Jones standing rule will become a minimum standard of fourteenth amendment
due process. As previously mentioned, the "standing rule" formulated
in Jones is much more liberal than the standing requirements imposed
by the lower federal courts and state courts.'-" Still it remains questionable whether Jones is or should be the final word on the standing
requirement for asserting the constitutional right of exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence. One point of view is that the scope of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal searches and seizures should
be limited by the imposition of a standing requirement. Proponents
of this position contend that: (1) The rights of individuals against
illegal searches and seizures are sufficiently protected by the existence
118 362 U.S. at 261.
119 Id. at 267. (Emphasis added.)
121 See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
121 See notes 99-114 supra and accompanying text. For an example of a recent holding
which reflects the relaxation of the standing requirement, see United States ex rcl. Coffey.
v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965). In Fay the petitioner and his companion were arrested
without a warrant by state and federal officers. In a search of their persons at the time of
the arrest, stolen jewels were found in the possession of the companion and seized by the
officers. The petitioner during his trial in state court unsuccessfully sought to have the
evidence excluded. After exhausting all state appeals the petitioner petitioned in federal
district court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention was in violation of constitutional rights, since it resulted from a conviction obtained through the use
of evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. The district court ordered a new
trial without considering the issue of standing to assert the exclusionary rule. On appeal,
the state contended that the petitioner lacked standing to object to the seizure because
the jewels were taken neither from his person nor from property within his control The
court held, inter alia, that a petitioner was a person "against whom the search is directed" and, therefore, he had standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule.
Ibid.
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of an exclusionary rule of which law enforcement officers are aware,
or, in other words, because the police know that in a vast majority of
illegal search cases that the evidence obtained cannot be used to aid
the prosecution, only innocently conducted illegal searches will be
protected by a standing requirement and that this type of police
misconduct does not represent a sufficient threat to society to necessitate application of the exclusionary rule; (2) the standing requirement
is in accord with the well-established constitutional principle that
constitutional guarantees are personal and, therefore, may be asserted
only by those whose rights have been violated; and (3) application
of the exclusionary rule results in exclusion of otherwise competent
evidence, which would tend to show guilt, and because there is a social
interest in the conviction of the guilty, application of the exclusionary
rule should not be extended beyond the very minimum point necessary to protect the interest of society in discouraging illegal searches
22
and seizures.
On the other hand, the standing requirements are not without
critics. The Supreme Court of California in People v. Martin2" apparently rejected the arguments in favor of a standing requirement
and left their state's exclusionary rule without the limitation of a
standing requirement. In that decision the California court, speaking through Justice Traynor, rejected the standing requirement basically on the policy grounds that to allow such evidence under a "no
standing" ruling is to allow the government to "profit by its own
wrong" and to condone "lawless activities of law enforcement
124
officers."
122 See Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6 Aiuz. L. REv.
65, 77-81 (1964); Note, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 488.
123 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
124 290 P.2d at 857. The court stated:
[T]he rule of the lower federal courts is based on the theory that the evidence Is
excluded to provide a remedy for a wrong done to the defendant; and that accordingly, if the defendant has not been wronged he is entitled to no remedy. Connolly
v. Medalie, supra, 58 F.2d 629, 630. In adopting the exclusionary rule, however, this
court recognized that it would not be justified on that theory, People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 443, 282 P.2d 905, and based its decision on the ground that "other
remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts under the
old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect, condone, the
lawless activity of law enforcement officers. 44 Cal. 2d at page 445, 282 P.2d at page
911. This result occurs whenever the government is allowed to profit by its own
wrong by basing a conviction on illegally obtained evidence, and if law enforcement
officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining evidence in violation
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The existence of a standing requirement presupposes that illegal
searches are wrongs against individuals, i.e., wrongs against those who
are given standing to complain. This limitation on the constitutional
protection fails to recognize one of the prime reasons for the prohibition against illegal searches and seizures-a governmental abuse which
is violative of such fundamental concepts of liberty that it would be
considered wrong in a so-called free society, even without a constitutional declaration of illegality'2-a basis which is clearly reflected in
the Court's formulation of the fourteenth amendment exclusionary
2 6 As the Court in Mapp declared: "The criminal
rule in Mapp v. Ohio.1
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the character of its existence."'2m Then
the Mapp majority quoted from Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting
- "Our government is the
opinion in Olmstead v. United States:12
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example.... If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."' -9
Accepting the premises that one fundamental element of liberty in
any civilized free society is freedom from illegal searches and seizures,
and that one primary function and obligation of government is by its
example to educate its citizenry to respect law, it is inconsistent to
limit the effectiveness of the prohibition against illegal searches and
seizures by the imposition of a standing requirement. Viewing the prohibition against illegal searches and seizures as an element of liberty,
as well as a means of encouraging governmental education of society,
requires that any illegal search not only be viewed as a wrong to the
individual against whom the search was directed, but also as a wrong
of the rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is to that extent nullified. Moreover,
such a limitation virtually invites law enforcement officers to violate the rights of

third parties and to trade the escape of a criminal whose rights are violated for the
conviction of others by the use of the evidence illegally obtained against them.
Since all the reasons that compelled us to adopt the exclusionary rule are applicable
whenever evidence is illegally obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees, such
evidence is inadmissible whether or not it was obtained in violation of the particular
defendant's constitutional rights.
125 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
126 367 US. 643 (1961).
327 Id. at 659.
128
129

277 US. 438 (1928).
367 U.S. at 659.
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against society, because such an unlawful search, when conducted by
a governmental agent, even if conducted in good faith, represents a
failure to satisfy the governmental obligation to educate society to
respect and to follow the law. In order to encourage fulfillment of
this obligation, the government should not be allowed to use to its
advantage any evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search. Not
only is an illegal search a wrong against society, it is, of course,
also a wrong against the rights of the party whose person or premises
was searched, even though the obtained evidence is not used against
that party. If this type of violation of individual rights is to be pre.
vented, the violation must not carry with it any possibility of benefit.
Illegally obtained evidence, therefore, should be inadmissible in all
criminal prosecutions, regardless of whose individual rights were
directly violated by the illegal search and seizure.
III.

WIRETAPPING AND ELErRONIC EAVESDROPPING

A. Wiretap Evidence
In this area, as in most areas of constitutional criminal procedure,
there is a collision between two important social interests-society's
interest in protecting the dignity and privacy of the individual, and
society's interest in being protected from criminals. Although the early
development in this area favored the latter interest, the trend now
appears to be in the opposite direction.
At present federal officers are denied the use of evidence obtained
by way of wiretap devices. This denial is based upon statutory interpretation, rather than interpretation of the Constitution. In Olmstead v.
United States"30 the Supreme Court in a 5-to-4 decision declared that
obtaining evidence by wiretapping was not a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment and therefore not within
the scope of that amendment's protection. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in
dissent, urged that "[c]lauses guaranteeing to the individual protection
against specific abuses of power, must have a ... capacity of adaption
to a changing world."' 1
After a substantial shift in the make-up of the Court, with the use
of wiretapping increasing and producing much public opposition,
the first Nardone v. United States"112 decision was rendered. Avoiding
reconsideration of the constitutional issue, as was then the Court's
130 277 US. 438 (1928).
131 Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
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practice when possible, section 605 of the post-Olmstead Federal Communication Act 133 was interpreted, contrary to apparent legislative

intent, as prohibiting wiretapping and the introduction of evidence
134
so obtained by federal officers.
33
In Weiss v. United States the Court rejected the government's
argument that section 605 applied only to interstate telephone calls.
Thus after Weiss, section 605 applied to all telephone calls-both
interstate and intrastate.
Then in the second Nardone v. United States'30 decision the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine, developed under the Court's general
supervisory power over federal criminal procedure, 3 7 was read into
section 605 by the Court. In Nardone it was held that not only were
federal officers prohibited from wiretapping and from introducing the
overheard conversation in a federal prosecution, but also were prohibited from using evidence obtained as a result of the overhead conversation.
In Schwartz v. Texas'38 a conversation recorded by state officers in
violation of section 605 was held to be admissible in a state court. The
Court reasoned that inadmissibility in federal courts does not necessarily require a rule of inadmissibility in state courts.3 0 At this point
the Court seemed to be closely following its development of the law
of searches and seizures. 40 Then in Benanti v. United States'41 the
Court appeared to deviate from its position in the parallel area of
searches and seizures 42 when it declared inadmissible in a federal
133 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
'34 See generally Bradley and Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to Benanti and
Rathbun, 46 GEo. L.J. 418, 421-24 (1958). Professors Bradley and Hogan point out that
nothing in the congressional hearings, S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). even
suggests an intent to condemn wiretapping and that language very similar to that contained in § 605 was contained in the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1172 (1927), which was
in force at the time of the Olmstead decision. It is pointed out also, however, that the
Nardone decision is no longer vulnerable on this ground because of Congress' implied
.acquiescence in the decision.
135 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
136 308 US. 338 (1939).
137 See, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
138 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
339 Id. at 203. 'Ve hold that § 605 applies only to the exclusion in federal court proceedings of evidence obtained and sought to be divulged in violation thereof; it does not
exclude such evidence in state court proceedings .... ." Ibid.
140 Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (development of prohibition of il-

legal searches and seizures); see notes 73-91 supra and accompanying text.
141 355 US. 96 (1957).-

' 142 See, e.g., Byars v. -United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), where the Court declared: "We
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prosecution evidence obtained by state officers in violation of section
605 provisions. Rather than a deviation this was an anticipation of
what was to follow in the parallel area. 148
B. Electronic Eavesdropping
A problem similar to that of wiretapping is that of electronic eavesdropping. Although treated differently from the wiretapping cases
because of the absence of an applicable section 605, it now appears
that the eavesdropping cases are headed toward a merger of solution
with the wiretapping cases.
Until now the bulk of eavesdropping cases have turned on whether
there was a "search or seizure." In Lopez v. United States144 and
Goldman v. United States 45 no search or seizure was found on the
ground that there had been no trespass or unlawful entry upon the
defendant's person or property. Therefore, the eavesdropping was
upheld. This intrusion-non-intrusion approach was recently reapproved by the Court in Osborn v. United States,148 where the secret
recording of a conversation with the defendant by a federal agent and
testimony by that agent as to the conversation were held not to make
defendant's conviction reversible. In Silverman v. United States147
where there was a slight intrusion onto the defendant's property by
federal officers, the evidence produced by the eavesdropping was held
inadmissible in a federal prosecution. While this distinction has been
recognized up until now, it should be noted that in a recent nonintrusion case, the Court showed a definite tendency to strain to find
a violation of some other constitutional right 48 so as to reach a
do not question the right of the federal government to avoid itself of evidence Improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own account. But the rule Is
otherwise when the federal government itself, through its agents acting as such, participates in the wrongful search or seizure." Id. at 33. In Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74 (1949), the Court stated: "The crux of the doctrine is that a search is a search by a
federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official If evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter."
Id. at 78-79. But Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), held that where state
police acting solely to enforce federal law obtained evidence by way of an illegal search,
the evidence is inadmissible in a subsequent federal prosecution.
143 See discussion of Mapp v. Ohio at notes 73-91 supra and accompanying text.
144 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
145 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
146 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
147 365 U.S. 505 (1961).

148 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah the petitioner, who
had been arrested and indicted for a narcotics violation, was lured into a co-defendant's
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result consistent with those reached in the intrusion cases. In a per
curiam opinion in Black v. United States40 the Court may have
adopted a rule which makes unconstitutional any conviction obtained
after electronic eavesdropping of conversations between the defendant
and his attorney, regardless of the lack of detrimental effect of conversational overhead. In Black the Court reversed a conviction following monitoring and recording of the petitioner's conversations with
his attorney, even though the F.B.I. action was carried on without the
knowledge of the prosecuting attorney and apparently was not relied
upon in any way by the prosecuting attorneys. In dissent, Mr. Justice
Harlan declared that "The only basis... for justifying this decision
is that any governmental activity of the kind here in question automatically vitiates so as at least to require a new trial of any conviction occurring during the span of such activity."'15 It remains to be seen
whether the Court intended such a far-reaching result by its decision in
Black.
C. Future Direction of the Law
The Supreme Court probably will ultimately declare unconstitutional the admission of evidence into both federal and state criminal
trials, when such evidence is obtained through wiretapping or some
other form of mechanical or electronic eavesdropping.""' However, the
ground upon which this development will be based is not yet clear.
One possibility is that the Court will retreat from prior holdings and
broaden the constitutional definition of search and seizure to include
the seizure of words by way of wiretapping and other forms of eavesdropping, or wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping may be treated
as forms of interrogation of the person against whom evidence is being
sought and therefore within the Miranda v. Arizona 52 rule which
car which had been equipped with an electronic sending device with the permission of
the owner. Petitioner made certain self-incriminating statements while in the car. These

statements were picked up on a federal agent's receiving set and at the subsequent trial
these self-incriminating statements were brought before the jury. The Supreme Court
held that "the petitioner was denied the basic protections of ... [the sixth amendment
guarantee of right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial evidence
of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." Id. at 206.
149 585 U.S. 26 (1966).
150 Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 31 (1966).
151 Some doubt as to the certainty of this eventual development was raised by the
recent decision of Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
152 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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makes a warning necessary before such evidence is admissible against
the accused. There is also the possibility of this development being
based upon the self-incrimination prohibition. The basis for this development would be that the capture of one's words without his consent
and the use of these words to incriminate him amounts to requiring
that individual to incriminate himself. Finally, and perhaps the best
route for the Court would be pursuit of the rationale of the recent
decision of Griswold v. Connecticut.5 In Griswold the Court found a
ninth amendment protected right of marital privacy which was viewed
as applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The
scope of the ninth amendment right of privacy could with little difficulty be extended so as to protect private communications164 This
might well be the best solution since it would not involve the express
overruling of a long line of cases or the strained interpretation of such
cases in an effort to distinguish them. 1'
IV. ILLEGAL ARutsrs
A. Legality of the Arrest
The constitutional right to be free from illegal arrests is secured
by the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
which declares that "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . against unreasonable . . . seizures shall not be violated."' 50
As a general proposition, in order for an arrest to be legal it must be
153 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
154 Mr. Justice Douglas seems to advance this type of theory in his dissent in Osborn
v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
155 See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928). See generally Donnelly, Electronic Eavesdropping, 38 Noa DAm
L. REv. 667 (1963); King, Electronic Surveillance and ConstitutionalRights: Some Recent
Developments and Observations, 33 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 240 (1964); Westin, The Wire.
Tapping Problem:An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal,52 CoLubt. L. REv. 165 (1952).
[Since the preparation of this manuscript, the Court has decided the case of Berger v.
New York, 87 Sup. Ct. 1873 (1967). The majority's decision suggests that the electronic
eavesdropping cases will be lumped together, without concern for the presence of a tres.
pass, for treatment as a "search and seizure" under the fourth and fourteenth amend.
ments. However, while the suggestion is of this "search and seizure" approach, It should
be noted that Berger does involve a "trespassory eavesdrop." This prompted Mr. Justice
Black, in dissent, to declare as follows: "This case deals only with a trespassory eavesdrop,
an eavesdrop accomplished by placing a 'bugging' device in petitioner's office. Significantly, the Court does not purport to disturb the Olmstead-Silverman.Goldman dlstinction between eavesdrops which are accompanied by a physical invasion and those that are
not." Id. at 1895.]
156 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
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made under the authority of a valid arrest warrant or, in the absence
of such a warrant, it must be made on the basis of a reasonable belief
that the individual arrested had committed or was committing a
57
criminal offense.
(1) Arrests Under Warrants
The fourth amendment sets forth three essential requisites for a
valid arrest warrant: "No warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
5l 8 The "probable cause" required
... the persons.., to be seized."'
for the issuance of a valid arrest warrant is the same as that required
for the issuance of a valid search warrant. 159 In other words, uncredited
hearsay and mere suspicion are not sufficient to provide "probable
cause," but the basis of a belief of guilt need not be grounded in
competent and admissible evidence in order for there to be probable
cause. For example, credited hearsay is sufficient to provide "probable
cause."'160 As to the requirement of a particular description of the
wanted individual, the name of the individual is sufficient. If the name
is not known, an alias by which the party is known is sufficient if
available. If not, a description sufficiently definite to identify the
wanted person with reasonable certainty is sufficient. This description
is not limited to physical characteristics but may be made up of any
peculiarities or descriptive factors which identify the individual, such
as habits, place of residence, or occupation. 161 While satisfying the constitutional standard of a particular description, an arrest warrant can
be and often is used to circumvent the particular description limitation
on search warrants. The search warrant must be based on "probable
cause" and must describe particularly the premises to be searched and
the items to be seized. 162 The arrest warrant, on the other hand, is concerned only with the sufficiency of evidence of guilt and a description
of the person to be arrested. Once the described person is arrested, the
necessary search often is made incidental to the arrest, thus allowing
the officer to enjoy the same benefits as would be realized from the use
157 See MORELAND, MODERN CRmtINAL PROCEDURE

1-27 (1959).

158 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (Court used search and

arrest cases interchangeably). See notes 24-44 supra and accompanying text for discussion
of "probable cause" in its search and seizure context.
160 See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 807 (1959) (arrest without a warrant).
161 See generally MAOr.N'D, MODERN CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE 18-271, (1959).
162 See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
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of a search warrant without satisfying the more exacting requirements
for the proper issuance of that type of warrant. 10 8
(2) Arrests Without Warrants
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a police officer
for a felony committed in the officer's presence; or, when the officer
has reasonable grouhd to believe that the arrested party committed a
felony, if such felony in fact took place; or, when the officer has reasonable ground to believe a felony has been or is being committed and
that the arrested party is the felon. 1 4 Under the traditional commonlaw rule arrests without warrants for misdemeanors were proper only
when a breach of peace occurred in the arresting officer's view and
presence.10 5 The trend is now away from this strict "in-presence" requirement and toward allowing arresting officers more leeway in the
making of warrantless arrests for misdemeanors.100
(3) Was There an Arrest?
One of the most critical problems in determining when an arrest is
illegal is that of determining whether there was actually an arrest. One
federal district court, in upholding the constitutionality of a thirty
minute interrogation conducted at a police station, which was not ob163 See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The judge's Role in Making and
Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 993 (1965).
164 See MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-15 (1959). Section 3.01 of the MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE provides: "A law enforcement officer may arrest a
person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person
has committed (a) a felony ......
AL, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 3.01 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
165 State v. Merrifield, 180 Kan. 267, 303 P.2d 155 (1956); see 10 HALsBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND, Criminal Law and Procedure § 637 (3d ed. 1954); ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROcEDURE 231 (1931).
106 See § 3.01(1) of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, which declared: "A
law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed . . . (b) a misdemeanor, and the
officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person (i) will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested; or (ii) may cause injury to himself or others or damage to
property unless immediately arrested; or (c) a misdemeanor in the officer's presence." The
drafters' note to § 3.01 provides: "Subsection (1) maintains the traditional in-presence
requirement for non-felony arrests without a warrant, except in circumstances of neces-

sity. Drawing on similar provisions in a number of recent codes, it allows an arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence only if the person
to be arrested could not otherwise be apprehended or if he might injure persons or
damage property if not immediately apprehended." ALI, MODE . CODE OF PmR-ARRAIGN.
MENT PROCEDURE § 3.01(1) and note (Tent. Draft No. 1 1966). See generally Bohlen and
Shuiman, Arrest With and Without a Warrant, 75 U. PA. L. Rlv. 485 (1927).
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jected to when conducted, declared that "a technical arrest demands
an intent on the part of the arresting officer to bring in a person so
that he might be put through the steps preliminary to answering for
a crime such as fingerprinting, booking, arraigning, etc."107 The real
167

United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). In his opinion Judge

Irving Kaufman states that "it is axiomatic that before a finding can be made that there
has been an illegal arrest, a showing must be made that there has been an arrest." Ibid.
He then adds that "state law will govern on what constitutes a technical arrest, in the
absence of specific federal statute." Id. at 77, n.10. In support of this proposition Kaufman cites United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), where Mr. justice Jackson, speaking for a majority of the Court, declared: "[The Government] now urges that 'the validity of an arrest without a warrant for a federal crime is a matter of federal law to be
determined by a uniform rule applicable to all federal courts.' We believe, however, that

in absence of an applicable federal statute the law of the state where an arrest without
warrant takes place determines its validity." Id. at 589.
If this formula for determining the existence of an arrest so as to determine its legality
is accepted, the door will be open to state circumvention of a constitutional guarantee.
Under this approach there is no question of the constitutionality of detentions under the
Uniform Arrest Act which provides:
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who has reasonable ground to suspect
is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of
him his name, address, business abroad and whether he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his action to
the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed two
hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any
official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released
or be arrested and charged with a crime.
UmFoaR ARRtsr Acr § 2. For a general discussion of the act, which has been adopted
in Delaware, New Hampshire, RLhode Island, and Massachusetts, see Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942).
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure does not
provide as much of a carte blanche to law enforcement officers as the Uniform Arrest Act.
The ALI's Model Code declares:
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, if a person is observed
in circumstances which suggest that he has committed or is about to commit a felony
or misdemeanor, and such action is reasonably necessary to enable the officer to determine the lawfulness of that person's conduct, order that person to remain in or
near such place in the officer's presence for a period of not more than twenty
minutes.
ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-AmEGNmtENT PRocEouRE § 2.02(29) (rent. Draft No. 1, 196).
Even in light of the Court's declaration in Di Re it seems highly unlikely that this
approach will be accepted if and when the Court decides to attach significance to the
guarantee. Particularly grave doubt as to the complete present validity of the Di Re.
Bonanno reasoning is raised by Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), where the Court
declares: "This Court, in cases under the Fourth Amendment, has long recognized that
the lawfulness of arrests for federal offenses is to be determined by reference to state
law insofar as it is not violative of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 37. (Emphasis added.)
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basis for the decision seems to be that the officer who did the detaining
not only lacked any intent to incarcerate the detained persons, but
actually intended not to detain the individuals for more than a short
period of questioning. Viewed from this negative intent approach the
decision is not altogether inconsistent with United States v. Mitchell,10 8
another federal district court decision. In Mitchell an officer stopped
the defendant, asked him some questions and then directed that he
accompany the officer to a police call box, where the officer checked
with headquarters to see if any crimes had been committed in the
neighborhood. It was held that the defendant was arrested when directed to accompany the officer to the call box. The court in Mitchell
appears to be of the view that an arrest occurs any time a person is
taken into custody or restrained of his liberty of ordinary mobility, or
where the detention of a person already in custody is continued even
for a short period of time.10 The essence of this view of arrest is that
the individual's freedom of locomotion has been restricted, if so, there
is an arrest.
From the cases involving arrest it is impossible to fully and accurately define arrest. While dependent upon the particular facts of each
case the general rule is that the restraint of an individual's freedom of
locomotion is an arrest. However, in an effort to avoid the potentially
devastating effect on police effectiveness which would follow from requiring strict constitutional compliance of the police, 70 the courts
have created a constitutional ambiguity in the word "arrest." This
ambiguity allows certain types of restraints, such as short periods of
questioning on the street to be treated as something other than an
arrest. Yet the police may be deterred to a degree by the vagueness of
the term since there is an uncertain point beyond which they cannot
go without the detention amounting to an arrest.
If the Di Re-Bonanno approach is accepted there would appear to be no reason why

states should not define "searches and seizures" so as to exclude from the ambit of the
fourth amendment at least some of the objectionable state practices.
168 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959).
109 This same basic definition of arrest was adopted for research purposes in Note, 100
U. PA. L. Rav. 1182 (1952).
170 See generally Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges In A Free Society: A Plea For Mod.
ernization, 51 J. Ciuar. L., C. & P.S. 395 (1960). The Chicago Superintendent of Police,

0. W. Wilson, points out that strict arrest restrictions are felt more keenly by local police, upon whom society relies most heavily in protection from the criminal, than by
specialized police agencies "whose principal responsibility is the gathering of evidence to
identify and convict persons after they have committed a crime, rather than to prevent

the act in the first instance." Id. at 397-99.
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(4) Consequence of Illegality
The consequences of an arrest's being illegal are not sufficient, however, to provide adequate protection to the guarantee.12 ' The most
important present consequence of an illegal arrest is that any search
made incidental to the arrest is also illegal, and therefore any evidence
obtained in the search, or as a result of the search, is inadmissible
under the exclusionary rule as evidence against the person against
whom the search was directed. 7 2 At present, even though an illegal
arrest in itself violates the Constitution,'7" it is not a valid defense to
a state or federal prosecution that the defendant was illegally arrested
or that he was forcibly or fraudulently brought within the court's jurisdiction.17 4 To this extent, the guarantee against illegal arrest is an
empty constitutional right, in the same sense that the fourteenth
amendment protection against illegal searches was an empty right
under Wolf v. Colorado. In view of the Court's basic rationale in Mapp
v. Ohio that the remedy of exclusion is necessary to give meaning to
the right, and that it is therefore a part of the right, and in view of
171 A lawful arrest is a privileged invasion of certain interests in personalty of the
person arrested. An unlawful arrest, of course, is not privileged and subjects the person
making it or attempting to make it to whatever action the law of torts provides for such
invasions of interests in personalty as are made thereby. An "unlawful arrest" is not a
separate or independent tort. The fact that the arrest is unlawful rather than lawful
merely means that the invasions of the plaintiffs interests are not within the privilege
which the law accords when a lawful arrest is made. In many cases, it involves the commission of several torts. A wrongful arrest usually invades the interest in freedom from
confinement and therefore constitutes a false imprisonment. It may also constitute an
assault or battery, or again, it may-and frequently does-amount to all three. In Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). the Court, in holding the exclusionary rule of the fourth
amendment prohibition against illegal searches not to be applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, declared the right of privacy to be adequately protected
against police abuse by available sanctions and public opinion. Id. at 31.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961), the Court retreated completely from its position
in Wolf on the sufficiency of safeguards of the right of privacy and declared that the
"other remedies have been worthless and futile." Id. at 652. Certainly this argument is
equally applicable on the question of the adequacy of civil sanctions to give effect and
meaning to the constitutional guarantee against illegal arrests. See generally LFMv,
AnansT 411-35 (1965), which adds to those sanctions mentioned above in Wolf v. Colorado
possible criminal prosecution of the arresting officer and possible departmental discipline.
See also Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories,"
53 J. Can . L., C. & P.S. 171, 182 n.83 (1962); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis.
conduct by the Police, 52 J. Cne. L., C. & P.S. 255, 261 (1961).
172 See notes 3-11 supra and accompanying text.
173 Henry v. United States, 361 US. 98 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480 (1958).
174 See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US. 519 (1952).
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the general tendency toward deterring illegal police activity, the law
applicable to illegal arrest appears ready for change.
It has been suggested that any constitutional prohibition of illegal
arrests, effectuated through a constitutional requirement of releasing
illegally arrested persons, could be circumvented by the legal re-arresting of the originally illegally arrested individual. 17 This potential
means of circumvention could be avoided under the general rationale
of the Court's deterrence theory, through the formulation of a constitutional rule, based upon necessity in giving the meaning to the
constitutional right against illegal arrest, which would make the illegal
arrest for a specific crime an absolute defense to any subsequent prosecution for that crime. This remedy plus a vague definition of arrest
could, if applied on a case-by-case basis, looking to the facts of each
case and all interests involved, contribute in encouraging fair conduct
on the part of police and protection of individual liberty, and at the
same time leave the courts with the flexibility needed to protect the
interests of society.
A recent Supreme Court decision may mark the beginning of a
trend toward this development. In Wong Sun v. United States,170 a
federal criminal prosecution, it was held, for the first time, that verbal
evidence-a confession-obtained following an illegal arrest is inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The Court reasoned
that the oral statement was so closely related to the illegal arrest that
the two could not be separated-an extension of the fruit of the poisonous tree reasoning. 7 7 The fact that the Wong Sun decision might
rest on the Court's supervisory power over federal criminal procedure,
rather than constitutional grounds, does not really detract from its
potential influence on fourteenth amendment decisions. The exclu175 Note, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1215 (1952). The position of the Pennsylvania Law

Review Note is that the allowing of re-arrest after an illegal arrest does not prevent the
guarantee from having substance because the police officer will have been taught to
respect the law. In many instances this officer will have been taught to respect the law
in virtually the same way as an officer who used a previously obtained coerced confession
to obtain a subsequent "voluntary" confession. In both instances the officer is receiving a
direct benefit from his illegal conduct; therefore, he is not really being deterred from
such conduct in the future.
170 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
177 Id. at 485-87. "[V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful
entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers' actions in the present case Is no less the
'fruit' of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted
intrusion." Id. at 485.
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sionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio began in Weeks v. United States'7 as a
product of the Court's supervisory power.
V. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Development of Right to Counsel and Its Constitutional Basis
The rule of Betts v. Brady7 9 that fourteenth amendment due process
does not require the appointment of counsel to represent indigent
8 0 redefendants in felony cases, though riddled with exceptions,2
mained in effect until 1963. Thus, it can be said that for the better
part of our nation's history the right to counsel predicated on the Constitution has been viewed as guaranteeing only a defendant's right to
have his counsel present during trial, if the defendant could, in fact,
obtain the representation of counsel. 8 1 Then in Gideon v. Wainwright,8 2 Betts was expressly overruled and the sixth amendment guarantee of right to counsel was held applicable, at least in felony cases,
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 3s Gideon did no more than declare the basic guarantee of right
to counsel for indigents; left unexplained were such important elements of the guarantee as its scope, when it attaches, when it terminates
and the question of retroactive application.
Gideon seems to have been based primarily on the general aim of
preventing conviction of the innocent,8 4 an aim of longstanding importance in the Court's handling of constitutional criminal procedure
cases.' 8 5 However, recent decisions, such as Gideon, manifest a poten178 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
179 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
180 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45 (1932). The Court held, under the special
drcumstances of that case, that due process required a state court to appoint counsel for
a person accused of a capital offense. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) and Wade
v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948), held that failure to appoint counsel where the defendant
is incapable of adequate self-representation violates fourteenth amendment due process.
Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962), held that "a trial on a charge of being
habitual criminal is such a serious one ... the issues presented under Virginia's statute
so complex, and the potential prejudice resulting from the absence of counsel so great
.." that the petitioner's conviction without counsel violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 447.
181 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954).
182 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
183 Id. at 342.
184 Id. at 344-45.
4179 (US. Feb. 14, 1967) (misrepresentations
185 See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 35 U.S.L. WaFXr
foisted upon jury by prosecution violates due process); Birody v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) (evidence favorable to defendant suppressed after request for disclosure by defen-
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tially important philosophical change in the Court's implementation
of this aim. Mr. Justice Black speaking for the majority in Gideon
wrote, "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured of a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."'8s0 Even though the announced basis for the Gideon decision was fourteenth amendment due
process, Mr. Justice Black's language strongly suggests the influence
of "equal protection" reasoning. In fact there is little doubt but that
equal protection has played and continues to play an influential role
in the development of the right to counsel guarantee.1 87 The foundation for this equal protection influence was laid in Griffin v. Illinois.188
In Griffin, which was not decided by a clear majority of the Court,
the Court held that under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, a state which requires a defendant to provide a
trial transcript in order to appeal, must furnish transcripts for those
indigents who wish to appeal. In support of this decision, the Court
reasoned that "there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants
who have enough money to buy transcripts."'1 9 Although equal protection was not advanced as the constitutional basis for the decision
in Gideon, the influence of the idea of a constitutionally required
equality of defense opportunity is vividly reflected by the majority
opinion in which the Court declared:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals
in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 10
After Gideon, in Douglas v. California,' a constitutionally based
requirement of equalization of rich and poor in the criminal process
dant); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 "(1942) (perjured testimony knowingly used by the
prosecution); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (denial of counsel to illiterate and
ignorant defendants)
186 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).

187 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
188 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
189 Id. at 19.
190 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
191 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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was advanced and relied upon as the basis for reversing a state court
decision. There the Court held unconstitutional a state rule of criminal procedure which allowed state appellate courts, upon application
for appeal by an indigent, to make an independent investigation of
the trial record to determine whether it would be advantageous to
the defendant or helpful to the appellate court for counsel to be appointed and appeal allowed. The granting of the appeal was completely within the discretion of the reviewing court. The Court
declared this to be nothing but a disguised determination of the
merits of the appeal itself-with the determination being made without the defendant being represented by counsel. In fact, the majority
went so far as to state the issue of the case to be "whether or not an
indigent shall be denied the assistance of counsel on appeal,"10 2 and
then, relying upon Griffin v. Illinois,19 3 the Court reversed the state
court decision and declared that "there can be no equal justice where
the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money
he has.' "94
B. When in CriminalProcess Right to Counsel Attaches
Another phase of right to counsel, which is presently in a state of
flux, is the question of when, timewise, the right attaches. The Court's
05
first important statement on this issue was in Powell v. Alabama.1
There the Court declared that due process "requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings . . . ."10 However, in 1942
07
the spirit of the decision in Powell was thwarted in Betts v. Brady.1
There the Court held that an indigent defendant had no right to appointed counsel in a non-capital felony case. This anti-Powell attitude
continued as late as 1958 as reflected by the decision in Crooker v.
99 In Crooker the Court upheld a conviction for murder
California.1
which subjected the defendant to the death penalty even though the
defendant's confession, which was the primary basis for conviction,
was obtained after the defendant's repeated requests for counsel were
denied. In sustaining the conviction the majority refused to accept
the argument of the dissenters that the constitutional guarantee of
right to counsel is applicable during the interrogation of a defendant.
192 Id. at 355.
193 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
194 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
195 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
196 Id. at 71.
197 316 US. 455 (1942).
198 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
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The dissenters urged that the right should be viewed as operative
during interrogation because that period is "the most critical period
of [the defendant's] . . . ordeal."' 199 The majority rejected this argument, relying on lack of prejudice to the defendant. The Court emphasized that the defendant was a college graduate and had completed
one year of law school and, therefore, rationalized the defendant must
have known of his right to remain silent even without advice from!
counsel. Doubt as to the significance of the prejudice consideration in
the denial of counsel cases was raised in Cicenia v. Lagay,200 a denial
of counsel case decided on the same day as Crooker. There, in a noncapital case, the Court reached the same result as in Crooker, even
though the defendant was not well educated. In Cicenia the Court did
not emphasize lack of prejudice but instead relied on a finding of a
lack of fundamental unfairness sufficient to violate fourteenth amendment due process. In other words the Cicenia majority seemed to find
no constitutional guarantee of legal representation during the interrogation process, regardless of the prejudicial effect on the defendant.
Perhaps the three decisions, Powell, Crooker and Cicenia, and their
apparently different approaches can be reconciled. Right to counsel
attaches in capital cases prior to the trial if prejudice would otherwise
result. If no prejudice would result from the denial of counsel the
right does not attach prior to the trial, even in capital cases. In neither
instance does the right attach prior to the trial in non-capital cases.
Then in Hamilton v. Alabama2 01 the Court altered this inflexible posture and began reviving the far-reaching constitutional requirement
of "the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings"
which had been advanced by dictum in Powell v. Alabama.212 In Hamilton, a capital case, the Court declared that due process required that
the defendant be provided counsel at arraignment, because arraignment in Alabama constituted a "critical stage in a criminal proceeding." 203 At that stage the entering of a plea of guilty or not guilty was
required and state law required that a plea of insanity be entered at
this point or be lost. Also in Hamilton, the Court rejected the Crooker
corollary, which added to the Powell requirement of counsel in capital
cases the requirement of prejudice from the denial of counsel, as a
'99 Id. at 444 (dissenting opinion).

200 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
201 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
202 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (dictum).
203 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
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requisite to the reversibility of a conviction.2 0- 4 Hamilton was followed
by White v. Maryland,20 5 another capital case, in which the Court,
applying the reasoning of Hamilton v. Alabama, declared "whatever
may be the normal function of the 'preliminary hearing' under Maryland law, it was in this case as 'critical' a stage as arraignment under
Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and
that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel."200 After Hamilton and White the rule seemed to be that in capital cases indigent defendants must be provided counsel at arraignment or preliminary
hearing if a plea of guilty or not guilty is entered at such proceeding.
Any distinction based solely on whether a case is capital or non-capital,
so far as right to counsel is concerned, is eliminated by Gideon -v.
Wainwright.2 17 In Gideon the sixth amendment guarantee of right to
counsel was held to guarantee appointment of counsel to represent an
indigent defendant in a non-capital state felony prosecution. After
Gideon, White and Hamilton, it would seem that in felony cases right
to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed from the time of the formal
charging of a defendant through trial. Development of the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel did not end with Gideon. A subsequent federal case, Massiah v. United States20 8 expanded the coverage
of the guarantee within the then protected time period-from the
time of formal charging through trial. Massia, seemingly holds that
not only is an accused entitled to legal representation from the time
he is charged, but he is also entitled to have his counsel present anytime he is questioned by police during the constitutionally protected
peiiod.20 9 The Court, in support of this position, declared that the
204 Id. at 55. "When one pleads guilty to a capital charge without benefit of counsel,
we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted. . . . [T]he degree of prejudice
can never be known." Ibid.
203873 U.S. 59 (1963).
206 Id. at 60.
207 872 U.S. 335 (1963).
208 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah agents of the federal government deliberately elicited from defendant after his indictment and in the absence of defendant's counsel incriminating statements which were introduced as evidence at trial of defendant. Id. at
203; accord, Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 815, 324 (Douglas, J., concurring), 326 (Sterwart,

J., concurring) (1959).
209 In Massiah the Court, in expressly applying the sixth amendment rather than the
Court's supervisory power over federal criminal procedures, declared "We hold that the
petitioner was denied the basic protections of . . . [the] guarantee [of right to counsel]
when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words,
which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and
in the absence of his counsel." 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); accord, Black v. United States,
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unconstitutionality of post-arraignment and post-indictment police
interrogation in the absence of defense counsel "no more than reflects
a constitutional principle established as long ago as Powell v. Alabama .... -1210 With the present tendency of the court to apply the
same constitutional standards to state and federal governments, 211
there was little doubt but that the constitutional principle advanced
in Massiah would become applicable to the states.
In Escobedo V. Illinois212 the time period during which right to
counsel is guaranteed was extended. There the defendant was arrested
without a warrant and interrogated. His attorney obtained his release
by way of a writ of habeas corpus. Defendant was then re-arrested.
After refusal of his request to consult with his attorney he confessed.
This confession was admitted into evidence during the trial over the
defendant's objection and served as the basis for his conviction. The
Court in reversing the conviction held that the conduct of the police,
though not amounting to coercion within the meaning of that term
as used in the traditional protection against coerced confessions, denied the defendant his constitutionally guaranteed right of counsel.
The Court held that this right attaches at that point in the criminal
process where "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect .. - "218 The obvious implications of Escobedo and Massiah
manifested themselves as realities in Miranda v. Arizona21 4 where the
development of right to counsel was merged with the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. In formulating this merger the
Court clarified the language of Escobedo quoted above, explaining
that an investigation "focuses'on an individual "after . . . [he] has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." 215 The Court in Miranda emphasized that the
385 U.S. 26 (1966). In Black the Court held that a recording of petitioner's conversations

with his attorney by the F.B.I., unknown to the prosecuting attorneys and not relled
upon by them, entitled petitioner to a new trial.
210 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964).

211 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination held applicable to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 835 (1968)

(sixth amendment guarantee of right to counsel held applicable to the states); Mapp V.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment guarantee against illegal searches and
seizures held apllicable to the states).

212 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
213 Id. at 490.
214 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

215 Id. at 444. Query whether this equivalent is necessarily valid. It would seem that
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right to counsel attaches at this point of deprivation of freedom; and
that this right obligates the investigating officers to advise the suspect
of his right to counsel, and if the suspect is an indigent, to advise that
suspect that he may have the services of an appointed attorney.2 10 However, if no interrogation is conducted, the police, without violating the
suspect's right to counsel, may detain the suspect for a reasonable
period of time while field investigation is being conducted, even
though counsel has not yet been appointed to represent the suspect.21 7
The Court went on to declare that it would be possible for these rights
to be knowingly and intelligently waived, but that such waiver would
not be presumed by silence after the requisite warnings had been
given; the Court then added that a heavy burden was on the prosecution to show this waiver. 218 This explanation of the Court's attitude toward the waiver of right to counsel indicates that our legal system has
arrived at a point in the administration of criminal justice where a
defendant should rarely contribute to his own conviction.
C. Prosecutions to Which Right to Counsel Extends
While Gideon v. Wainwright219 declared that the sixth amendment
right of counsel applied to defendants in state prosecutions through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, that decision left
unanswered whether the right extends to all state prosecutions and,
if not, to which prosecutions it does extend. Some commentators have
suggested that the Gideon rule be applied to all criminal prosecutions,
including both felonies and misdemeanors.2 20 Others have suggested
that Gideon should be limited in application. One proposal to limit the
right is suggested by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,221 which declares
that "in every [federal] criminal case in which the defendant is charged
with a felony or a misdemeanor, other than a petty offense" the defendant is to be advised that "counsel will be appointed to represent
him if he is financially unable to obtain counsel." The most commonly
an investigation could reasonably be said "to focus on a particular suspect" before such
suspect has been deprived "of his freedom of action in any significant may."
216 Id. at 472-73.
217 Id. at 474. [In United States v. vade, 87 S. Ct 1926 (1967). decided since the preparation of this manuscript, the Court held that post-indictment lienup was a critical
stage in the criminal process at which the defendant was entitled to the aid of counsel
in the absence of intelligent waiver.]
218 Id. at 475-79.
219 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see text at notes 191-94 supra.
220 See, e.g., Fortas, The Consequence of Gideon, 22 LEGAL Am BRMFaCASE 7 (1964).
221 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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suggested scope of the constitutional right is that the right should extend to all felony prosecutions, but not to misdemeanor prosecutions.222 Determining the applicability of the right on the basis of
this distinction is simply not realistic. First, this approach ignores the
fact that some misdemeanors are actually more serious than some felonies, both as to potential punishment and the effect of conviction on
the reputation of a defendant in the eyes of the public. 22 Secondly,
basing the availability of the right on such an artificial distinction
leaves the door open to possible weakening of the right by the states
through the arbitrary designation of some serious offenses as misdemeanors rather than felonies. 224 Finally, recognition of this distinction would tend to perpetuate lack of uniformity between the states
in the administration of criminal justice since each state would have
the task of making the division between the two types of offenses, and
thereby produce a result which is contrary to one of the primary aims
of the present Court-that of encouraging national uniformity in the
administration of justice. While this felony-misdemeanor distinction
has not yet been considered by the Supreme Court, it has been rejected
by the Fifth Circuit. In Harvey v. Mississippi2 6 and McDonald v.
Moore226 the Fifth Circuit held that the fourteenth amendment guarantee of right to counsel extends to a prosecution for illegal possession
of liquor, a misdemeanor carrying with it a maximum punishment of
up to 90 days in jail. In light of the dangers inherent in the felonymisdemeanor approach it seems certain that this distinction will not
222 See, e.g., Bennett, Right to Counsel-A Due Process Requirement, 23 LA. L. REY.
662 (1963), where the writer declared: "It is sincerely hoped that future . . . decisions
will not extend the indigent defendants' 'due process' right to court-appointed counsel

beyond the actual holding of Gideon v. Wainwright, i.e., where the defendant is charged
with a felony." Id. at 668.
223 See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 64-65 (1963), where provisions of

Maryland law are given as an example. Maryland state law declares larceny of dogs or
cats, which is punishable by up to 3 months in jail, or felony, while certain motor vehicle law offenses which are classified as misdemeanors are punishable by a fine of up
to $5,000 and imprisonment of up to 5 years.
224 Kamisar and Choper point out that "utilization of the basic felony-misdemeanor
dichotomy need not preclude a critical recognition of certain 'misclassified' offenses." Id.
at 65. In other words, the felony-misdemeanor approach could be adopted, along with

a practice of realistic examination of the nature of offenses declared by state law to be
misdemeanors, so as to prevent misclassification of offenses aimed at circumventing the
constitutionally guaranteed right of counsel. Even this addition to the felony-misdemeanor

approach is subject to criticism as being potentially more uncertain than necessary.
225
226

340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1955).
353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
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be adopted by the Court for determining the scope of right to counsel
coverage.
A second possible approach is to extend right to counsel only to
felony prosecutions and those misdemeanor prosecutions where it
appears that the defendant has a potentially meritorious defense. -2
The weaknesses of this approach are delineated by the Court in Douglas v. California.228 In Douglas the Court takes the position that in
some instances a defense does not appear to have substance unless advanced and developed by a competent attorney; and, consequently, to
make appointment of counsel for representation of indigents dependent upon such a determination of substance would result in a discrimination between rich and poor which would violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 2 9
A third possible approach is to make appointment of counsel in
misdemeanor prosecutions dependent upon the presence of a request
for such representation by the defendant. This approach would have
as its conceptual basis the idea of an implied waiver in those cases
where no request is made. This requirement of a formal request in
order to prevent an implied waiver is inconsistent with the Court's
present attitude toward waiver of constitutional rights, which requires
that there be a voluntary and understanding release of a constitutional
right in order for such a right to be effectively waived.-3° Implying a
waiver in the absence of a specific request for counsel, in order to
satisfy the requirement of understanding, would necessitate an unreasonable presupposition of knowledge by a defendant of his own legal
rights. On the other hand, if all misdemeanor defendants are required
to be advised of their right to counsel in order for their waiver to be
effective, then as a practical matter such a small number of waivers
would occur that, in effect, Gideon would have been extended to all
misdemeanor prosecutions. While this may be the most desirable result, it is subject to serious objections. This approach would either
result in excessive expenditures by the state for the purpose of retaining appointed attorneys for indigents or in unreasonable demands
made upon attorneys for legal services without just compensation.
Consequently, the argument voiced against this approach is that any
benefit derived by the indigent is outweighed by the cost to society.
227 See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 223, at 77.
228 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
229 Id. at 356-57.

230 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436-79 (1966).
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The basis for this contention is that even though the suspect is subjected to potential prejudice this prejudice is not severe enough to
justify the cost to society of appointed counsel. 2 1 Another argument
against a blanket requirement of appointed counsel for indigents in
misdemeanor cases is the time-consuming effect that lawyer participation in such proceedings would have on our already crowded inferior
court dockets.
A fourth possible solution to the problem is adoption of an approach
similar to the petty offense-serious offense approach contained in the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964. 232 The weakness of the petty offenseserious offense approach is the likely arbitrariness and uncertainness
concomitant with judicial determinations as to whether an offense is
"serious" or "petty." This weakness is not insurmountable. Indeed,
the "petty offense-serious offense" approach may offer the most satisfactory solution to the problem, if the approach is coupled with some
definite guideline for determining when a misdemeanor is "petty" and
when one is "serious." Assuming the general desirability of the approach, there seem to be four feasible guidelines for this determination. First, a definition characterizing "serious offense" as any offense
which subjects the accused to the possibility of incarceration or as any
offense which would expose the accused to social stigma, would appear
to be the most satisfactory guideline from the standpoint of certainty
or lack of arbitrariness. If this definition of "serious offense" is viewed
as too extensive, a second approach is available. The term could be
more exactly defined as any offense which subjected a misdemeanant
to a punishment of a specified degree of severity-for example, incarceration of thirty days or more. This approach is superior to the first
in certainty, but is subject to possible criticism on the point of arbitrariness. Since this guideline relies upon artificial and inflexible considerations to achieve certainty, it necessarily ignores any social stigma
associated with the conviction of certain offenses. 88 A third guideline
has been offered as a possibility. This guideline would look to the
likelihood of punishment of a certain degree of severity rather than
the mere possibility of such punishment. 2 4 This approach, while en231 See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 223, at 78-83.
2 2 18 U.S.CA. 3006A (Supp. 1966).

233 For example, embezzlement often carries with it a possible punishment more severe
than driving under the influence of alcohol or some minor sex offenses, while the social
stigma accompanying conviction for these latter offenses is considered by some equal to
if not greater than the first mentioned offense.
234 For example, a first offender will in many, even serious, misdemeanor cases not
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joying the practical advantage of requiring appointment of counsel
only where actually needed to avoid incarceration or other serious
punishment, is subject to criticism for arbitrariness and for uncertainty in application. Moreover, this approach ignores the social stigma
effect of conviction for certain minor offenses which do not involve
any likelihood of actual incarceration or other serious punishment.2
A fourth approach would be to define "serious offense" as one which
entails the likelihood of punishment of a certain degree of severity
or any real possibility of social stigma. While the addition of the social
stigma criteria eliminates one weakness of the preceding approach it
fails .to remedy the certainty of application weaknesses of that approach, a weakness which is more acute than its counterpart in the first
suggested guideline where the area for discretionary decision of the
possibility of social stigma is not as broad because of the inclusion of
all offenses involving the possibility of incarceration within the guideline.
D. Suggestions for Future Development of Right to Counsel
At its present stage of development the sixth amendment guarantee
of right to counsel, which is applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, requires that an individual be provided counsel: (1) immediately after detainment and
before interrogation, if the individual is to be interrogated by police,
(2) during arraignment or preliminary hearing, if such proceeding is
a "critical stage" in the criminal process, e.g., where the defendant is
required to enter a plea at such proceeding, (3) during trial and (4)
to some degree on appeal. Added to this development is the potential
consequence of Douglas v. California236 and its "equal protection"
rationale. If this approach is pursued its ramifications could be farreaching. Mr. Justice Harlan, who frequently has not favored expansion of due process in this area,23 dissented against application of the
likely be imprisoned, while a second- or third-time offender accused of the same offense
will be in much greater danger of incarceration. Also, under this approach the court in
deciding whether to appoint counsel could view the seriousness of the circumstances
making up the offense. Moreover, the same court might view the likelihood of a jail
sentence upon conviction as differing between two battery cases, where in the first, the
defendant simply pushed the victim and in the second, the defendant beat up the victim
with his fists. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 228, at 74-76.
235 E.g., driving while intoxicated and some of the minor sex offenses, such as indecent
exposure.
236 372 U.S. 853 (1963).
237 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Pointer
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equal protection clause in Douglas. He urged that its application is
unnecessary in light of the results which have been obtained in the
general area through development of the due process clause. He also
anticipated serious problems arising from "equal protection" reasoning and the inherent meaning of the term, such as to what extent equal
protection would be applied. 28 Does the right apply only to legal
services or does it extend also to investigatory services, which are admitted by many successful defense attorneys to be the key to many
successful defenses? Does it guarantee a minimum quality of legal
representation-if so, does it guarantee one equal to that provided
by the best attorney or only the average attorney? Does it guarantee
equality with the wealthy, the average, or simply the minimum endowed non-indigent defendant? Does it guarantee representation in
legal or quasi-legal post conviction proceedings, such as probation and
pardon hearings? If pursued to its logical end, why does the clause not
guarantee the non-indigent of average or less means legal representation equal to that which can be afforded only by the more wealthy?
Clearly this type of equal protection of the criminally accused is impossible under our existing system. In fact, an effort to equalize individual protection in the administration of justice through this approach could destroy some of the very protections which are being
sought. If pursuit of this idea of equality of defense opportunity is
continued to its ultimate end it can only lead to the creation of a constitutionally required state agency which would represent all individuals accused of criminal offenses regardless of the desires of such
individuals. This agency would be notified by the police before they
detain a suspect for interrogation. The agency would provide the suspect with legal representation. The legal representative would be required to be present during any custodial interrogation and at all
formal stages in the criminal process. The potential dangers of such
a system to our traditional notions of liberty and justice are apparent
since under such a system the government would be both prosecutor
and defender. The defense of the criminally accused would become a
bureaucratic task and our accusatorial system of criminal justice would
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (concurring opinion); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
492 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117, 118 (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
238 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360-63 (1963) (dissenting opinion); accord,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29, 34-36 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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probably, in practical effect, tend to give way to an inquisitorial form,
long considered alien to our concept of liberty and justice. While this
type system could be a more effective truth seeking device, its potential
for governmental abuse is obvious. Inherent in it is the possibility in
some cases of unenthusiastic representation of defendants which would
be keeping with general bureaucratic traditions and even the possibility of the criminal process becoming an arm of political suppression
through collusion between prosecution and defense.
These potential dangers of application of equal protection can be
avoided. At the same time the abuses its application is aimed at preventing can be prevented. In fact, application of equal protection in
this area could easily produce a constitutional over-kill, analogous to
the result which would follow from the widespread use of atomic
weapons in a limited guerilla war in which one aim is the physical
preservation of the area upon which the war is being fought. The "big
break throughs" in the development of right to counsel, up to now,
have been made through development of the due process clause.3 9
The concept of due process is sufficiently vague and undefined so as
to allow it to be given new meaning, when necessary to correct new
abuses. With this sufficiently powerful weapon there is simply no need
for application of equal protection in this area, particularly in light
of the potentially devastating consequences of its application-that of
a total undermining of our traditional accusatorial system. If this end
is to be avoided it is imperative that the bar move toward implementation of steps to protect the economically less-fortunate, who become
involved in the criminal process. Otherwise the bar may well find itself
to have lost its independence in one major phase of its present function-that of independent representation of defendants in criminal
prosecutions. And the American individual might find that he has
lost one of his most vital guarantees against governmental abuse and
suppression. For certainly, protection of the individual from state
abuse should not be completely in the hands of governmental agencies.
While the judiciary, which has been a champion of individual liberty
particularly through the efforts of the Supreme Court, must remain an
arm of the government, the defending process need not and should
not lose its independence from state control. 40
239 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US. 478
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963). But see Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963).

240 Several important questions related to the constitutional guarantee of right to
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counsel have not been dealt with in this development. The first of these questions Is:
When is a defendant an indigent so as to be entitled to state appointed counsel? The
real crux of this question is the additional question of whether a defendant must exhaust all his material resources before he can be called an indigent. For example, If a
defendant has funds sufficient to meet bail or retain legal counsel but not both, If he
meets bail, is he an indigent so as to be entitled to appointed counsel or would it be
necessary for a defendant, who owned only a car and some furniture, to liquidate those
goods and exhaust the proceeds in furtherance of his defense, before the defendant could
be called an indigent? Perhaps the best answer to these questions is suggested by the
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S CommiarrEE, REPORT ON POVERTY AND TilE ADMINISTRATION OV POVERTY (1963), where it stated: "Legislation should define persons eligible for appointment
of counsel at government expense as persons 'financially unable to obtain adequate representation.' The terms 'indigent' or 'indigency' should be avoided. . . . iT]hey suggest,
not financial inability to obtain some essential defense service, but a total absence of
financial resources." Id. at 40-41. See Kamisar 8- Choper, supra note 223, at 22-28.
On the question of standards for determining indigency, see generally ibid.; Prettyman,
Three Modem Problems in Criminal Law, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187 (1961); Trebach,
A Modern Defender System for New Jersey, 12 RUTGERs L. REV. 289 (1957); Note, The
Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 579 (1963); Note, Legal Aid to Criminal Indigent Defendants in Philadelphia
and New Jersey, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 812 (1959).
A second question of importance, which is not developed in this treatment of tile
sub.
ject, is concerned with the point at which the constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel terminates. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), indicates that right to counsel
does not end with trial. Assuming that the right extends beyond trial, several subques.
tions still remain unanswered. Does the right extend to all appeals? Is it applicable ill
collateral hearings such as habeas corpus proceedings? Is it applicable in probation pro
ceedings? Pardon hearings? Probation revocation proceedings?
A third untreated problem and one which may increase greatly in importance In the
foreseeable future is whether the constitutional right guarantees any minimum quality
of legal representation. The foundation for a development of a guarantee of a minimum
quality of representation could be found in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where
the Court declared that the constitutional requirement of appointed counsel for Indigents "is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as
to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." Id. at
71. (Emphasis added.) A requirement of eflective aid could become particularly Important, in light of the practice of many trial judges of concentrating appointments among
young and inexperienced members of the bar and the practice of spreading the work
load throughout the bar through appointment of many attorneys who specialize in areas
of law other than criminal law. The beginning of the development of a guarantee of
right to "effective" legal representation may have been made in White v. Ragen, 324
U.S. 760 (1945), where the Court declared there to be a constitutional requirement for
allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of defendant's case between the time of
assignment of counsel and the trial. In Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948), the
constitutional requirement for appointment of counsel to represent an indigent about to
be arraigned on a criminal charge was held not to have been satisfied by the court calling
on a lawyer present in court who, after indicating reluctance, was assured by the court
that his services would require only 2 or 3 minutes, and who, without looking at the
indictment and without advising the accused of the nature of the charge against her, of
possible defenses, and without inquiring if she knew the potential punishment that could
be imposed, merely questioned accused and a co-defendant if they "understood what this

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

55

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 4

1967]
VI.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

441

INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS AND CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

The Court's treatment of confessions in terms of "voluntariness"
has recently undergone extensive and far-reaching change. Under the
common law involuntary confessions were inadmissible under a principle of the law of evidence, not because they were the product of an
invasion of individual liberty, but because they were considered inherently unreliable.241 The basis for this consideration was that most
individuals would readily confess to a crime of which they were not
guilty in order to prevent further pain from being inflicted upon
them. 24
The "voluntariness-of-confessions" test was only one phase of the
basic reliability test which runs throughout the law of evidence..243
But in recent fourteenth amendment decisions, the voluntariness test
has been removed from its reliability context and given new vitality
and a much broader scope. 244 The foundation for this development was
was about" and on receiving an affirmative reply suggested that they should stand mute.
So far as any requirement of effective counsel is concerned, one can start off with the
proposition that a reversal of a conviction cannot ordinarily be obtained because of the
lack of competence of defendant's retained counsel. See, e.g., Lotz v. Sacks, 292 F.2d 657
(6th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (Sd Cir. 1953). cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.
1948). But retained or appointed counsel can be so incompetent or so lacking in diligence
as to result in a conviction being a denial of due process. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Tahash,
324 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 1963) (conviction sustained in habeas corpus proceeding but court
seems to recognize reversal possibility on this ground); O'Malley v. United States. 285
F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961) (here collusion with prosecutors was alleged but not sustained);
Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957). In these cases the burden of establishing unconstitutionally inadequate representation is on the defendant, and the generally
accepted rule is that "only if it can be said that what was or was not done by the
defendant's attorney for his client made the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice,
shocking to the conscience of the Court, can a charge of inadequate legal representation
prevail." O'Malley v. United States, 285 F2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961). There seems to be
developing a tendency to require less in the way of lack of competence or lack of dill.
gence to necessitate a reversal in the case of court-appointed counsel. See People v. Ibarra,
34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487 (1963).
For a discussion of the retroactive effect of Gideon v. Wainwright, see notes 44041
infra and accompanying text. For a recent survey of right to counsel, see generally Com-

ment, 26 LA. L. RaV. 666 (1966).
241
242
243
244

3 WIGMORE, EvmENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
Ibid. But see McCoparrc, EVIDENCE § 109 (1954).
McCoancn, EvmrNcE § 110 (1954).
See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), where the Court declared:
The State suggests, however, that we are not free to reverse this conviction, since
there is sufficient other evidence in the record from which the jury might have found
guilt, relying on Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156. But Payne v. Arkansas, 856 US.
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24 5
provided in Brown v. Mississippi.
In Brown a conviction based upon
a confession obtained by use of physical violence was held violative of
fourteenth amendment due process. From this base the constitutional
guarantee against the admission of involuntary confessions was enlarged
to include mentally coerced confessions. 40 As a result, confessions obtained through long and virtually uninterrupted interrogation, without actual physical violence, violated due process. 2 47 At this point in
development the question of the reliability of the confession remained
significant, because the type of duress involved in these cases was severe
enough to be viewed as sufficient to cause an innocent individual to
break down and falsely admit guilt in order to stop the physical or
mental torture.

560, 568, authoritatively establishes that Stein did not hold that a conviction may
be sustained on the basis of other evidence if a confession found to be Involuntary
by this Court was used, even though limiting instructions were given.
Id. at 324.
The Court originally rejected the reliability approach in Haley v. Ohio, 852 U.S. 590
(1948), but with a shift in the make-up of the Court the reliability test returned In
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), followed in Stroble v. California, 843 U.S. 181
(1952), and Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958),
marks the point of departure from the old "reliability" approach as the constitutional
criterion for the admissibility of confessions. There the Court declared:
[W]here . . . a coerced confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury
and a general verdict is returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury
gave to the confession. And in these circumstances this Court has uniformly held that
even though there may have been sufficient evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 568.
245 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
246 E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (thirty-six hour continuous interrogation held to violate due process); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (five days of
questioning resulted in unanimous agreement of the Court that there was danger of
confession's being unreliable).
For a response by the Court to the question of the admissibility of a second confession,
given subsequent to a statement apparently barred from admissibility under the McNabbMallory rule, see United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947). Here the Court declared
"... this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a
usable one after those conditions have been removed .. " Id. at 540-41. But see Killough
v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (subsequent confession held
inadmissible on a 5-to-4 decision).
The supervisory tenor of the application of the McNabb-Mallory rule was undoubtedly
precedentally influential upon the Court in later decisions relative to criminal procedure,
so many of which are regulatory in nature.
247 See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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The reliability approach was not dearly repudiated until 1961 in
Rogers v. Richmond.248 In Rogers the Court made clear that the probable reliability of a confession is not a proper factor to consider in
determining its admissibility. The Court declared that involuntary
confessions are inadmissible not because they are "unlikely to be true
but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State
must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and
may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth."2 49 The Court clearly indicated that the basis for the prohibition against the use of coerced confessions is not to protect against the
conviction of the innocent but to protect the dignity of the individual
from state abuse.
This announcement of policy was to some extent a revelation of
developments to come. In the development of the law of involuntary
confessions the Court traveled far in its effort to protect the individual
from abusive police methods. This was not, however, the only path
chosen for development of the law in this general area of protection
against governmental abuse of the individual. In addition the Court
has chosen to expand the guarantee of right to counsel to the extent
that most confessions made by the defendant out of the presence of
his attorney are held inadmissible. The foundation for this second
approach was developed in Spano v. New York.25- 0 In their concurring
opinions, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart urged that the
Spano decision should turn on denial of right to counsel during postarrest interrogation rather than strictly on the voluntariness of the
confession.251 Mr. Justice Stewart trenchantly delineates this contentonOur Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel to a man
on trial for his life in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a
judge, open to the public, and protected by all the procedural
safeguards of the law. Surely a Constitution which promises that
248 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
249 Id. at 540-41; accord, Haynes v. Washington, 373 US. 503 (1963); Lynumn v. illi-

nois, 372 US. 528 (1963).
250 360 US. 315 (1959). Compare this position with that taken by a majority of the
Court one year earlier in Crooker v. California 357 US. 433 (1958), and Cicenia V. Lagay,

357 US. 504 (1958).
251 360 U.. 315, 324, 326 (1959).
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much can vouchsafe no less to the same man under the midnight
26 2
inquisition in the squad room of a police station.
Escobedo v. Illinois2r3 made it clear that the future development of
the law of this area did not depend entirely upon development of the
traditional voluntariness rules. In Escobedo a majority of the Court
indicated willingness to apply the constitutional right of counsel to
the area of involuntary confessions. There the questioning of a prisoner out of the presence of his counsel, after suspicion had focused
upon him, was held to be a denial of the constitutional guarantee of
right to counsel, resulting in the inadmissibility of the confession obtained during the interrogation. 254 This decision revealed the Court's
deep-rooted distrust of the methods used in obtaining confessions-a
distrust which may be explained in part by the experiences of Mr.
Chief Justice Warren as a prosecuting attorney--and the vehicle to
be used for future development limiting their use.
266
A major step in this development was made in Mirandav. Arizona
where the Court formulated the constitutional standards applicable to
custodial interrogation. These standards are applicable anytime a suspect is questioned by police following a deprivation of his freedom of
action by police. The defendant
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
20
result of interrogation can be used against him.
252 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959). Compare Mr. Justice Stewart's position in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), where he joins in the dissenting opinions of Harlan and White, JJ., at 504, 526 respectively.
253 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

254 Ibid. For an interpretation of the meaning of this test, see note 215 supra and
accompanying text.
255 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
250 Id. at 479. One question which seems certain to arise in application of the Miranda
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A failure to request the assistance of counsel does not in itself amount
to a waiver of the right to have counsel present during interrogation.
To be effective the waiver must be preceded by a clear statement by
police to the suspect of the suspect's rights and the possible consequence of his answering of questions. Where interrogation is carried
on "without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a
heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly .and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."25T
Where waiver of rights is claimed by the prosecution the length of
time of the interrogation period is a material consideration, and the
longer the period the greater the burden of establishing voluntary
waiver, free from compulsion arising from the "compelling influence
of the interrogation." 258
The Court's refinement of pre-trial safeguards in Miranda is little
more than recognition that mental torture can be as abusive to the
individual as physical torture. The slowness of the development of this
protection reflects the fact that the law has long understood better the
physical nature of man than it has the mental. Support for this general
proposition can be drawn from the law of torts, where the law has long
recognized and awarded compensation for physical injury, while only
recently has this recognition been afforded to victims of mental injury.
The step taken by the Court in Miranda is simply another phase of the
law's recognition of the mind as a part of the whole man. Because of
the difficulty in detecting the occurrence of mental torture, since the
scars tend not to show, there is a need which the Court recognized in
Miranda,for strict safeguards to implement the recognition.
The Escobedo-Miranda rationale does not pre-empt the constitutional prohibition against the use of coerced confessions. Instead, it
provides minimum standards which must be satisfied to prevent a confession from being treated, in effect, as involuntary per se. Therefore
the general case law of involuntary confessions will continue to be of
some importance. 259 Several procedures have been employed for the
requirements is the extent to which the police must go in explaining the meaning of
the warnings to a suspect who without explanation would not understand the real significance of the warning.
257 id. at
258 Id. at

475.
476.
259 For an example of a recent voluntary confession case, see Davis v. North Carolina.
384 U.S. 737 (1966). In Davis the Court did not apply Miranda because of its nonretro-
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determination of whether a confession is voluntary. These methods of
determination will probably be utilized for determining if there has
been an effective waiver of the Ecobedo-Miranda protections. Until
recently, the majority approach for determining the voluntariness of
a confession was to treat this as an ordinary question of fact to be left
to jury determination. 260 Other methods which have been employed
require the trial judge to rule on the issue with the jury not being
bound by a judicial determination that the confession was voluntary0 1
or for the trial court to decide the issue out of the presence of the
jury.26 2 Question of the constitutionality of the pure jury determination method was first raised in Stein v. New York, 213 where the Supreme Court held the procedure not to be unconstitutional. This decision, in effect, tended to affirm the traditional reliability rationale for
determining the voluntariness of confessions, 2 4 if one assumes that most
jurors will tend to give credit to a confession believed to be accurate
regardless of its voluntariness. 2 5 The constitutionality of the procedure
again came under scrutiny in Jackson v. Denno.201 There Stein was
expressly overruled and the pure jury determination procedure was
held violative of due process. The majority viewed the procedure as
encouraging the use of involuntary confessions, because it allows to
be done indirectly that which is expressly prohibited from being done
activity; but, the Court did hold that a confession obtained after sixteen days of confinement was not voluntary. Therefore, its admission into evidence violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 752.
260 See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 248 Ala. 510, 520, 28 So. 2d 542, 550 (1946); Read v.
People, 122 Colo. 808, 318-19, 221 P.2d 1070, 1076 (1950). For a comprehensive listing, see
appendix A to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964).
261 See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 89 Ariz. 103, 106, 358 P.2d 332, 333-34 (1960); People v.
Bevins, 54 Cal. 2d 71, 76-77, 351 P.2d 776, 779-80 (1960); State v. Von Vlack, 57 Idaho
316, 342-43, 65 P.2d 736, 748 (1937); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 603-04,
48 N.E.2d 630, 639 (1943). For a comprehensive listing, see appendix A to dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
262 See, e.g., People v. Fox, 319 Ill. 606, 150 N.E. 347 (1926). According to INOAu &
SOWLE, CRIMINAL JUSTIE CASES AND COMMENTS 623 (1960), "In contrast to the . . . New
York and Massachusetts view, the orthodox procedure followed in most states . . . requires that the preliminary hearing on confession admissibility be conducted outside the
presence of the jury." See generally 48 J. CIuM. L., C. & P.S. 65 (1957).
283 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
204 See note 241 supra and accompanying text.

205 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 (1964).
2606 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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directly. The decision is based on the premise that jurors will not be
07
able to ignore an involuntary confession they believe to be reliable.
In strong dissents both Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan
emphasized that trial by jury was born out of the desire to safeguard
individual liberties against state abuse and that the majority opinion
is no more than an indictment of the jury system. Mr. Justice Black
pointed out that the majority's basic premise of jury unreliability
"overlooks the fact that the Constitution itself long ago made the decision that juries are to be trusted."20- 8 Black also pointed out a gap in
the majority's decision. Under the rejected New York rule the state
had the burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.
Black urges that if this proof requirement is not maintained under
the Court's new constitutional approach that the approach instead of
protecting the defendant may well be a "distinct disadvantage to the
defendant." 2 9 Mr. Justice Harlan questioned the wisdom of the majority in overturning the New York rule in light of the continued
existence of the Massachusetts rule which requires an initial determination of voluntariness by the trial judge, with an independent determination made by the jury if the judge finds the confession voluntary.
He pointed out that this method tends to encourage the trial judge
to resolve any close question in favor of admissibility, leaving the real
determination to the jury, thus in effect making for no difference between the two procedures in doubtful cases.2 0 The logic of Mr. Justice
Harlan's argument as to the Massachusetts rule seems undeniable. In
light of Jackson, it would seem to be only a matter of time until the
JaCkson rationale is used to overturn the Massachusetts procedure.
As of now a defendant who contests the voluntariness of a confession
is entitled to at least an initial determination of this issue by the trial
court. This would seem equally applicable in a case where a defendant
contests the existence of a waiver of his rights under the Escobedo267 See note 265 supra.
268 378 U.S. 368, 405 (1964) (dissenting opinion). Black also declared: "[I]t is impossible for me to believe that permitting the jury alone to pass on factual issues of voluntaxiness violates the United States Constitution, which attempts in two different places
to guarantee trial by jury." Id. at 406-07.
269 Id. at 405.
270 378 US. 368, 436 (1964) (dissenting opinion). The logic of Mr. Justice Harlan's
argument as to the constitutionality of the Massachusetts rule seems undeniable in light
of the majority's rationale in Jackson. It would seem to be only a matter of time until
the Jackson rationale is used to overturn the Massachusetts procedure.
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Mirandarationale. Being retroactive the Jackson decision entitles any
convicted prisoner, whose confession was found to be voluntary by a
jury, to a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness or to release where
71
no hearing is provided.
Another development in the area of confessions left to be clearly
defined is that of a "poisonous fruit" doctrine prohibiting the admission into evidence of the fruits of an unconstitutional interrogation.
The formulation of such a doctrine will probably mark the effective
end of unrestricted post-arrest interrogation since the potential gains
to be derived from a statement under such interrogation will then be
totally outweighed by the potential loss to the prosecution. The basis
for such development may appear in Miranda where the Court stated
that unless the required procedural safeguards are complied with "no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him. 2 7 2 This development would also offer a definite solution to the
problems caused by the traditional rules that a voluntary confession
following an illegally obtained confession is competent 278 and that an
admission is not a confession and is, therefore, not subject to the same
exclusionary rules. 274 The ultimate solution to the problem of involuntary confessions might be to make all confessions inadmissible at
the election of the defendant. 27 This approach should have little more
of a potential effect on the position of the prosecution than does the
Mirandarule. It leaves the prosecution free to make a deal in exchange
for a confession in the form of a guilty plea, which is the outcome of
a vast majority of cases. By greatly reducing the importance of confessions, the rule would lessen greatly the criticism of brutality which
police are presently subjected to through the publicity given claims
of coerced confessions. This rule is consistent with the present trend
of the law. If the reliability approach is to be completely abandoned
this rule should be adopted. After Jackson v. Denno both of the procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession uphold to
271 878 U.S. 368, 891-96. There is no problem of retroactivity of the Miranda rule

since the Court has declared it to have only prospective applicability.
272 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
273 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 822 U.S. 596 (1944).
274

In Miranda v. United States, 884 U.S. 436, 477 (1966), the Court stated that the

decision applied to admissions and exculpatory statements as well as confessions.
276 Such a rule would not be unprecedented. Section 25 of the Evidence Act of India
declares: "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person
accused of any offence." The majority in Miranda may have turned their mind to this
type of rule as indicated by their discussion of the Indian rule in note 60 at 489.
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some degree the reliability approach, unless one can accurately assume
that trial courts -will not be influenced in close cases of voluntariness
by their view of the reliability of the confession in question.
VII. DIscoVERY AND DUTY OF PROSECUTOR

TO

RE VEAL

EvIDENcE FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT

Pre-trial discovery in criminal cases is undergoing considerable
change and development at the present time. Since the right of discovery was never established in the common law, there is little historical basis for its recognition. 27 Still several state courts have recognized
the need for such a procedure and have required pre-trial discovery
in criminal cases. 277 The United States Supreme Court in Brady v.
Maryland,2 78 has recently indicated an interest in the field. In Brady
the defendant's pre-trial request to examine certain statements made
to officers by his co-defendant was denied. In upholding the Maryland
Supreme Court's decision to remand the case for a new trial on the
question of punishment only, since the suppressed evidence could in
no way have affected the determination of guilt, the Court declared
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
279
faith of the prosecution."
This decision could be the first step toward the formulation of a
278 See 6 WGMORE, EvmnF.cE § 1859g (3d ed. 1940); see, e.g., Rosier v. People, 126
Colo. 82, 247 P.2d 448 (1952); State ex rel. Keast v. District Court of Fourth Judicial
Dist., 135 Mont. 545, 342 P.2d 1071 (1959).
277 See, e.g., People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957) (held defendant was

entitled to discovery of statements made by state witnesses); State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928,
22 So. 2d 273 (1945), noted in 20 Tur. L. REv. 133 (1945) (held defendant has constitutional right to pre-trial discovery of his written confession). For a discussion of this
development, see generally Fletcher, Pre-Trial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STA.
L. RFv. 293 (1960). For other treatments in sympathy with the development, see Brennan.
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 IVASn. U.LQ. 279
(1963); Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 163 (1963); Everett,
Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE L.J. 477; Goldstein,
The State and the Accused: Balance of Adamntage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YAMa L.J.
1149 (1960); Krantz, Pre-Tial Discovery In Criminal Cases: A Necemsity for Fair and
Impartial Justice, 42 Nm. - REv. 127 (1962); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real
or Apparent?, 49 CAr. L. REv. 56 (1961); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 228 (1964); Note, 27 BRoor.L4 I- REV. 318 (1961); Editorial
Notes, 35 U. Chc. L. R.v. 195 (1966); 49 MARQ. L. R-v. 736 (1966); 31 Mo. I. Rtv. 424
(1966).
278 373 US. 83 (1963).
279 Id. at 87.
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constitutionally required pre-trial discovery procedure for state prosecutions. Such a development would seemingly be based on the "fundamental fairness" approach to fourteenth amendment due process,
rather than on absorption of a Bill of Rights guarantee. This should
not cause great difficulty, because it has long been held that the fourteenth amendment guarantees an accused a fair trial. 2 0 All that is
necessary to achieve a constitutionally required discovery procedure
is an extension of the concept of fair trial so as to require satisfaction
of minimum pre-trial discovery standards.
Assuming the discovery requirement can be read into the due
process clause, the primary question facing the Court is whether it
should be. The principal argument in favor of the requirement is
that it would help prevent conviction of the innocent. 28 ' The traditional arguments advanced against criminal discovery are: (1) that the
procedures would further swing the balance of our system already
favoring the defendant, too far in his favor; (2) that it would encourage
perjury and the altering of evidence; and (3) that such a procedure is
contrary to our adversary system, since the procedure would not be
equally available to the prosecution, due to our constitutional pro2 2
hibition against self-incrimination.
The idea that our system of criminal procedure is balanced in favor
of the defendant is to a great extent based on our announced principle
of presuming innocence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. This admirable claim is somewhat unrealistic. It seems to this
writer that the often stated principle fails to recognize that in our
society when a man is brought to trial, the average member of society
who makes up the typical American jury, assumes he is guilty. 2 8 Also
the argument of overly favoring defendants does not consider the tremendous advantage of the state in the construction of a case, due to
its vast financial, scientific and investigative resources. 28 4 The argument that discovery will encourage perjury and other abuses is not
280 See note 185 supra.
281 For discussion of the possibility of convicting the innocent, see generally ZoRcuARW,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); FRANK, B. & J., NOT GUILTY (1957); Lewis, GDEON'S
TRUMPET

(1964).

282 See, e.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953); see Louisell, Criminal

Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent, 49 CAUF. L. REv. 56, 57-58 (1961).
283 See generally Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1152-63 (1960).
284 See FRANK, B. & J., NOT GunXTY 242-48 (1957); see generally Goldstein, supra note

283.
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borne out by the experience of jurisdictions which have implemented
such a procedure. 8 5 Professor Louisell has urged that abusive attempts
to fish for the prosecutor's plans and ideas about the case could be
controlled through the development of a doctrine analogous to the
Hickman v. Taylor28 6 "work-project" rule.287- Jerome and Barbara
Frank in their book, Not Guilty, urge that these potential abuses are
immaterial: that the honest defendant should not be refused a "fair
means of clearing himself" because of the possibility that a dishonest
defendant will misuse the "discovered information." They point further to the paradox created by denying criminal discovery. "A guilty
defendant knows the facts about the crime without any disclosure by
the government; if he is unscrupulous, he will fabricate evidence.
Only the innocent man is kept in ignorance of what the government
plans to prove."2 -8 The final argument, that discovery is inconsistent
with our adversary method, presupposes that our system of criminal
procedure is a game rather than a search for truth. The idea that a
criminal trial should be a mental encounter between defense and
prosecution, refereed by a judge, fails to recognize society's true interest in such a trial. Society's interest is not in the conviction of the
accused even in a fair manner but in a fairly conducted determination
of his guilt or innocence, and if guilty, then in his conviction and
separation from society if necessary.
Another point of controversy is, if criminal discovery is to be available, should it be available as a matter of right or should its operation
be within the discretion of the trial court. Able writers have argued
the need to seek an objective standard-urging that criminal discovery
be established as a right, rather than as a matter of discretion.2-s There
is no doubt that this is the most practical effective method of protecting the innocent party accused of a crime. The method would preclude the arbitrary use of discretion by a trial judge, which so often
goes uncorrected because of the limited scope of appellate review of
285 See FRANK, B. & J., Nor GuEL-r
286 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

245-48 (1957).

287 See generally Louisell, supra note 283, at 92. The problem with this approach is
that it places the burden on the defendant to request disclosure of the evidence and to
establish necessity for such disclosure. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947).
288 FxkNK, B. & J., NOT GurmTv 246 (1957). Professor Goldstein points out that this
argument against discovery assumes all persons accused and brought to trial are guilty,
since it is the guilty who generally would tamper with evidence. 69 YALE I.J. 1149,
1193 (1960).
289 See Goldstein, supra note 283, at 1197-98.
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discretionary decisions. Also supporting the absolutist position is the
argument that if the doctrine is made a due process guarantee, withdrawal of the right should not be left to the whim of the trial court.
The absolutist position, however, does have its faults. It fails to take
into account the possible abuse, especially from organized crime, of
witnesses, whose identities would not otherwise have been discovered
prior to the trial, and informers, whose identities might not otherwise
have been learned at all.
The answer to the discovery problem seems to lie in the formulation of a broad constitutional doctrine of criminal discovery.2 0° The
scope of this doctrine should extend beyond particularly described
specific information and beyond evidence favorable to the defendant. 291 Materiality would seem to be the best test. 2 2 This protection
should not, however, be absolute, but should be more than what is
ordinarily viewed as within the trial court's discretion. This nonabsolute approach should not necessarily be unacceptable to constitutional absolutists, since this right is being read into the due process
clause by the Court without the aid of one of the Bill of Rights as a
guide. One possible test which could be used as the criteria for withdrawal of the right of discovery would be one analogous to the old
"clear and present danger" rule which has been applied in the area
of freedom of speech. This test would look to whether the granting of
discovery would present a "clear and present danger" to the fair administration of the defendant's trial. Implementation of the right subject to this limitation would recognize society's interest in a fair trial
290 A good indication of the type constitutional rule which may develop can be found
in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), which was decided under the Court's
supervisory power over federal criminal procedure. As indicated throughout this article
these federal supervisory power decisions are very often an accurate projection of what
is to develop under fourteenth amendment due process.
In Jencks the defendant petitioned to require the prosecution to turn over to the

trial judge records of statements made by informants so the trial judge could ascertain
whether the defense had a right to inspect them for use in cross-examination. Tie

trial court refused to so order the prosecution; but the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the defendant had an absolute right to inspect and use the documents.
The basic idea of Jencks was further developed in the concurring opinion of Justice
Brennan (joined in by three justices) in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 843, 360
(1959). Justice Brennan suggested that there is a point in denying criminal discovery
beyond which a trial court cannot go and cannot be legislatively forced to go without
violating the sixth amendment guarantees of right of confrontation and right to have
compulsory process to obtain witnesses.
291 Already guaranteed by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (196).
292 See United States v. Kaskel, 18 F.R.D. 477, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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and orderly administration of justice, not only to the point of providing the accused adequate protection against erroneous conviction, but
also to the point of providing sufficient protection to interested citizens
and police informers. To further protect the deserving defendant, the
burden should be placed on the state to show by "clear and convincing
proof" that the right to discovery should be withdrawn in a particular
case. In making its decision a trial court should consider: (1) the reputation and character of the defendant; (2) his criminal record; and
(3) the extent of his criminal operations, with particular attention
29 3
being paid to his connection with organized crime.
While discovery as an element of constitutionally required fair
trial presupposes a request to discover specific evidence, the constitutional requirement of a fair trial may also contain a disclosure requirement independent of request.2 9 4 There appears to be developing a
constitutionally based requirement of disclosure by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to the accused. The origin of this development
lies in the principle that due process is violated where the prosecution
knowingly uses false testimony. The foundation for the constitutional
prohibition against the knowing use of false testimony was formulated
in Mooney v. Holohan.29 5 There, while the principle was given recognition, relief was denied without prejudice on the ground that there
had not been an exhaustion of all state remedies. Then in Pyle v.
Kansas296 the principle was applied in reversing a state criminal conviction. This decision may well have planted seeds of far-reaching
future importance. While the decision turned primarily on the issue
of knowing use of false testimony, the Court also stated that an individual's constitutionally secured right to a fair trial is abridged if he
is convicted as a result of the use of perjured testimony "knowingly
used by the State authorities ... [or] from the deliberate suppression
29 7 From this prohibition against
... of evidence favorable to him."
the intentional use of false testimony, a related proposition has evolved
293 See Louisell supra note 282, at 98-101.
294 See generally Carter, Suppression o1 Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 84 F.R.D.

87 (1964); Comment, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60
CoLum. L. REv. 858 (1960); Note, 38 Tuot. L. REv. 759 (1964).
295 294 U.S. 103 (1935). This principle was recently reaffirmed in Miller v. Pate, 87
Sup. Ct. 785 (1967), where the Court declared due process to have been violated wvhere
prosecutor's representations to the jury that stained undergarments found near the
scene of a rape belonged to defendant and was covered with the victim's blood, while

knowing that the stains on the garments were paint stains.
296 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
297 Id. at 216.
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which recognizes that due process is violated if the prosecution fails to
correct testimony introduced against the defendant which the prosecution knows or has reason to know is false or inaccurate. This due
process violation occurs when the uncorrected, inaccurate testimony
relates to the degree of the crime for which the defendant could be
convicted, 208 the credibility of a witness against the defendant 0 9 or,
a fortiori, the actual question of the defendant's guilt.8 00
From this prohibition against the knowing use of false or inaccurate
testimony, there is developing a positive constitutional guarantee of
disclosure by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant.
While not yet clearly formulated by a Supreme Court decision the
existence of this positive guarantee is reflected in several lower federal
court decisions.801 However, the scope of this guarantee is not yet certain. For example, some of the decisions have taken the point of view
that "evidence is not suppressed or withheld if the accused has knowledge of the facts and circumstances or if they otherwise become available to him during the trial. 30 2 Other decisions have rejected this
strict limitation on the duty. One court declared that the "availability
of witnesses to the defense through its own investigations is a relevant
consideration, but . . . not . . . ordinarily determinative." 03 Also, it
is not clear how important the withheld evidence need be in order to
amount to a due process violation. One test which has been applied
considers the materiality of the withheld evidence. In order to be
material the evidence need not have been so important as to have
probably produced a different verdict if introduced. Materiality in
this context seems to be nothing more than a safety valve to allow a
court to avoid giving effect to a failure to disclose evidence which could
have had no bearing on the ultimate disposition of a case or the punishment imposed. If the withheld evidence could possibly have had effect
298 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).

299 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
300 The prohibition against acquiescence in false or inaccurate testimony has been

extended to the point that due process has been held to have been violated where the
prosecution unknowingly used false testimony which was procured by state law enforcement officers. This development was apparently based upon recognition of the law enforcement officers as part of the actual prosecution. See Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d
707 (3d Cir. 1958).
301 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964)2
Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1958).
302 United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 123 F. Supp. 759, 762 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
This rule was approved in principle in the appellate decision in Thompson at 221 F.2d
763, 767-68 (3d Cir. 1955).
303 See United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1964).
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on either of these decisions, the simple fact that the prosecution prevented the jury from hearing the favorable evidence is all that is required to entitle to defendant to relief.304 Another approach is when
active misconduct-the knowing use of or acquiescence in the use of
false testimony-is alleged to require only a showing of the misconduct
by the prosecutor in order to entitle the defendant to relief. This approach, however, requires an actual showing of prejudice to entitle the
defendant to relief if passive misconduct-simple failure to discloseis alleged rather than active misconduct.30
VIII. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 300

The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees "that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This constitutional right was aimed at re-enforcing the well recognized common law prohibition against the use of hearsay evidence in criminal
trials. With this aim in mind the amendment has been interpreted so
as to allow the admission of former testimony of witnesses in appropriate cases, where the witness had been subject to cross-examination
at the time of the testimony;30 7 and also for the admission of certain
hearsay evidence, of a type which has been viewed as an exception
to the evidentiary prohibition against the introduction of hearsay,
such as testimony of a dying declaration.30 8
304 Ibid.
305 See Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1961); see generally Comment, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUM. L. R'.
858, 863-65 (1960); Note, 38 Tut. L. Rav. 759 (1964).
306 See generally McConsca, EvmiENcE § 231 (1954); Pollitt, The Right of Confronta.
tion: Its History and Modem Dress, 8 J. PuB. L. 381 (1959); Note, 44 N.C.L. Ray. 173
(1965).
307 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (death); Norton v. State, 148 TeM.
Criin. 294, 186 S.V.2d 347 (1945) (witness absent from state); State v. Ortego, 22 Wash. 2d
552, 157 P.2d 320 (1945) (state unable to find witness after diligent search); State v.
Anderson, 219 Wis. 623, 263 N.V. 587 (1935) (temporary absence from state, two 'week
vacation, not sufficient); McCoy v. State, 221 Ala. 446, 129 So. 21 (1930) (witness prevented
from testifying by husband-wife privilege); Smith v. State, 147 Ga. 689, 95 S.Y. 281
(1918); State v. Wheat, 111 La. 860, 35 So. 955 (1904) (illness of witness); Marter v. State,
67 Ala. 55, 42 Am. Rep. 95 (1880) (insanity of witness).
308 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Other exceptions to the hearsay rule
have been recognized as not violating the right of confrontation. See, e.g., People v.
Nisonoff, 293 N.Y. 597, 59 N.E2d 420 (1944) (autopsy report by assistant medical examiner); State v. Guaraneri, 59 R-I. 173. 194 Atl. 589 (1937) (hospital records); State v.
Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 131 AtL 429 (1925) (certified copy of report of liquor anal)sis
by state chemist).
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While long in existence, this Bill of Rights guarantee has had little
meaning in state prosecutions. In West v. Louisiana0 9 it was held not
to be applicable to state criminal prosecutions. This position was
31 0 and Stein v.
adhered to in the later cases of Snyder v. Massachusetts
8
1
1
New York.
Then in 1965, the Court in Pointer v. Texas 12 and
Douglas v. Alabama,3 13 in accordance with the trend toward absorption of the Bill of Rights, reversed its prior position and declared the
right-of-confrontation portion of the sixth amendment applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Pointer the victim testified against the defendant at the pre814
liminary hearing. The defendant was not represented by counsel.
A co-defendant attempted to cross-examine the victim and it appears
that the defendant could also have cross-examined, since he was allowed
to attempt cross-examination of other witnesses. A transcript of this
prior testimony was offered and admitted into evidence at the trial
because the victim had by then permanently left the jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction on the ground that
the sixth amendment right of confrontation is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth and that the affording of the defendant with
the empty opportunity to cross-examine without the aid of counsel
at the preliminary hearing did not satisfy the constitutional mandate
of the right of confrontation.
In Douglas the prosecutor in the presence of the jury read to a
prosecution witness, in order to refresh his recollection, a confession
made by the witness which implicated the defendant in the crime
for which the defendant was being tried. The witness, who had already
been convicted of the crime in question and thus could not properly
claim the privilege against self-incrimination, refused to answer any
question concerning the confession. Since cross-examination is limited
to matters considered during direct examination, counsel for the
defendant was precluded from questioning the witness on this point.
Thus, so far as effect upon the jury was concerned, the witness through
the reading of his previous confession, which was taken at a time
when cross-examination was not available to the defendant, testified
309 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
310 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
311 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
312 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

380 U.S. 415 (1965).
814 See notes 201-06 supra and accompanying text.
313
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against the defendant but was not subject to cross-examination. This
was held to be violative of the fourteenth amendment.
Aside from their specific holdings, the decisions in Douglas and
Pointer are significant in other respects. First, these two cases reflect
another step toward the uniformity of minimum procedural standards
in the administration of criminal justice in the United States by way
of absorption of federal standards into the fourteenth amendment. In
addition, while the decisions do not seem to be a foundation for
future constitutional attacks on the well recognized exceptions to the
evidentiary rule declaring the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence,315
they do provide a possible basis for requiring the revelation of the
identity of informers. 316 Moreover, the two decisions seem to provide
a basis for extension of right to counsel to the "line-up" or identification of the suspect stage of criminal procedure. Such an extension
would be based on a realization that an eye witness identification of
the defendant may be a two stage process. The recollection at the trial
stage may relate to the identification of the defendant at the "line-up"
and not to the earlier actions during the actual criminal conduct.
Thus, if the "line-up" identification is not correct the trial identification will tend not to be. When this is realized, the courts will admit
that confrontation at the "line-up" stage is essential. Thus, it will
become a constitutional mandate that the suspect be provided with
counsel and an opportunity to examine witnesses at the identification
stage and a record will be required of the witness' statements at this
identification proceeding. In order to give the proceeding real meaning, it will be necessary that the proceeding take on certain formalities
such as the presence of an appropriate officer who must keep an accurate record, the presence of the suspect's attorney, and an opportunity for cross-examination of the identifying party. [In United States
v. Wade, 87 Sup. Ct. 1926 (1967), decided since the preparation of this
manuscript, the Court held that post-indictment lineup was a critical
stage in the criminal process at which the defendant was entitled to
the aid of counsel in the absence of intelligent waiver.]
315 In Pointer the Court indicated that it did not intend that
type of well-accepted evidentiary exception to the hearsay rule. The
Court has recognized the admissibility against an accused of dying
of testimony of a deceased witness who has testified at a former
we hold here is to the contrary." 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).

decision to alter this
Court declared "This
declarations . . . and
trial .... Nothing

316 See notes 35-41 supra and accompanying text; see also Comment, Disclosure of
Informers' Identities, 17 HAsnxcs L.J. 99 (1965).
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311
RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREEDOM OF PRESS

Within the last few years, the constitutional right to a fair trial, has
been extended to include "freedom from prejudicial news coverage."8 18
The appropriate remedies where there has been prejudicial news
coverage are continuance or change of venue. Where the prejudicial
effect is of a sufficiently serious nature, it is reversible error for the
trial court not to grant one of these remedies.8 1
The foundation for this development was formulated by Mr. Justice
Jackson concurring in Shepherd v. Florida,820 where the newspapers
had reported that the sheriff had informed them that the defendant
had confessed. Because no confession was introduced into evidence at
the trial Mr. Justice Jackson reasoned that either the story was false
or the confession inadmissible, and in either case the publication of
the story circumvented the "rights of the defendant to be confronted
."021 In
by witnesses against him and to cross-examine them ...
speaking of this highly prejudicial news coverage Jackson said, "The
case presents one of the best examples of one of the worst menaces to
American justice," 22 and he urged that this menace be a proper
ground for reversal.
Then in Stroble v. California28 the Court indicated that prejudicial
news coverage could be a proper ground for reversal, but refused to
overturn a conviction because of the defendant's failure to show that
community prejudice was produced by the news coverage in question
and because the confession, which was reported by the news media,
was at the trial found to be voluntary and admitted into evidence. In
his dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter rejected the majority's approach
and contended that the pre-trial release of information related to the
case by the prosecutor made "the prosecutor a conscious participant
817 See generally GILLMOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1966); McCarthy, Pair Trial
and Prejudicial Publicity: A Need for Reform, 17 HASTINcs L.J. 79 (1965).
318 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 881 U.S. 532
(1965); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723

(1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
319 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1964). "But where there is a reasonable likeli-

hood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should
continue the case until the threat abates or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity." Id. at 363. Cf., Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
320 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
321 Id. at 52.
822 Id. at 55.
323 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
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in trial by newspaper, instead of by those methods which centuries of
experience have shown to be indispensable to the fair administration
of justice." 324 The crux of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's rationale is that
a conviction should not be allowed to stand where the defendant's
right to a fair trial is circumvented by inflammatory pre-trial news
coverage regardless of the accuracy of the reporting and the admissibility of the facts reported. Frankfurter's theory seems to require a
presumption of community prejudice in cases where the news coverage
has been sufficiently inflammatory.
In Marshall v. United States32 5 the Court took a cautious step forward. There the Court, relying on its supervisory power over federal
criminal procedure, reversed a lower court conviction, even though
the prosecution had not cooperated with the news media in the dissemination of the inflammatory information and the impact of the publicity on the jury did not appear significant. 320 There the ground for
reversal was the "exposure of jurors to information of a character
which the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly
offered as evidence." 327 Although the Court paid lip-service to the rule
of Holt v. United States328 that "the trial judge has a large discretion
in ruling on the issue of prejudice resulting from the reading by
jurors of news articles concerning the trial,"3 2 9 the Court was not influenced by the fact that the trial court had during the trial, upon
learning that four of the jurors had read the news article containing the
inadmissible information, questioned the jurors on their ability to
render a fair and impartial decision and found that the four jurors
could render a fair and impartial verdict.
Later in Irwin v. Dowd,330 the Court for the first time struck down
a state conviction because of denial of a fair trial caused by prejudicial
pre-trial news coverage. The Court formulated a standard very similar
to the one urged by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Stroble. Neither total
ignorance of the facts of a case nor total lack of opinion as to guilt or
innocence is required of the jury. It is sufficient that a juror can lay
324 Id. at 201 (dissenting opinion).

360 U.S. 510 (1959) (per curiam).
326 In Marshall four of the jurors had read one or more of the prejudicial news
stories, while three others had scanned one or more of the stories. All of these jurors
assured the trial judge that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based solely
on the evidence of record. Id. at 312.
327 Ibid.
328 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
329 360 U.S. 10, 312 (1959).
330 366 US. 717 (1961).
32
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aside any preconceived notion and render an impartial verdict based
on the evidence presented in court; however, where there is a showing
of "deep and bitter prejudice" in the community it must be presumed
that this has produced preconceived notions of guilt which cannot
be laid aside.33 '
In Rideau v. Louisiana33 2 it was held reversible error for a trial
court to refuse a request for a change of venue where the defendant's
confession given in response to questioning by the sheriff was televised
three times by the local television station. From Rideau it appears that
the Irwin v. Dowd requirement for reversal of "deep and bitter prejudice in the community" is either no longer required or is presumed to
exist anytime there has been serious prejudicial pre-trial publicity.
The Court declared:
[W]e do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire examination of the members
of the jury, that due process of law in this case required a trial
before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not
seen and heard Rideau's [the defendant] televised "interview." 38
The Court further reasoned that the pre-trial publicity had infringed
upon the defendant's "right to counsel," his "right to plead not guilty"
34
and his "right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a judge."0
Justices Clark and Harlan dissented because of the failure of the
record to show that the publicity had "fatally infected the trial . . .";
that there had not been an adequate showing of community prejudice
or any other factor which would shed doubt upon the statements of
jurors that they could render a fair and impartial verdict. 8
Estes v. Texas33 offers further indication that actual prejudice need
not be shown by the defendant in cases where the adverse publicity is
of sufficient seriousness. 33 7 This development continued in Sheppard
v. Maxwell,3 3 8 which also involved pre-trial and trial publicity. In
Sheppard the Court declared:
331

Id. at 727-28.

332

373 U.S. 723 (1963).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 726-27.

333
334

335 Id. at 728-33 (dissenting opinion).

381 U.S. 532 (1965).
The Estes conviction was reversed because of the televising of both pre-trlal proceedings and the trial itself. The televised pre-trial proceedings involved primarily the
question of whether and to what extent televising of the trial would be allowed.
338 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
336
337
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Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness
of modem communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts
must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the
duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances....
[C]ourts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences."
According to Sheppard these proper steps include: (1) the continuing
of the case until publicity and public hostility has subsided or the
granting of a change of venue or both; (2) a certain amount of policing
of newsmen, such as regulating the number to be present in the courtroom at one time, where they are to be located in the courtroom, their
access to trial evidence and a warning of the impropriety of publishing
material not introduced in proceedings; (3) the insulation of prospective witnesses from interviews by the press; and (4) regulation of
news releases by police, witnesses, prosecution and defense counsel. 3 0
At this point it is difficult to ascertain whether the protection against
prejudicial news coverage afforded defendants in state criminal proceedings is as broad as that afforded federal defendants. If not, it
certainly appears that it soon will be. In Marshall, it appears that the
prosecution did not cooperate with the press in the dissemination of
the prejudicial news in question; whereas, in all the state cases it
appears that there was state involvement in the prejudicial news
coverage, either by law enforcement officers, the prosecution or the
judiciary. However, beginning with Irwin v. Dowd and going through
Rideau, Estes and Sheppard the Court has tended to de-emphasize the
importance of state involvement and look simply to the question of
whether the effect of the prejudicial news coverage was to deny the
defendant a fair trial. While the Court has not yet gone this far it
would seem that if a defendant could show that one juror had read
one news article containing "prejudicial" material this would be
proper ground of reversal of a conviction. Another development in
this area is the expansion of the meaning of "prejudicial news coverage." In the cases down to Irwin v. Dowd the reporting of facts which
would be inadmissible as evidence and the reporting of facts which
339 Id. at 362-63.
340 Id. at 358-63.
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would be admissible but are not later introduced into evidence were
0 41
held to come within the meaning of "prejudicial news coverage."
Then in Rideau and Estes it became apparent that the scope of this
protection was not limited to protection against publication of inadmissible or unintroduced evidence. These cases indicate clearly that the
criminally accused has a basic constitutional right to a fair trial which
is abridged when a defendant is, in effect, tried in the press prior to his
actual trial. 42 From this statement of the right, it follows that the
defendant is entitled to have details of his guilt introduced to the jury
for the first time at the trial, when the truth of the facts introduced
are in issue, rather than for them to be introduced by way of publication, which is considered by many as verification of the fact being
reported. Thus, it would seem that a defendant is likely to be denied
a fair trial anytime news reporting goes beyond a statement of the
occurrence of the crime in question plus a statement that the defendant
has been accused of the commission of the crime and will be tried
for it.
Abatement of the prejudicial news coverage barrier to a constitutionally fair trial is difficult. The difficulty of correcting the problem
is due primarily to the collision of two basic constitutional guarantees
S41 See, e.g., Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951). In Shepherd a rape conviction

was reversed on ground of racial discrimination in jury selection; however, the concurring opinion urged reversal on grounds of prejudicial news coverage resulting from
statements attributed to the Sheriff that defendants had confessed, when no confession
was ever offered as evidence at the trial. Justice Jackson declared:

It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the offlcer
of the court charged with defendants' custody stating that they had confessed, and
here just such a statement, unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted,
was conveyed by the press to the jury.

Id. at 52 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J. concurring). In Stroble, petitioner's challenge to the validity of his conviction for murder rested in part on the ground that a
fair trial was impossible because of prejudicial newspaper reports of a confession inspired by the prosecuting attorney. In rejecting this contention the Court declared: "It Is
also significant that in this case the confession which was one of the most prominent
features of the newspaper accounts was made voluntarily and was introduced in evidence
at the trial itself." Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952).
342 In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) the Court stated:
Under our Constitution's guarantee of due process, a person accused of committing
a crime is vouchsafed basic minimal rights. Among these are the right to counsel,
the right to plead not guilty, and the right to be tried in a courtroom presided over

by a judge."
Id. at 726-27. (Emphasis added.) In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 552 (1965), the Court commenting on the adverse publicity generated by the televising of both the prc-trial hearing and the trial itself said: "The facts in this case demonstrate clearly the necessity
for application of the rule announced in Rideau." Id. at 550.
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-that of a fair trial and that of freedom of press. Many would argue,
incorrectly applying Pound's balancing of interests as a basis for their
argument, that there is no problem, that the collision of constitutional
guarantees involves a conflict between an interest of society and an
interest of the individual. This reasoning, of course, ignores society's
interest in protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction and providing the guilty with the fairest possible trial, since only in this
manner can the state assure the accuracy of guilt determination and
expect to maintain the respect of society's in general. 343
One feasible solution to the problem is suggested by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter. Concurring in Irwin v. Dowd, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
declared that there is a point in the pre-trial disbursement of prejudicial information beyond which the press is not constitutionally protected. 34 This suggests the possibility of using the English method
of restricting news coverage to little more than the official record,
through liberal use of the contempt power. Until now a series of Supreme Court decisions has virtually precluded use of the contempt
power in this area. 345 These decisions require that pre-trial publicity
amount to a "clear and present danger" to the orderly administration
of justice before the contempt power can be used without violating
the constitutional protection of freedom of press. Although the contempt approach has not been utilized it seems at least convincingly
arguable that, since Rideau and the presumption of community prejudice, the Court has, in effect, declared any prejudicial pre-trial publicity to present a "dear and present danger" to the orderly administration
of criminal justice.
343 INBAU & SOWLE,

CASES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

815-16 (1960), suggest that freedom of

speech does not extend to the point of protecting pre.trial news reporting which prejudices the defendant. They contend that the constitutional freedom of speecl of an individual is as strong as those of the press. Yet would an individual not be constitutionally
protected if he walked into a trial and shouted to the jury information prejudicial to
the defendant?
This argument fails to consider the traditionally recognized difference in the use of
contempt power in in-court situations as opposed to out of court situations, see COLDFARB, THrE Cotrn'zr
Poisa 48 (1963), and the difference in the total importance to an
informed society of granting the individual an unrestrained right to inform the public
and granting the news media this same privilege.
344 Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (concurring opinion).
345 See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 US. 367
(1947); Pennekap v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941). See also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d
594 (1966), where it was held that a trial court cannot properly in advance of publication
limit right of newspaper to publish details of open court proceedings.
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While it seems that more liberal use of the contempt power might
now be allowable under the old guidelines to it use, pursuit of the
present course of reversing both the case which holds a newspaperman
in contempt because of pre-trial publicity and the one in which the
convicted defendant is denied his right to a fair trial because of prejudicial news coverage, could solve the problem and yet avoid chipping
away the protection of freedom of press. The policy of reversing convictions because of unrestrained and inflammatory news coverage may
so outrage the public, that the public will exert sufficient pressure to
restrain the press. The bullet which killed Lee Harvey Oswald may well
have greatly delayed the possibility of marshalling this public pressure. 340 At the same time, it may have prevented a decision which would
have hindered greatly the development of this protection of a fair trial.
In evaluating the wisdom of the Court's present policy, consideration
must be given to the effect that the press can have on public opinion
and to the effect that the continuation of this policy may have on the
faith of society in the judiciary, at a time when respect for the
law seems to be reaching a very low ebb.3 47 Still if freedom of the
press, which is so basic to a democratic society, is to be limited, it
should, if possible, be limited by public opinion rather than by the
sanction of the law.
346 See the letter from seven Harvard Law Professors to the Editor of the New York
Times, December, 1963, § 4, p. 10, col. 8 (set out in LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CuO1ER, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROcEDuRE

205 (1964), which strongly suggests the impossibility of

Lee Harvey Oswald having been given a constitutionally required fair trial. The press
handling of the Oswald case points up vividly the conflicting interests in this area.
There can be little doubt but that Oswald's constitutional right to a fair trial had been
infringed prior to this death. On the other hand, as Donald Gillmor in his book Frea
Press and Fair Trial points out:
It was not . . . mere public curiosity that demanded satisfaction in the Oswald case.
The matter was essential to the citizens of the Republic as any other than can be
imagined. Was there time to wait for the winnowing and shifting of fact and error?
It is terrifying to contemplate what forms fanatical segments of public opinion
might have taken had there been a news blackout, or had only disconnected bits of
information been released before the conclusion of Oswald's trial.
Id. at 22.
347 Another step which could be taken in working out a solution to this problem Is
strict enforcement of Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics plus further action
by the Bar itself to prevent its members from participating in the disbursement to tile
press of information outside the official record of a case. Also the courts could formu.
late and enforce rules prohibiting attorneys, law enforcement officers and other officers
of the court from disbursing such information. If the Bar and the judiciary would meet
their responsibility in this area a major portion of the problem would be solved.
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PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

465
48

This phase of criminal procedure has proven no exception to the
general tendency toward change. For many years, under the rule of
Adamson v. California349 the fifth amendment privilege against self-

incrimination was held not to be within the scope of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Adamson the Court declared
that the fourteenth amendment guarantees a fair trial, but that allow-

ing comment by the prosecutor on the defendant's failure to testify-a
practice which had already been disallowed in federal cases under the

fifth amendment-did not infringe upon the fair trial guarantee.
Neither phase of the Adamson holding remains effective. In Malloy

v. Hogan350 the Court held that the fifth amendment's exception
from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the fourteenth amendment against abridgement by the States.35 1 At this

point the same standard became applicable in state and federal cases:
an individual may not be compelled to give testimony which would

serve as a link in the chain of evidence necessary to convict him of a
crime. Under the Court's statement of the standard, the determination

of what would serve as a link in the chain is almost completely within
the discretion of the person asserting the privilege. This phase of the
Malloy decision is the basis of Mr. Justice White's dissent. Although
348 Discussion in this section concerns the privilege against self-incrimination other
than as a basis for the prohibition against involuntary confessions. Note also the difference between the defendant's right not to testify at all and the privilege of an individual not to answer specific questions the answers of which might tend to incriminate
the individual to whom the question is directed.
The evidentiary rule that a defendant need not testify at all grew, not out of the
privilege against being required to incriminate himself, but rather from tEi rule of
competency that a party to a law suit is not a competent witness. This total incompetency continued until the mid-1800's. Then as the disqualification to tesify was lifted

it -was recognized that a partial continuation of the past total disqualification, as a
privilege of the defendant not to be called as a witness, was a logical extension of the
already recognized privilege of an individual not to incriminate himself. In a short
time this privilege was recognized as included within the constitutional protection.
Professor McCormick points out that the newer constitutional protection is even further reaching than the original protection. The older privilege required the witness to
sift through questions excluding and claiming the privilege as to those which might
tend to be self-incriminating. The defendant, under the newer approach, can avoid
this problem entirely by exercising his privilege of not testifying at all. See McCoRunic,
EvmENcE § 122, at 257-59 (1954);

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE § 2268 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

349 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
350 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
351 Id. at 3.
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he agreed with the Court's basic "chain of evidence" rule he urged that
it should be up to the trial court to determine when an answer would
be within the chain of evidence and, therefore, within the scope of
the privilege. He urged that until this decision the practice in federal
courts has been to allow the trial court to determine the applicability of
the privilege and that in Malloy the trial judge was not provided
sufficient information to serve as a basis for making the determination.
There the decision, according to White, suggests not only a change as
to the applicability of the privilege to the states through fourteenth
amendment due process, but also a change in the content of the privilege as it had previously been applicable to the federal government
352
through the fifth amendment.
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Malloy is of a more basic nature.
It is grounded in the traditional notion of federalism and its corollary
doctrine of dual sovereignty. He urged that contrary to this principle,
the majority decision is a subtle attempt at formulating a broad rule
incorporating the Bill of Rights into fourteenth amendment due
352 Id. at 33, 38 (dissenting opinion). White concluded his dissent with the statement
that "adherence to the federal standard of incrimination . . . in form only, while its
content is eroded in application is hardly an auspicious beginning for application of
the privilege to the states." Id. at 38.
In Malloy petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor gambling offense. After the
statute of limitations had run he was called before a special court appointed referee
and questioned concerning his associates at the time of the offense for which he was
convicted. Petitioner sought to invoke both the state and federal privileges against selfincrimination. The Connecticut courts judged him in contempt on the ground that the
federal privilege against self-incrimination was not available and that the state privilege
had not been properly invoked.
The Supreme Court reversed a denial of habeas corpus holding that the "Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed the petitioner the protection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination." The setting of the questions, a wide ranging inquiry into
crime, made it apparent that if the people whose names petitioner was to furnish were
still engaged in unlawful activities, the petitioner's tesimony might very well furnish
a link in the chain of evidence connecting him with more recent crimes.
Mr. Justice White in dissent urged that "the assumption necessary to the above
reasoning is that all persons, or all who have committed a misdemeanor, are continuously engaged in crime. This is but another way of making the claim of privilege
automatic." Id. at 37. Further, White distinguished Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479 (1951), on the ground that Hoffman involved questions directed to a felon "known
to be involved in rackets in the area...." Still it is difficult to circumvent the Court's
statement in Hoffman that one should not be required to answer after invoking the
privilege unless it is "perfectly clear . . . that the witness is mistaken, and that the
answer cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate." Id. at 488. See generally Note,

Recent Extensions of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 275
(1953).
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process-an attempt to make the states subject to the same constitutional limitations as the federal government.
With the foundation of Adamson thus destroyed, it was only a
matter of time until the case was expressly overruled. This occurred
in Griffin v. California,353 where the California practice of allowing
the prosecutor to comment to the jury on a defendant's failure to
testify, which had been upheld in Adamson, was held to violate fourteenth amendment due process. Now, consistent with the holding in
Malloy, the states are subject to the same privilege-against-selfincrimination rule as the federal government.
Another factor which for many years frequently rendered ineffective
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was the rule that
the privilege is not available to a witness to protect him from being
compelled to give testimony in one jurisdiction which could be used
to convict him of a criminal offense in another.3 54 In our system of
federalism the potential consequences of such a doctrine are particularly dangerous to the effectiveness of the privilege.
The door to federal-state cooperation in circumventing the privilege
was opened in United States v. Murdock,351 where it was held that the
federal government could, without violating the privilege, require a
person, who is given immunity from federal prosecution, to give
evidence which might incriminate him in a state criminal proceeding.
Further, in Feldman v. United States,3 50 it was held that self-incriminating evidence obtained through the use of state immunity could be
used in a federal criminal proceeding. The circle was completed in
Knapp v. Schwertzer,357 where it was held that a state could require
a witness to give evidence which might prove incriminating in a
federal criminal prosecution. At this point, through an artificial, conceptual utilization of the dual sovereign doctrine a plan for the effective circumvention of the privilege had been judicially approved.
This approval was withdrawn in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission
of New York Harbor,35 where the Court held that because of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, a state witness may
not be compelled to give testimony which may be self-incriminating
354

380 U.S. 609 (1965).
See McCoRdmcm, EvmaEcE

355

284 U.S. 141 (1931).

353

§

124, at 259 (1954).

356 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
357 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
358 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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under federal law unless he is insured that neither the compelled
testimony nor its fruits will be used against him in a federal criminal
proceeding.3 59 To implement this rule the Court prohibited the
federal government from using testimony compelled through state
immunity or from using the fruits derived from such testimony. No
answer is offered to the difficult question of how the use of the fruits
of such testimony can be controlled. While limitation was placed
on federal use of state-immunity compelled testimony, the Court did
not go so far as to prohibit subsequent federal prosecution for an
offense related to the state compelled testimony. The danger of going
this far in the implementation of the protection is obvious. Such a
rule could in many instances allow the state to grant immunity to its
citizens from criminal responsibility for federal offenses.
The Court in Murphy goes no further than overruling Feldman,
but the rationale of the decision demands its applicability to federal
questioning after a grant of immunity from federal prosecution and
subsequent state use of the testimony. The majority's theory was that
"since the privilege is now fully applicable to the State 0 0 and to the
Federal Government, the basic issue is the same whether the testimony
is compelled by the Federal Government and used by a State or compelled by a State and used by the Federal Government." 1l This approach recognizes that the same privilege is involved under both the
fifth and fourteenth amendments and that this basic constitutional
guarantee should be protected against conceptual manipulation based
upon the idea of dual sovereigns. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in
judgment, attacked the constitutional basis of the majority's decision
prohibiting the use of state-immunity compelled testimony in a federal
prosecution. He urged that the same result could and should have
been reached through application of the Court's supervisory power
over federal criminal procedure rather than through a mixing of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. 3 62 In other words, he argued that the
Constitution should not have been relied upon because it was not
necessary to the decision. Although it may be superior from a traditional constitutional-interpretation point of view of not relying upon
the Constitution unless necessary, the Harlan approach has one serious
shortcoming. It leaves wide open the possibility of state use of incrimi359 Id. at 70.

360 Referring to the holding in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
361 378 U.S. 52, 53 n.1(1964).
362 Id. at 90-91. (Harlan, J., concurring.)
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nating testimony obtained through grants of immunity by federal
officials, since the Court has no supervisory power, as such, over state
criminal procedure. In order to provide for the complete solution of
the broad problem in this area it was necessary that the Court utilize
the Constitution.
The Court appears to have gone about as far as possible in crystalizing the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Murphy
seems to provide the answer to the dual sovereign loophole in the
privilege and Malloy has produced uniformity of the privilege between
federal and state governments. The only possible major extension of
the privilege left would be to include within its scope a prohibition
against the asking of questions by a government official which might
tend to incriminate the party being questioned. Or short of this, questions which might require incriminating answers could be required to
be submitted to wimesses in advance so that their assertion or waiver
of the privilege could be in private. Various means of implementing
such a rule are possible. The most far-reaching would be to prohibit
subsequent prosecution for an offense related to the question, unless
the prescribed procedure had been followed. Such an extention of the
privilege might be justified on the basis that an assertion of the privilege is viewed by most as amounting to an admission of guilt, thus
tending to defeat the very purpose of the privilege. One present trend
running throughout the broad area of constitutional criminal procedure is to require the state, if it is to convict a person, to do so without
requiring or coercing that party to aid in his own conviction.sta While
363 The marked shift to the federal standard in state cases began with Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), where the Court spoke of the accused's "free choice to
admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer." Id. at 241. To trace further development, see
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Malinskos v. New York, 32-1 U.S. 401 (1945);
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). The
shift reflects recognition that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial,
not inquisitorial, and that the fifth amendment privilege is its essential mainstay. Rogers
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured.
and may not by coercion prove a charge against the accused out of his own mouth.

The overall tendency is also reflected in Massiah, Escobcdo and Miranda. But cf.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), noted 41 TuL_ L. REv. 132 (196). In
Schmerber the petitioner was taken to a hospital after being injured in an automobile
accident. A police officer, after observing petitioner, placed him under arrest and in.
structed a physician to take a blood sample. Petitioner objected but submitted. The
results of the test were introduced at petitioner's trial and contributed to his conviction
for driving while intoxicated. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court held in
a 5-to-4 decision that the taking of the blood sample did not violate petitioner's privi-
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this possible extension of the privilege is in accord with this trend,
there appears to be no real indication that the Court will extend the
privilege this far in the foreseeable future.
XI.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

A. General
In Palko v. Connecticut,3 4 the Court held the portion of the fifth
amendment which prohibits an individual from being held in jeopardy
more than once for the same offense not to be applicable to the states
under the fourteenth amendment. The recent and growing tendency
of the Court to hold the Bill of Right's prohibitions and guarantees
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 0 0 seems
to suggest that a new attack on Palko should remove this limitation on
fourteenth amendment due process. 360 The prohibition against double
jeopardy is not merely based upon tradition and a sense of fair play.
There are very practical reasons for its recognition. In accord with the
goal of deterring state abuse of the individual, the double jeopardy
provision tends to prevent legal harassment by the state. And in accord
with the aim of protecting against the conviction of the innocent,
it lessens the likelihood of such conviction, by preventing repeated
prosecution for the same offense. If the fifth amendment prohibition
against double jeopardy is made applicable to the states, the main
impact on state law will be on the scope of the prohibition and the
question of when jeopardy attaches, since now all but five states have
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy, and these five states
adhere to the common law prohibition against double jeopardy.0 11
lege against self-incrimination, his right to counsel, his right not to be subject to an
unreasonable search and seizure or any other right extended him by the fourteenth
amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas in a brief but blistering dissent declared: "[T]he Fifth
Amendment marks 'a zone of privacy' which the Government may not force a person
to surrender . . . . Likewise the Fourth Amendment recognizes that right when It
guarantees the right of the people to be secure 'in their persons.' . . No clearer invasion of this right of privacy can be imagined than forcible blood-letting of the kind
involved here." Id. at 778-79 (dissenting opinion).
304 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
365 See, e.g., Mallay v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
366 But see Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966), where the Court avoided deciding
the applicability of the "double jeopardy" prohibition to the states. Four justices, however, made it clear that they view the prohibition to be a part of fourteenth amendment due process.
367 See ALl, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 56 (Tent. Drafts Nos. I and 2,
1931-1932). (Alaska and Hawaii are not listed. Both have constitutional provisions pro'
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B. Attachment of Jeopardy
Because former jeopardy is essential to double jeopardy, the question of when jeopardy attaches can be crucial. The majority rule is
that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the complete jury is empaneled and sworn 36 8 and in a trial without a jury when the first
witness is sworn. 369 If after jeopardy attaches the trial is terminated
Without a verdict, re-prosecution is still possible in many instances
without violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. The test
for determining the permissibility of re-prosecution is whether the
premature termination was caused by "manifest necessity." 3 ° If so,
there is no double jeopardy violation. No ex.haustive definition of
.'manifest necessity" has been formulated. As a general rule questions
raised in this area are handled on a case-by-case basis, with an examination of the facts by the court to determine the possible presence of
"oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibition is
aimed." 371 The typical examples of "manifest necessity" are a hung
jury372 and the disqualification of a juror.37 3 "Manifest necessity" is
hibiting double jeopardy. ALASrA CONST. art. I, § 9; HAwAii Cosr. art. 1, § 8.) The
common law prohibition against double jeopardy has been incorporated into the constitutions of all but five states: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina and
Vermont; however, each of these states recognizes the prohibition of double jeopardy as
a part of its common law. See State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829); Gilpin v. State,
142 Md. 464, 121 Ad. 354 (1923); Commonwealth v. McCann, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N.E.
633 (1931); State v. Clemmons, 207 N.C. 276, 176 S.E. 760 (1934); State v. O'Brien, 106
VL 97, 170 Ad. 98 (1934).
368 See, e.g., Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593 (1906); O'Donnell v. People. 224 Ill.
217, 79 N.E. 639 (1906); People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 27 N.W. 539 (1886). Sec generally
38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 158 (1963).
369 See, e.g., Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.D.C. 1939). See generally 1 WuAmrTON,
CRIAMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 309-10 (12th ed. 1957).
370 This test was originated in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
The Court stated: "We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts
of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in
their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest neces.
sity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to
exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere." Id. at 580. For an application of
this test as a constitutional standard, see Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (193);
God v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
371 Wade v. Hunter, 336 US. 684, 688-89 (1949).
372 See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). The question of whether the
jury could or could not agree is generally said to be one of sound judicial discretion,
not subject to attack except in the case of gross abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v.
Huff, 75 Kan. 585, 90 Pac. 279 (1907).
373 See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 155 US. 271 (1894). Other cases where "manifest necessity" is generally held to be present are: (1) where the jury has been tampered
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generally not recognized where the trial is terminated because of improper conduct or error by the prosecutor or judge.37 4 Under the
American approach there is no former jeopardy, as there is held to be
in the English system, when the defendant's former conviction is set
aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction.3 17
At first glance the English position would seem to be the ideal device
with which to implement fully the aim of deterring state law enforcement misconduct, i.e., by forever barring prosecution for the crime in
cases where illegalities tainted the prosecution and conviction. The
state would thus be encouraged to provide each defendant with the
fairest trial possible. But th arguments against adoption of the English
position are impressive. If liberally applied, it could result in circumvention of the "societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is
clear." Moreover, such an approach would tend to result in a much
more restrictive interpretation of constitutional rights, since an appellate reversal would permanently place the convicted party beyond the
reach of the law in so far as the particular crime in question is concerned.
One indication of at least partial adoption of the English practice
appears in Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent in United States v. Tateo870
with (State v. Hansford, 76 Kan. 678, 92 Pac. 551 (1907)); (2) where there has been an
unauthorized separation of a juror from the remainder of the panel (Etter v. State,
185 Tenn. 218, 205 S.W.2d 1 (1947)); (3) where it is discovered that a juror is so biased
or prejudiced that he cannot render a fair and impartial verdict (Simmons v. United
States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (juror obtained his place by perjury); People v. Sharp, 168
Mich. 79, 127 N.W. 758 (1910) (juror had a preconceived opinion); Commonwealth v,

McCormick, 130 Mass. 61 (1881) (juror was interested in the accused surety on his
word); Armor v. State, 125 Ga. 3,53 S.E. 815 (1906) (juror related to prosecutor)); (4)
where juror served on the grand jury (Watt v. State, 193 Tenn. 257, 246 S.W.2d 4 (1952));
(5) illness of juror, where it appears that the juror was not likely to recover soon
enough to allow the trial to proceed within a reasonable time (Baker v. Commonwealth,
280 Ky. 165, 132 S.W.2d 766 (1936)); (7) where there is a death or illness in a juror's
family which would prevent proper consideration of the case (Salistean v. State, 115
Neb. 838, 215 N.W. 107 (1927)); (8) illness of trial judge (State v. Slorah, 118 Me. 203,
106 All. 768 (1919)).
374 See, e.g, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (discharge of jury on request of prosecution because of absence of key prosecution witnesses). But see, Corl v.
United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961) (where the judge on his own motion erroneously
declared a mistrial because of his concern for the rights of the accused).
375 See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964), wherein the Court stated: "Tile
principle that . ..[the double jeopardy] provision does not preclude the Government
retrying a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings
leading to conviction is a well-established part of our constitutional jurisprudence. In
this respect we differ from the practice obtaining in England." Id. at 465.
370 Id. at 468.
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In Tateo the defendant obtained a reversal of his first conviction on
the basis of the trial judge's misconduct during the trial which coerced
the defendant to change his plea from not guilty to guilty.371 After
reversal of the first conviction, when the government sought to reprosecute, the district court held that such re-prosecution was barred
by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.3 78 A majority
of the Supreme Court held that re-prosecution was not barred in
this case. While declaring general agreement with the American
approach to double jeopardy, Mr. Justice Goldberg urged the applicability of the double-jeopardy prohibition in this case on the ground
that judicial error had deprived the defendant of "his valued right
,"37 This position can
to have the original jury consider his case ....
be reconciled with the Court's past approach to "manifest necessity"
and its exceptions to that doctrine,3 80 by viewing the error in Tateo
to be the same, in effect, as an erroneous, premature termination of
the trial,38 1 since any competent trial lawyer would advise his client
under the Tateo circumstances to plead guilty rather than risk life
imprisonment by proceeding to a verdict and appealing the resulting
sentence. 3s2 Goldberg's assertion of this reasoning blunts the thrust
377 In defendant's first trial, during the fourth day of trial, the trial judge told defendant's attorney that if the defendant continued his not guilty plea and was found guilty
he would sentence him to prison for life. Immediately thereafter defendant upon the
advice of counsel withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty.
378 United States v. Tateo, 216 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
379 377 U.S. 463, 473 (dissenting opinion) (quoting from Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S.
684, 689 (1949)).
380 See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
381 In Tateo by virtue of his conduct the trial judge had become an adversary of the

defendant rather than an impartial referee. This lends further similarity between Tatco
and Downum. On this point of similarity between the cases Mr. Justice Goldberg urged:
"If anything Tateo's deprivation is more serious [than was Donumr's]. The purpose of
the judicial coercion in his case was to deny him the right to have the impaneled jury
decide his fate, whereas this was merely the effect of the prosecutorial negligence in
Downum. Moreover, Downum was not subjected to the taking of evidence, whereas
Tateo's trial had been in progress for four days before its abortive ending." United
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473 (1964).
382 On this point Mr. Justice Goldberg quoted the argument of defendant's counsel
that "... it would be an audacious trial lawyer indeed who would advise a client in
a Federal Court to risk a life in prison without hope of parole on the basis of an
appellate review of his sentence, for there is not power to review a sentence within the
statutory maximum either in the Supreme Court . . . or in the Court of Appeals."
Id. at 475. Mr. Justice Goldberg stated that this contention is of questionable accuracy,
but the fact of the dilemma lends validity to the conclusion of the argument that a
competent trial lawyer would advise his client to plead guilty rather than run the risk
of not being able to get effective review of the sentence imposed. Id. at 475 n.5.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss3/4

88

Taylor: The Supreme Court, the Individual and the Criminal Process

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:386

of the majority's argument that re-prosecution is permissible because
it would have been, had the defendant moved for and obtained a
mistrial or had he let the case go to a verdict and then appealed and
obtained a reversal. The majority argued that acceptance of the dissent's position would place a premium on delay in raising objections. 31
The dissent urged that there is no real option open to the defendant
in this type situation. Thus, it would not provide a premium for
choosing one tactical alternative-since there is in effect no choice. 88 4
According to the majority, the dissent's reasoning on this point "entirely misconceived the thrust" of the majority's contention.
The point is not whether one could have expected Tateo to
ask for a mistrial. Rather, it is whether, if such a request had been
made and either had been granted or had underlain reversal on
direct review, Tateo could have been tried again. If he could have
been tried again, a decision proscribing retrial if attack is collateral would mean that any lawyer worth his salt would forbear
requesting a mistrial in similar circumstances, even where he is
certain that his position would be sustained by the trial judge or
on review. That any judicial system should encourage litigants to
raise objections at the earliest rather than latest possible time
seems self-evident. In other words, simple logic compels the conclusion that if the court precluded retrial here, it would also have
to preclude retrial in a similar case in which a mistrial is granted. 888
This argument fails to recognize that, as a general proposition, a mistrial will be granted only in cases where the trial judge's error resulted
from carelessness or a mistake rather than from the judge's assumption
of an adversarial position toward the defendant. In the simple-mistake
case, Goldberg's Tateo-Downum approach is not intended to be applicable, since in that case the trial judge could not be considered an
adversary, which is necessary in order to bring the case within the
exception to "manifest necessity."
Even though Mr. Justice Goldberg limited the right to have the
original jury consider the case, to something less than error-free jury
consideration, 8 6 there is no logical reason why the theory could not
be extended to the point of providing the defendant with the right to
383 Id. at 467-68.
384 See note 347 supra.
385 United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 nA (1964).
386

See id. at 473 (dissenting opinion).
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have the original jury consider the case free of error, or at least free
from serious prejudicial error-which, if present, would preclude a
real consideration of the case by the jury. Nevertheless, at present there
is no real indication that the existing American practice will be
abandoned or even seriously modified. There is, however, the possibility that the Court may decide that its aim of preventing state abuse
of individual liberty can ,best be effectuated through adoption of the
English practice or a watered-down version thereof accompanied by a
conscious effort to allow it to influence and limit appellate consideration of trial errors.
C. Appeals by State-Appeals by Defendant-Reprosecution
One point of disagreement on the scope of double jeopardy prohibition is whether it removes 'from the state the privilege of appealing
an error of law and thereby possibly obtaining a new trial. In some
states this practice of allowing an appeal of an error of law by the state
is not considered violative of the prohibition against double jeopardy.38 7 The basis for this view has been expressed as follows:
The state should not be permitted to continually prosecute a
citizen in the hope that it may find a jury which will eventually
convict him, but it should have the privilege of one legal trial
of the defendant for the offense with which he is charged. This
can only be accomplished by the correction of natural errors in
each case, whether it be prejudicial to the state or to the defendant. The single jeopardy of the defendant is not terminated until
both the facts and the law applicable thereto are finally determined. Finality is essential, but not when it is acquired contrary
to law. Justice occupies the paramount position in American
Jurisprudence, and changes in procedure are fundamentally based
on this fact. The statute in this case does not deprive defendant
in error of a fair and impartial legal trial-in fact, it guarantees
just this. There is a continuing jeopardy until the case is finally
determined 3s8
387 See State v. Palko, 122 Conn. 529, 191 Ad. 320, afl'd, Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937); Commonwealth v. Prail, 146 Ky. 109, 142 SAV. 202 (1912) (appeal allowed the state by statute from acquittal in misdemeanor cases where only a fine is
involved); State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 At. 23 (1918); State v. Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120,
154 P.2d 826 (1945) (statute allowed state to appeal from an order terminating or abating
the case but not from a jury verdict of acquittal); State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10
N.V.2d 117 (1943).
388 State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W2d 117, 120 (1943).
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Another problem area ,which may be subjected to the federal standard is the effect a finding of guilt to a lesser included offense, e.g.,
second degree murder in a case where the defendant was charged with
first degree murder, has upon a subsequent trial arising due to a successful appeal by the 'defendant from the first conviction. At present
there is a close split on the question of whether the defendant can be
retried for the greater offense. 389 The generally recognized basis for
the complete retrial position is that the defendant by appealing waived
his protection against double jeopardy. 9 0 At least .three theories other
389 Apparently at least 18 American jurisdictions allow subsequent prosecution for
the greater offense.
For examples of cases from jurisdictions allowing subsequent prosecution for greater
offense, see U.S. v. Frank, 8 Alaska 436 (1933); Young v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130 Pac.
l011 (1913); Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573, 64 S.E. 676, aJJ'd, 217 U.S. 284 (1909); State
ex rel. Lopez v. Killicrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931); Application of Christensen,
116 Kan. 671, 203 P.2d 258 (1949); Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 805, 154 S.W. 919
(1913); Butler v. State, 177 Miss. 91, 170 So. 148 (1936); State v. Beard, 334 Mo. 909, 68
S.W.2d 698 (1934); State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 18 N.W.2d 203 (1945); Gibson V.
Somers, 31 Nev. 531, 103 Pac. 1073 (1909); People v. McGrath, 202 N.Y. 445, 96 N.E. 92
(1911); State v. Correll, 229 N.C. 640, 50 S.E.2d 717, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 969 (1948);
State v. Robinson, 100 Ohio App. 466, 137 N.E.2d 141 (1956); Pierce v. State, 96 Okla.
Crim. 76, 248 P.2d 633 (1952); State v. Gillis, 73 S.C. 318, 53 S.E. 487 (1906); State v.
Kessler, 15 Utah 142, 49 Pac. 293 (1897); State v. Persons, 117 Vt. 556, 96 A.2d 818
(1953); State v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194, 122 Pac. 995 (1912).
For examples of cases from jurisdictions not allowing subsequent prosecution for
greater offense, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Corbett v. State, 38 Ala.
App. 536, 91 So. 2d 503, cert. denied, 265 Ala. 394, 91 So. 2d 509 (1956); Hem v. State,
212 Ark. 360, 205 S.W.2d 477 (1947); State v. Naylor, 28 Del. (5 Boyce) 99, 90 Atd. 880
(1913); Simmons v. State, 156 Fla. 353, 22 So. 2d 803 (1945); People v. Carrico, 310 111.
543, 142 N.E. 164 (1923); State v. Coleman, 226 Iowa 968, 285 N.W. 269 (1939); State v.
Elmore, 179 La. 1057, 155 So. 896 (1934); People v. Rock, 283 Mich. 171, 277 N.W. 873
(1938); State v. White, 61 N.M. 109, 295 P.2d 1019 (1956); State V. Wilson, 172 Ore. 373,
142 P.2d 680 (1943); Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 Atd. 632 (1938); Reagan v.
State, 155 Tenn. 397, 293 S.W. 755 (1927); Lane v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 58, 55 S.E.2d
450 (1949); State v. Franklin, 139 W. Va. 43, 79 S.E.2d 692 (1953); Radej v. State, 152
Wis. 503, 140 N.W. 21 (1913). See also People v. Henderson, 368 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr.
77 (1963), which held that after reversal of judgment imposing life sentence, an accused
cannot, on retrial for the same offense, constitutionally be sentenced to death, Gomez v.
Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 2d 297, 322 P.2d 292 (1958), presents the California rule
which prohibits subsequent trial for the greater offense but does not recognize this as
applying to different degrees of the same offense. Hill v. State, 126 Tex, Crim. 79, 69
S.W.2d 409 (1933), reflects the post-1927 rule in Texas that the general rule that a
conviction of a lesser offense bars a prosecution for the greater offense on a new trial
does not apply in prosecutions for murder and assault with intent to murder-thus one
found guilty of murder without malice can after reversal be tried for murder without
malice.
390 See, e.g., State v. Terreso, 56 Kan. 126, 42 Pac. 354 (1895), wherein It is stated:
"Upon the defendant's motion for a new trial the court granted just what he asked,
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than waiver have been advanced to support the practice of allowing
a defendant who obtains a reversal of a conviction on appeal to be retried for a greater offense than he was previously convicted of. Dissenting in Kepner v. United States, Mr. Justice Holmes said of "waiver,"
as used in this context:
Usually no such waiver is expressed or thought of. Moreover,
it cannot be imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner the
correction of a fatal error unless he should waive other rights so
important as to be saved by an express clause in the Constitution
of the United States.3 91
Holmes went on to offer a "continuing jeopardy" basis for the principle as a substitute for the waiver basis. He declared:
It is more pertinent to observe that... logically and rationally
a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the
same cause, however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one
continuingjeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause3 9 2
(Emphasis added.)
In Waller v. State393 the Supreme Court of Georgia, apparently realizing the conceptual difficulty involved in applying the waiver theory,
declared:
We do not base our decision ... upon [waiver], but upon the

[Georgia] constitution itself. It expressly excepts certain cases
from its guarantee that a person shall not be put in jeopardy more
and of course he waived all right to object to the legal consequences necessarily resulting from such grant. He waived his right to plead former jeopardy . .. to again being
tried for the same offense." Id. at 355. In State v. Ash, 122 Pac. 995 (Wash. 1912), the
court said: "The theory of these cases is that, when a conviction for the lesser crime,
under an indictment or information charging a greater crime, is reversed upon the
voluntary appeal of a defendant, he thereby waives the acquittal upon the higher
charge, and, upon the conviction being set aside, he is in the same position as if no
trial had been had; the reversal operating upon the acquittal as well as upon tie
conviction." Id. at 997; see State v. Robinson, 137 N.E.2d 141 (Ohio App. 1956). "[N]o
constitutional right of the accused is invaded, for the law has accorded him the privilege of appeal of which he may, but is not required to, avail himself. If he does appeal
and secures a reversal of judgment of conviction, even though it be a conviction of a
lower included offense, the effect of such reversal at the instance of the accused is to
set aside and nullify the whole verdict. Such has been the law of this state for many
years." Id. at 145.
391 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1903) (dissenting opinion).
:392 Id. at 134.

393 104 Ga. 505, 30 S.E. 835 (1898).
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than once for the same offense. The state, for the purpose of protecting society against crime and criminals, reserved the right to
place more than once upon trial for the same offense persons accused of crime who had upon their own motion been granted new
30 4
trials.
The rationale for this approach seems to be that protection against
re-trial for a greater offense following a reversal of conviction is simply
not essential to the protection of liberty afforded by the prohibition.
95 In Behimer the deA third theory is advanced in State v. Behimer.3
fendant was charged with first degree murder after his conviction of
second degree murder was reversed on appeal. The trial court refused
to allow him to be tried for this greater offense and the prosecution
appealed. The appellate court in response to the defendant's argument
that he could not be tried for a greater offense than the one for which
he had previously been convicted prior to reversal declared:
The only effect.., that could be given to so much of the verdict
as acquitted the defendant of murder in the first degree, after the
rest of it had been set aside, would be to regard it as finding the
qualities of an act while the fact of the existence of the act was
undetermined. This would be a verdict, to the effect that if the
defendant committed the homicide he did it without "deliberate
and premeditated malice." ... There can be no legal determination of the character of the malice of a defendant in respect to
homicide which he is not found to have committed; or rather,
of which, under his plea, he is, in law, presumed to be innocent
...upon mature consideration we are of opinion that the verdict
is severable only when there is a conviction or an acquittal on
different counts for separate and distinct offenses, or where there
are several defendants; but that where there is but one defendant,
and, in fact, but one offense, the verdict is entire. a00
The waiver reasoning is also utilized in some states to allow a retrial
on all of the counts in an indictment when convictions of a lesser number are reversed on appeal;397 but this does not represent a clear ma304 Id. at 507, 30 S.E. at 836.
395 Ohio St. Rep. 572 (1870).

390 Id. at 577-79; accord, Bohanan v. State, 24 N.W. 390, 397 (Neb. 1885).
307 See, e.g., State v. Blasley, 159 Ind. 395, 65 N.E. 185 (1902); State v. Beal, 202 N.C.
266, 162 S.E. 561 (1932); State v. Pianfetti, 79 Vt. 236, 65 At. 84 (1906).
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jority view. 98 The United States Supreme Court has rejected the

waiver doctrine in the federal system as a "narrow, grudging application" of constitutional protections, since it, in effect, threatens the de-

fendant, with the possibility of imposition of a more serious penalty
as a consequence of asserting a valid constitutional right. 9 With the
growing trend toward absorption of Bill of Rights guarantees into the
fourteenth amendment and toward the imposition of federal standards
upon the states, it seems highly probable that the waiver doctrine will
be laid to rest in the same manner as have other technical loopholes
in constitutional protections. 400
D. Multiple Prosecutions

Another wide-spread state practice which may soon be held violative
of the fourteenth amendment is that of trying a defendant separately
for multiple crimes committed on a single occasion.4 0 ' The problem
here is determining what constitutes the "same offense" under the fifth
amendment prohibition against putting an individual in jeopardy
twice for the same offense.
The traditional test has been the so-called "same evidence" rule,
under which, if one act constitutes a violation of two penal statutes,
such act amounts to two separate offenses if each of the statutes requires
proof of a fact which the other does not require. 40 2 When strictly interpreted this rule avoids the double-jeopardy prohibition in almost every
instance where one transaction results in two offenses.40 3 A modified
398 See, e.g., State v. Casey, 207 Mo. 1, 105 S.W. 645 (1907); People v. Dowling, 84
N.Y. 478 (1881); State v. Abernathy, 153 Tenn. 441, 284 S.W. 361 (1920).
399 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). "In any normal sense . . . [waiver]
connotes some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right .... When a man
has been convicted of second degree murder and given a long term of imprisonment
it is wholly fictional to say that he 'chooses' to forego his constitutional defense of
former jeopardy on a charge of murder in the first degree in order to secure a reversal
of an erroneous conviction of the lesser offense. In short, he has no meaningful choice."
Id. at 191-92.
400 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961) (lack of express exclusionary rule in
constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures overcome).
401 See, e.g., Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915); Roark v. United States, 17 F.2d
570 (8th Cir. 1927); Anderson v. Moyer, 193 Fed. 499 (N.D. Ga. 1912).
402 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). "The applicable rule is that
where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test is to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id.
at 304. For other examples of application of this rule, see State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199,
33 S.W.2d 905 (1930); Usary v. State, 172 Tenn. 305, 112 S.WV.2d 7 (1938).
403 See, e.g., Pivak v. State, 202 Ind. 417, 175 N.E. 278 (1931); State v. Brooks, 215 Wis.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss3/4

94

Taylor: The Supreme Court, the Individual and the Criminal Process

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 1,.386

version of the "same evidence" rule prevails in the federal system.
Under this modification, conviction for a lesser offense bars subsequent
prosecution for a more serious offense within which the lesser one is
included. 40 4 The federal rule is of no value to the individual, when the
offenses in question are not divisible into degrees. 40
Thus far the Court has given the states wide discretion in their
handling of multiple offense prosecutions. In Hoag v. New Jersey,40
the defendant was tried on four occasions for the robbery of different
individuals, all of whom were held up in the same robbery. The defendant was acquitted in the first three trials only to be convicted in
the last. The Court, with three justices dissenting, held that these consecutive trials did not result in "fundamental unfairness," so as to
violate the fourteenth amendment. In Ciucci v. Illinois,407 the defen-

dant was charged with murdering his wife and three children and was
tried and convicted of the murder of his wife and one child and later
for the murder of a second child. In each of these trials the defendant
received a long jail sentence. The state then tried the defendant for
the murder of the third child. He was found guilty and sentenced to
death. In a five to four decision, a majority of the Court relying on
Hoag, affirmed the conviction. But judging from the growing number
of dissenters in these cases 408 and the recent shift in the balance of the
Court, a change could come in the near future. A growing number of
justices are urging that as a practical matter the defendant in these
multiple offense cases is generally tried for all of his offenses each time
he is tried. This trend seems aimed toward making a "single transaction" test the constitutional standard and making the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. The "single transaction" rule will
bar any second prosecution for an offense which is part of the same
criminal transaction as was an offense for which the defendant has
already been tried. The defendant can be tried for only one offense
134, 254 N.W. 374 (1934). But see State v. Pennsylvania R.R,, 9 N.J. 194, 87 A.2d 709
(1952); Coffey v. State, 207 Tenn. 260, 389 S.W.2d 1 (1960).
404 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). The latest indication of the
Court, though not conclusive, is that this rule is not a part of fourteenth amendment
due process. See Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966).
405 See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958) (here
defendant was convicted of three offenses growing directly out of the same illegal sale
of narcotics and the conviction was affirmed).
406 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
407 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
408 Hoag was 5 to 3; Cucci, 5 to 4.
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arising out of the same act or transaction. If this approach is made a
constitutional requirement, it may necessitate the revamping of penal
statutes, to conform punishment provisions to the change; but, it will
remove one possible means of state abuse of the judicial process to
harass the individual, and it will lessen the likelihood of conviction
of the innocent through repeated prosecution for what actually is only
one criminal act.
E. Prosecution by Separate Sovereigns
Serious problems are also presented by dual prosecutions for the
same act by separate sovereigns.409 At present the rule of Bartkus v.
IllinoislO allows the state to prosecute a defendant for the same act
for which he has already been prosecuted by the federal government.
The reverse of this, with the federal prosecution following the state
prosecution, was upheld in Abbate v. United States.a41 The real basis
for these decisions seems to be the preservation of our system of federalism and its dual sovereignty concept. This basis is most vulnerable
at the present time. The role and importance of the states in our system is rapidly diminishing with increasing power being absorbed by
the federal government. Also suggesting an end to the Bartkus-Abbate
rationale is the Court's reasoning in Murphy v. Waterfront Commis41 2
sion of New York Harbor,
which closed the fifth amendment selfincrimination loophole under which a defendant could be whipsawed
into incriminating himself under both state and federal law. The
Court pointed out that the policies behind the protection were being
defeated by the growing "cooperative federalism, where the federal and
state governments are waging a united front against many types of
criminal activity." 413 The policies underlying the constitutional protection against double jeopardy are equally subject to circumvention
under the Bartkus-A b bate rule.
Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Bartkus urged that there is no need
for blindly adhering to the dual sovereignty concept in this area. He
pointed out that most civilized nations do not and have not needed
the power to try people a second time to protect themselves even when
409 See generally Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1961); MAYERS & YARBROLIGi, Bis Vexari, New Trials
and Successive Prosecutions,74 H.Av. L. Rv.1 (1960).
410 359 US. 121 (1959).
411 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
412 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
413 Id. at 55-56.
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dealing with foreign lands and that this should be even more unnecessary where the two sovereigns are so closely bound in interest as are
414
the American states and the federal government.
Another potential problem which exists under the dual sovereign
theory is that of successive prosecutions by state and municipal governments. At present even though municipalities are generally thought
of as political subdivisions of the states, such successive prosecutions
are generally allowed. 415 Thus, under the present constitutional rule
it is, at least theoretically, conceivable that an individual could be
tried for one act by a municipality, a state, and the federal government. The municipality-state loophole will surely be closed as soon
as the federal-state one is, if not before.
XII.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 41 0

In determining whether a method of punishment is "cruel and
unusual" the Court has stated that it is to be guided by "evolving
417
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Recognizing the now wide-spread supervision of criminal justice by
the Court, this statement carries far-reaching implications.
Even though the eighth amendment prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishment" has been held applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 41 8 the scope of
the prohibition has been quite restricted as reflected by the Court's
414 359 U.S. at 156-57 (dissenting opinion).
415 See Kneier, Prosecution Under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double
Jeopardy, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 201 (1931); Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy:
A Critique of Parthus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 W. Rrs. L. REv. 700,
722-23 (1963).
416 The eighth amendment of the Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." For
a brief discussion of the history and development of this constitutional right against
cruel and unusual punishment, see Note, 41 N.C.L. REV. 244 (1963); Note, 34 MINN. L.
REV. 134 (1950).
417 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
418 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson the Court struck down
a California statute making it a misdemeanor to "be addicted to the use of narcotics"
as violating the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as made applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. After thuis
holding that criminal punishment for the status of narcotics addiction violates the prohibition against cruel and unsual punishment, the lower federal courts picked up the
principle and extended it to drunkenness. See Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir.
1966); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966). From this develop.
ment may come a constitutionally based definition of legal insanity accompanied by a
principle that criminal punishment of one within this definition amounts to a violation
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holding in Louisiana ex rel. Francisv. Resweber.410 There the Court
assuming applicability of the eighth amendment prohibition to the
states held the "re-execution" of a seventeen year old convicted murderer, following an unsuccessful attempt to electrocute him, did not
amount to "cruel and unusual punishment." The majority reasoned
that the unavoidable accident did not add an "element of cruelty to
a subsequent execution." 420 The unsuccessful attempt to execute was
likened to a fire in the cell block, which endangered the life of the
condemned man but from which he was able to escape. 421- The four
dissenters urged that any state action which could result in "death by
installments" is a "cruel and unusual punishment" and that the mere
fact that the prior unsuccessful attempt was caused by an accident did
422
not affect its cruel effect on the condemned man.
Possible expansion in the development of the prohibition against
"cruel and unusual punishment" seems to have been indicated recently
in the dissenting opinion in Rudolph v. Alabama.42 Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for three justices dissenting from a denial of certiorari
in a rape case, urged that imposition of the death penalty in a case
where the convicted party has not taken or endangered human life
amounts to a "cruel and unusual punishment." The constitutional
test urged by the dissenters is whether the punishment is "greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged";42 4 if so, it violates the eighth
amendment guarantee applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Professor Herbert L. Packer, who indicates sympathy with abolition
of capital punishment, urges that there are "legitimate devices for
judicial control of the administration of the death penalty," but that
the Goldberg "disproportionate penalty" approach is not one of
of the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. At present.
however, only punishment for an unwilled status, as opposed to an unwilled direct
offense to the person or property of another, is prohibited by the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court has, however, held that the conviction of a
legally incompetent defendant violates due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 US. 375 (196).
If the incompetence of the defendant at the time of conviction violates due process, it
will be a simple step to hold the conviction of one incompetent at the time of the
offense to be violative of due process.
419 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
420 Id. at 464.
421 Ibid.
422 Id. at 472-81.
423 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
424 Id. at 891.
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them. 425 The justification for his criticism of the Goldberg approach
is the difficulty he has in viewing imposition of the death penalty in
a rape case as a violation of "evolving standards of decency ' 1 2 1 or par' 427
ticularly of "standards of decency more or less universally accepted,
which are the previously announced eighth amendment standards,
when nineteen American jurisdictions permit the imposition of capital
428
punishment in cases involving rape.
This writer agrees with Professor Packer that the Goldberg disproportionate penalty approach is subject to criticism. This is not, however, to agree with the criticisms offered by Packer. To begin with,
Packer's first criticism is quite provincial in outlook; it fails to take
into account a definite trend which exists at the international levela trend which appears to be extending to this country.4 2 As another
basis for criticism of the Goldberg approach Packer appears to urge
judicial delay until there is sufficient mobilization of social sympathy
with abolition. The merit in this suggestion depends to a great extent
upon one's philosophy of the role of the Supreme Court. If an approach
of following, rather than leading, had been strictly adhered to in the
past, this nation might still be waiting for a change in social sympathy
sufficient to allow for Brown v. Board of Education. One who views
the proper role of the Supreme Court as one of leadership should not
be troubled by the abrupt change represented by the Goldberg approach. Implicit in the independence provided the Supreme Court by
the Constitution is an intended role of leadership. Neither of the other
two branches of government is given the same independence to resist
425

Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HaRv. L. REv. 1071,

1081-82

(1964).
426

This test was formulated by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86.

101 (1958).
427 This test was formulated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947).
428 See Packer, supra note 425, at 1073.
429 Because 19 American jurisdictions permit "imposition of the death penalty for
rape, . . . it is hard to see how 'evolving standards of decency,' let alone 'standards of
decency more or less universally accepted,' can be said to be violated." Id. at 1073-74.
This argument against the Goldberg position is subject to obvious criticism on Its lack
of a universal point of view. The critic seems to treat this nation as the center of the
universe and this nation's customs and morals as the only proper measures of civilization.
He does not recognize that his statement is simply that because 19 of 51 jurisdictions
(including the federal government) which make up our legal system recognize the death
penalty in rape cases, it satisfies minimum requirements of civilized society. He does
not point out that only in these 19 states of our country and in four countries is the
death penalty recognized in rape cases.
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public sentiment and prejudice. The Supreme Court occupies such a
place in our governmental structure as to allow and even encourage
resistance to change or implementation of change depending upon the
circumstances involved. Under our system the Court should, while
exercising self-restraint sufficient to preserve necessary public respect
for the law in general and the Court in particular, be the conscience
of the nation.
The Goldberg approach is subject to criticism on two other grounds.
First, assuming that the real basis for the approach is the idea that our
society has matured to the point that imposition of the death penalty
can be viewed as contrary to "evolving standards of decency,"' 30 the
disproportionate penalty approach contains built-in limitations which
could preclude ultimate abolition of capital punishment. If absolute
abolition is not the ultimate aim, then it is submitted that a mistaken
value judgment was made. The most widely-accepted argument in
favor of capital punishment is deterrence. If the Court were to decide,
as Goldberg urged, that our society has become civilized to such a degree as to make "cruel and unusual" imposition of the death penalty
in cases of convictions for crimes which do not result in death or
involve a danger of death, why then allow the death penalty, which
by virtue of its partial abolition has become suspect, in cases where
there is a less effective argument for its imposition because of its weaker
deterrent effect? This lesser degree of effectiveness is pointed out by
Professor Henry Weihofen, who convincingly argues:
Why should a punishment that did not deter men from stealing
sheep be any more effective to deter them from committing murder? Murder usually involves less calm premeditation, not more.
Punishment or the threat of it is more likely to deter crimes
where there is a conscious and deliberate motive for gain. It is
least likely to deter crimes attributable to passion, and to embittered, frustrated or actually disordered personality .... Murder
is not typically the crime of the so-called criminal class. Much
more often, it is an incident of miserable lives characterized by
domestic quarrels, brawls, drinking and fighting. The killing is
the unpremeditated and more or less accidental culmination of a
43
long series of acts of violence. '
430

Id. at 1073.

THE URGE TO PUNISH 156, 158-59 (1956). Mr. Justice Goldberg in
Rudolph at 891 cites Ivilliams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), as support for the
431 WVEIHOFEN,
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Accepting the accuracy of this argument, it would seem equally uncivilized to impose the death penalty in cases where it tends to have
little or no deterring effect, as it would be to impose capital punishment where the penalty is viewed as being out of proportion to the
harm or risk of harm to the victim. In short, the Goldberg approach
seems based upon a retribution theory of punishment rather than
deterrence.
Perhaps a stronger attack can be made on the imposition of capital
punishment under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. The foundation for such an attack is the clear
pattern of discrimination according to race and sex which exists in the
application of the death penalty in this country. 43 2 In light of this discriminatory pattern it seems, even though exact instances of discrimination may not be accurately ascertainable, that it can accurately be
said that state sentencing agencies place a lesser value on the lives of
non-white and male defendants than upon the lives of whites and
females. Because of this definite, wide-spread discrimination-virtually
incapable of isolation-it should follow that the imposition of the
death penalty against a non-white or a male is per se violative of the
fourteenth amendment, since the non-white and male is statistically
much more apt to receive the death penalty than is a white person or
a female, who is accused of the same offense. If this argument for partial abolition is accepted, then complete abolition should follow; imposition of the death penalty against the white female, which at this point
in the argument is the only category of individual subject to the penalty, would also violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, since all others are automatically protected against improposition that deterrence, isolation, rehabilitation arc the basic permissible aims of
punishment.
432 According to SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959), of those 3096 individuals executed in the United States from 1930 to 1957, 1542 were white and 1516 were Negro.
In other words, approximately 10% of the total population provided approximately
50% of the total number of execution victims; and, in the southern and border states,
of the 1706 total executed, 1158 were Negro, or, in other words, approximately 30%
of the population provided approximately 65% of the execution victims. This is not a
new situation. Id. at 6. See SPEAR, ESSAYS ON THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH 227-31 (1844).
According to Wolfgang, Kelly, & Nolde, Comparison of Executed and the Commuted
Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. Ctum. L., C. & P.S. 301 (1962), reprinted In
]EDAu, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMEPUCA 464 (1964), based on a study of imposition of
the death penalty in Pennsylvania from 1914 to 1958--"Negroes (in a ratio of five to one)
more than whites (in a ratio of four to one) are more likely to be executed than coinmuted. Of the 3096 persons executed from 1930 through 1957 only 29 were women."
SEr.UN, supra at 6.
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position of the penalty. Also at this point with it unconstitutionl to
execute a non-white or a male the Court could simply bring fonvard
the "cruel and unusual punishment" idea and the fourteenth amendment due process concept of "fundamental fairness" in order to achieve
complete abolition.
Another approach the Court could take in this area, short of complete abolition, is a case-by-case examination of the state which is imposing the death penalty, with particular emphasis placed upon how
many individuals have been tried and convicted of the same offense
in the past, how many of these were executed and what percentage of
these were non-white (and in an appropriate case a percentage evaluation would be made on the basis of sex). In other words ie Court
would look to smaller patterns of discrimination rather than the broad
national one. The more limited nature of this approach would be more
satisfactory to those who urge judicial restraint, while at the same time
would probably eventually result in total abolition. Such an approach
does, however, raise serious problems. For example, a necessarily arbitrary decision would have to be made as to what percentage of nonwhite executions would be required in order to substantiate a finding
of a pattern of discrimination. Problems could arise in the determination of when a pattern of discrimination has ended. Also, national
uniformity in the administration of criminal justice, which is a basic
aim of the Court, would not be achieved and this state-by-state approach would tend to make every death penalty an appropriate case
for Supreme Court consideration, which would tend to further crowd
an already crowded docket.
XIII.

RETROACTIVE OR PROsPECTIVE EFFECT OF DECISIONS4M

Many of the Supreme Court's recent decisions left open the question of the retroactive effect of a holding of unconstitutionality.
The sweeping changes made in criminal procedure decisions have
caused the problem of retroactive-prospective application to become
critical. Proponents of change have generally urged retroactive application,434 reasoning that if it is unconstitutional today to convict a
man and imprison him on the basis of illegally obtained evidence or
433 See generally Bender, The Retroactive Eflect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962); Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law:
Prospective Overruling,51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Comment, 64 Mieni. L REv. 832 (1966);
Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
434 See, e.g., Currier, supra note 433, for an ably developed argument favoring retroactive application.
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other illegal procedure, it is equally unconstitutional to continue to
detain one convicted under the same circumstances at a time prior to
43 5
the judicial declaration of illegality.A
The ground work for the present argument against retroactivity was developed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Griffin v. Illinois.40 Urging recognition of the
potentially devastating administrative problems which could arise with
thousands of prisoners claiming their detention to be illegal, after each
important new criminal procedure decision, Frankfurter recommended that the Court "recognize candidly the considerations that
give prospective content to a new pronouncement of law."' a 7 At first
it appeared that the Court would reject the argument for prospective
application. The first trend might be said to have begun with Recl v.
Pate,438 where a conviction based on a confession considered voluntary
under the existing law when admitted into evidence at the petitioner's
trial, was overturned in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding because it was not admissible under the new constitutional standards of
voluntariness existing at the time of the habeas corpus proceeding.
In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board43 the decision in Griffin v.
Illinois was held to be retroactive. Doughty v. Maxwell" and Pickelsimer v. Wainwright44 indicated that the Court intended Gideon v.
Wainwright to be given retroactive application. Language in Jackson
v. Denno 42 seems to suggest that that decision was intended to receive
retroactive application.
It was the decision in Mapp v. Ohio that gave rise to considerable
435 Id. at 259-60.
436 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Traditionally the question of whether judicial decisions based
upon the Constitution should be given retroactive or prospective application has been
stated in terms of whether judges, when interpreting the Constitution, "make" law or
"find" it. The older view is that judges find the law rather than make it. See Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886). This view is in accord with the view of Blackstone on
the judge's function in a common law decision, see 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (l5th
ed. 1809); but, contrary to the view of Austin who urged that a judge through interpretation gives meaning to empty statutory or common-law terms, thus making law. Bcginnlng
in 1932 the Court's decisions have suggested a more realistic approach to the question than
was reflected in Norton. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411 (1964); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940); Great Northern R.R. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
437 Id. at 26 (concurring opinion).
438 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
439 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
440 376 U.S. 202 (1963) (per curiam).
441 375 U.S. 2 (1963) (per curiam).
442 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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disagreement on the retroactive-prospective application question. The
federal Courts of Appeal were split on the issue. 443 Even though there
was little doubt that a Supreme Court decision could be limited to
prospective application, 444 most indications suggested that Mapp would
be given retroactive application. The Court soon after Mapp applied
the rule of the decision to a case where the search and seizure had
occurred before Mapp but where direct appeal had not been completed
until afterwards.4- Another indication of the probability of retroactive
application was the Court's reasoning in Fay v. Noia. 40 That decision
appears to direct a federal judge in determining the lawfulness of a
petitioner's detention to proceed as if the trial had been held on the
same day as the habeas corpus proceeding. In the face of these indicat
tions of retroactive application, the Court in Linkleiter v. Walker 4
held Mapp applicable retroactively only in instances where direct appeal had not been completed prior to the Mapp decision. The coerced
confession cases such as Fay v. Noia448 were distinguished on the difference in aim of each of the involved constitutional guarantees. The
Court viewed the prohibition against use of coerced confessions as
443 The Fourth Circuit in Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 809 (1963), applied Mapp retroactively. The Second, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits gave Mapp prospective application. See United States ex tel. Angelct v. Fay, 33
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964); Sisk v. Lane, 331 F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel.
Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d 494
(10th Cir. 1963).
444 See, e.g., England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 808 U.S. 371 (1940).

445 See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 US. 23 (1963), (where the Court found that Afapp
had been complied with).
446 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Noia three defendants had been convicted. Two appealed
their conviction but Noia did not. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding the two
defendants who had appealed were ordered to be given new trials or released. Noia was
denied relief for failure to exhaust state remedies. In reversing this denial of relief the
Supreme Court declared:
[N]o fair-minded person will contend that those who have been deprived of their
liberty without due process of law ought nevertheless to languish in prison. Noia,
no less than his co-defendants . . . , is conceded to have been the victim of unconstitutional state action. Noia's case stands on its own; but ... no just and humane
legal system can tolerate a result whereby . . . (the co-defendants] are at liberty
because their confessions were found to have been coerced yet a Noia, whose confession was also coerced, remains in jail for life. For such anomalies, sud affronts
to the conscience of a civilized society, habeas corpus is predestined by its historical
role in the struggle for personal liberty to be the ultimate remedy.
Id. at 441.
4417 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
448 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss3/4

104

Taylor: The Supreme Court, the Individual and the Criminal Process
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:386

being based in part on their unreliability and because their use, in
effect, tends to result in conviction by a pre-trial "Star-Chamber" type
proceeding, which is alien to our system. The constitutional principle
requiring the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, rather than being aimed at preventing the use of unreliable evidence or an unfair
trial, was viewed as aimed at deterring future use of illegal means of
obtaining evidence. 449 Thus, the Court appears at least in this instance
to value protection against conviction of an innocent person higher
than protection of the dignity of the individual from state infringement.
The Court's ground for distinguishing between coerced confessions
and illegally obtained evidence is not entirely adequate. The rationale
behind the exclusion of coerced confessions, rather than inherent unreliability more accurately appears to be protection of the individual
against governmental abuse. This view is substantiated by the fact
that a vast majority of coerced confessions are not unreliable, physiological coercion being one of the most efficient means of obtaining an
accurate confession, and by the fact that corroborated coerced confessions are not admissible. 45 0 Even though the foundation of the protection against illegal searches and the protection against coerced confessions appears to be the same, the Court's position in Linkletter may be
defended on another ground. It was well-established that the fourteenth amendment guarantee against coerced confessions required exclusion, while the guarantee against illegal searches and seizures was
not held to so require until the decision in Mapp v. Ohio. Because of
its rather radical departure from prior law in Mapp, the Court may,
at least subconsciously, have realized in Linkletter that Mapp involved
more actual law making than most decisions and therefore should be
treated more like legislation than a judicial decision. In any event it
now appears that the Court has completely reversed its approach to
the retroactivity problem.
One plausible explanation for the Court's change in approach is
that holdings of retroactivity of the earlier decisions such as Griffin
v. Illinois, Gideon v. Wainwright and Jackson v. Denno brought about
only slight disruption in the administration of justice. This has not been
true of the later decisions such as Mapp, Escobedo and Miranda where
4 1
retroactivity has been denied. 6

449 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
450 See McCoRinfcK, EVIDENCE, § 109 (1954).
451 Comment, Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 Mci.
L. REv. 832 (1966).
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In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Short"52 the rule of Griffin v. California concernii g comment by a state prosecutor upon a defendant's
failure to testify was held to apply prospectively rather than retroactively. This trend was further substantiated in Johnson v. New
Jersey453 where Escobedo v. Illinois and Mirandav. Arizona were held
to apply only prospectively. In Johnson the Court advanced general
guidelines applicable to the problem of retroactive as opposed to prospective application. Emphasizing that the question of retroactive application does not turn on the relative importance of the constitutional
guarantee involved,454 the Court nevertheless indicated that a material
factor in determining retroactive application is the relation of the
abridged right to the "truth-determining process at trial." On this
point the Court indicated that the truth-determining process was protected by the pre-Escobedo-Mirandacoerced confession doctrine to the
point of making retroactive application unnecessary. Moreover, due
to the rather radical change brought about by these two decisions, it
was felt that the states should not be required to have contemplated
them. This concession reflects a tacit recognition of the Court's legislative functioning in this area of constitutional law.
Law enforcement officers and trial courts will have fair notice that
statements taken in violation of these standards may not be used
against an accused. Prospective application only to trials begun
after the standards were announced is particularly appropriate
here. Authorities attempting to protect the privilege have not
been appraised heretofore of the specific safeguards which are now
obligatory. Consequently they have adopted devices which, although below the constitutional minimum, were not intentional
evasions of the requirements of the privilege. In these circumstances, to upset all of the convictions still pending on direct appeal which were obtained in trials preceding Escobedo and
Miranda would impose an unjustifiable burden on the admin455
istration of justice.
Professor Currier has ably urged that, although limiting decisions
to prospective application is quite desirable in certain cases, it should
452 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
453 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
454 Id. at 728. "We here stress that the choice between retroactivity and non-retroactivity in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved... . (WIe
do not disparage a constitutional guarantee in any manner by declining to apply it
retroactively." Ibid.
455 Id. at 732-33.
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not be done in the area of criminal procedure due to the embittering
effect that such a limitation will have on those convicted in the same
manner, and whom the technicality of prospective application precludes from successfully asserting their constitutional rights. "4 0 Moreover, it is argued that such a sanctioning of old wrongs has undesirable
45 7
effects on society in general.
While Professor Currier addressed himself to the ramifications of
retroactive application, it is submitted that his conclusion does not
give proper weight to the social interest of allowing the states to rely
upon existing law, without subjecting themselves to ex post facto penalties, in cases where the denial of the constitutional right involved
does not enhance the chances of convicting an innocent defendant. In
a time of great transition the states should not be required to anticipate developments in constitutional law, unless their failure to do so
endangers the innocent. Where the innocent are so endangered, the
social interest in stability is outweighed. Another factor which adds
weight to the prospective application argument is the social interest
of protecting society from criminals. The deterring of future courses
of action by state officials, where the possibility of conviction of the
innocent is not involved, should not be at the expense of society's
interest. Finally, and of primary importance, is the greater freedom
which prospective application gives the Court in the development of
constitutional guarantees. It would seem to be a much easier task to
change existing law when one does not have to worry about undoing
and righting all that has gone before. Conceding Professor Currier's
argument that prospective application will result in some embitterment, nevertheless, this embitterment will be far less than would occur
if the trend of the law toward potection of the individual were impeded
by the requirement that every change made be given retroactive application.
456 See Currier, supra note 433 at 201-205.

[The] great mass of people-and not just simple folk . . .- do "universalize" their
notions of right and wrong. They are capable of being outraged at old wrongs-the
burning of witches, say, the beating of slaves-and will not be put off with the

explanation that the wrongdoers were upright men affording the due process of
their day and meaning only to serve the highest good. It is a flaw of moral percep-

tion, perhaps to apply our morality retroactively, but it is a powerful phenomenon
and can lead to a dangerous contempt for a system . . . that does not take it Into
account.
Id. at 204-05.
457 Ibid.
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XIV. CONCLUSION

Much has taken place in the development of minimum constitutional standards aimed at preventing state abuse of the dignity of the
individual in the administration of criminal justice. The older cases
such as Betts v. Brady, Stein v. New York, Crooker v. California,Adamson v. Californiaand Wolf v. Colorado which have fallen under the
recent tide of change, reflected the Supreme Court's traditional concern for preserving a balance between federal and state power. This
concern was implemented through a course of restraint, achieved by
applying to the states a vague subjective constitutional standard of
"fundamental fairness" 45 8 which almost invariably fell short of the
guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. This undefined standard
was applied to prevent only the most serious state abuses and, therefore, left the states considerable latitude in the formulation of rules
of criminal procedure. This application was necessitated by the political concept of federalism and justified by the states' closer relationship
to most criminal activity, which has made the bulk of crime detection
primarily a responsibility of state law enforcement officers.
In recent years the subjective standard has begun to crumble and
give way to a more objective approach. At present the Bill of Rights
is the guide in this development, which is gradually evolving one concept of liberty from a possible fifty-one-a concept which is being
molded and defined in a careful case by case process.
The Court's apparent conversion to objectivism will not be permanent. The two primary bases for the subjective approach-facilitation of
crime detection and preservation of federalism-have been rapidly
diminishing in importance. First of all, the goal of crime detection is being surpassed in importance by the more fundamental goal
of crime prevention. Detection was necessary to punishment, which, in
turn, was aimed at deterrence and reformation. Professors Sutherland
and Cressey, in their work Principles of Criminology, note:
When the punitive reaction to crime was most popular, the
usual assumption was that severe punishment both reforms those
who are punished and deters or "prevents" others from committing first crimes. Even today, legislative commissions appointed
458

See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 802 U.S. 319 (1937). There Mr. Justice Cardozo

declared as the test of fourteenth amendment due process that a right to be protected by
it must be of "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." The right must involve
"aprinciple of justice so routed in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."
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to make suggestions for programs to reduce crime rates generally
confine their recommendations to measures designed to increase
severity of punishment. However,... this policy has not proved
efficient; it is being supplemented, and to some extent replaced,
by policies based on the treatment reaction to crime. Consistent
with this trend, "reformation" and "prevention" are coming to
refer exclusively to positive non-punitive efforts to rehabilitate
a 9
criminals and to forestall criminality.4
They go on to urge:
[T]he policy of prevention must be emphasized if the crime
rate is to be reduced significantly. Punishment . . . [is], at best,
S.. [a method] of defense against criminals or of rescuing criminals. It is futile to take individual after individual out of the
situations which produce criminals and permit the situations to
remain as they were. A case of delinquency or crime is more than
a physiological act of an individual. It involves a whole network
of social relations. If we deal with his set of social relations we
shall be working to prevent crime. It has become a commonplace
in medicine that prevention is better than cure. The same superiority exists in the field of crime.
The superiority of prevention may be illustrated in the problem of school discipline. Two generations ago corporal punishment was used with great frequency in the schools and disorder
was generally prevalent in spite of the punishment. Orderly behavior did not develop by increasing the severity and frequency
of punishment or by "treating" unruly students. Rather the improvement in the behavior of school children came as a result of
improvement in the teachers and the curricula, and in the gradual
development of a tradition of orderly behavior, together with
liberality in the criteria of good behavior. The school system was
adjusted to the needs of the children much better than it had
been previously. It is probable that analogous changes must be
made in the social organization before great reductions can be
460
made in crime rates.
The recent policy of the Supreme Court reflects recognition of the
need for a shift in emphasis from crime detection to crime prevention.
459 SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 590

(6th ed. 1960).

460 Id. at 607.
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The Court's policy addresses itself to encouragement of crime prevention in two primary ways. First, it recognizes that much of the present
disrespect for the law within the lower economic levels of society, in
which the vast majority of criminal activity occurs,40 ' is due in part to
the example set by that portion of the law enforcement process with
which the members of these social elements most often come into contact-the policeman. The policeman who is "apt to be discourteous,
sarcastic, or rude when arresting persons of lower socio-economic
classes, but courteous and lenient when dealing with persons of high
social status"4 62 clearly reflects the lawlessness of the law. Brutal en4 3
forcement, if not completely suppressive, creates a brutal subject
If such undesirable consequences are to be obviated an essential preventive factor must be that the economically less fortunate be shown
that the law is for their benefit, not simply a weapon to be directed
against them. Accomplishment of this aim requires that efforts be
made to see that the poor are treated as fairly by the law as those who
are economically more fortunate. If the government is to have any expectation of a law abiding society, the government must obey the law.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis once explained: "Our government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
If the government becomes a lawwhole people by its example ....
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. '

4 4

Secondly, the Court in the

implementation of its present policy impliedly assumes that if traditional methods of crime detection are made more difficult, other means
will be devised to protect society from crime. Hopefully the other
means will be crime prevention addressed to the sources and causes
of crime, rather than detection and separation of the criminal from
society. Such an approach certainly may be justified from an economic
point of view. It should lessen the cost to society of maintaining facilities for the separation of the criminal while at the same time making
available within the economy many additional potentially productive
461 See generally id. at 145-59, 358-59.
462 Id. at 341; see also HoPrNs, OuR LAWLEsS Pouca (1931); LoniAuN, TIe PoLICE
AND MmORiTY GRouPs (1947).

463 See SUTHERLAND & CREsSEY, op. cit. supra note 459 at 392-98; VA,,'.tn, "RErpolr o,
POU(cE," NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENORCEmMENT, Report No. 14,
at 45 (1931); HoPKmNs, op. d. supra note 462; DAVIES, POLICE, Tim LAW, AND THE INDIvmuAL, 143-51 (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1954);
Packer, The Courts, The Police and the Rest of Us, 57 J. Cam.r. L., C. & P.S. 238 (1966).
464 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1938) (dissenting opinion).
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individuals. This approach should also lessen the social upheaval and
unrest presently being radiated by the emergence of minority groups
and lower socio-economic classes as active and vocal members of society. Of course organized crime will continue, but hopefully those
from lower economic classes will not continue to be attracted to its
ranks out of what in many instances amounts to virtual economic
necessity.
The almost certain continuation of organized crime necessitates
that society have enough lee-way in the coverage and operation of rules
of criminal procedure to effectively combat this threat. Accordingly
it is perhaps no coincidence that most of the recent break-through decisions, such as Mapp, Gideon, Escobedo and Miranda, have involved
convicted defendants who were not involved in organized criminal
activity. Nevertheless, the rules formulated in these decisions will also
be available to members of organized crime. Grudging application of
the rules by trial judges and restrained review by the appellate courts,
may be the most satisfactory approach in prosecutions of such persons.
The opposite approach could be taken in all other criminal trials and
appeals.
In other words, the answer may lie in the formulation of a constitutional double-standard. Such a dual standard should not be formalized or a rigid one but an unannounced and almost subconscious
element in the decisional process. The standard imposed in cases involving organized criminal activity would require only that the most
basic and fundamental principles of liberty be satisfied, while a much
stricter standard would be imposed in other cases. All but the most
basic constitutional rights contain enough inherent ambiguity to allow
this approach to be implemented in a nonobvious manner. For example, less could be required of the state in establishing a waiver
under the Miranda doctrine in organized crime cases than is required
in others.
Such an approach is not completely without historical basis in our
Anglo-American legal system. It bears some similarity to the old procedure of outlawry where under appropriate procedure the law breaker
could be declared to be outside the law and to have its protection withdrawn from his person and property. The approach suggested here is
neither as formal nor as drastic. The judges, particularly those at the
trial level, would merely make an unannounced determination of
whether the defendant was involved in organized criminal activity.
If so, he would be afforded only the very basic and fundamental pro-

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

111

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 4

1967]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

tections of the Constitution. Others would be afforded a much broader
and more liberal interpretation of their constitutional rights.
Of course distinguishing between members of organized crime and
non-members in applying constitutional protections involves danger
to individual liberty due to the discretion given the judge in applying
the protections. This danger, however, is minimized by the growing
supervision of the state and the continuing close supervision of federal
criminal procedure by the Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts of
Appeals. Indication of a tendency toward more enlightened state
appellate courts offers a further possibility of reduction in the dangers
of the approach. The major advantage of such an approach is that it
continues the present judicial contribution toward crime prevention
and at the same time offers a means of protecting society from the
crime-for-profit elements-the members of which should be considered
to have assumed, by virtue of their career selections, the risk of all but
flagrant abuses of liberty.
The second and most commonly announced foundation of the subjective "fundamental fairness" approach was the political doctrine of
federalism. The present decline of the subjective approach has been
accompanied, not only by a shift from crime detection to crime
prevention, but also by an over-all undermining of the importance
of states as political units. Objectivism, by guaranteeing uniform
application of minimum constitutional protections throughout the
nation, promotes nationalism over federalism. When this development is finalized there will probably be a tendency on the part of a
majority of the Court to return to subjectivism, in either an open or
a disguised form, for future development. An indication of this future
struggle between objectivism and subjectivism is apparent in two dissenting opinions in Adamson v. California.4 5 These dissents were in
agreement on the question of incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the fourteenth amendment; but were in fundamental disagreement on
the ultimate desirability of objectivism as opposed to subjectivism. Mr.
Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas urged that the chief objective of the fourteenth amendment "was to make the Bill of Rights
... applicable to the states." 4o6 In support of this position it was urged
that
to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the
particular standards enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other
465 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
466 Id. at 71-72 (dissenting opinion).
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parts of the Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes because of application of "natural law" deemed to be above and
undefined by the Constitution is another. "In the one instance,
courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional boundaries
seek to execute policies written into the Constitution; in the other
they roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to
reasonableness and actually select policies, a responsibility which
the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of the
people" . ... 467
Mr. Justice Rutledge expressed agreement that "the specific guarantees of the Bill of Right should be carried over intact into the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment;"' 408 but, argued that the fourteenth amendment is not "entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill
of Rights. Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of
conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the
absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights." 4 0
Now that absorption is substantially achieved it seems only a matter
of time until the once formidable weapon of the protectors of federalism will be utilized by their opponents to further defeat that institution which advocates of federalism fought so fiercely to preserve.
Powerful vehicles beyond those expressly contained in the Bill of
Rights are available for the future development of constitutional prohibitions against both federal and state infringement upon the liberty
of the individual. The limitless fourteenth amendment concept of
"fundamental fairness," which was once aimed at preserving the status
quo, could be used to further limit state activity. Fifth amendment
due process and the recently awakened ninth amendment 470 are available for preventing abuses of liberty by federal law enforcement officials. With absorption virtually achieved, the Court must choose
between pressing on beyond the Bill of Rights with continued evolution of constitutional protections of individual liberty or exercising
restraint, particularly with the states. A period of restraint would possibly have as its chief merit the allowance of time for acceptance by
the public of the Court's policy toward the criminally accused. This
public acceptance is particularly important in light of recent criticism
467 Id. at 91-92.
468 Id. at 124.
469 Ibid.

470 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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of the Court and in light of the general widespread loss of faith in the
law.4 7 ' On the other hand, the importance to society of crime prevention demands a continued activist approach in this area.
If a course of activism is pursued, there remains a question of how
far the Court will and should go in seeking uniformity of criminal
procedure. With the Bill of Rights basically applicable to the states,
the Court could still choose to preserve a modified form of federalism.
By applying the Bill of Rights to the states plus a subjective fourteenth
amendment due process standard, while applying to the federal government the basic Bill of Rights guarantees plus additional principles
developed under fifth amendment due process or the ninth amendment this preservation could be achieved. As an alternative to relying
upon the fifth and ninth amendments the Court could fall back upon
its supervisory power over federal criminal procedure to obtain needed
new developments and thereby distinguish between federal rules and
state rules. On the other hand, the present pursuit for national uniformity of criminal procedure could be continued either by equating
fifth and fourteenth amendment due process or by utilizing the ninth
amendment and applying the principles developed under it, to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Pursuit of uniformity will probably be continued. This course is
suggested by the previously mentioned shift of the Court from emphasis on crime detection to emphasis on crime prevention. The rationale
underlying such a shift is the idea that the states can expect their citizens to respect and obey the law only in so far as the states comply
with what the citizenry reasonably understands the law to be. The
average citizen in a federalist system simply cannot understand a
constitutional principle (he views as a technicality) which allows one
sovereign to infringe upon individual rights in the exact manner prohibited to the other sovereign.
Of the two unifying approaches mentioned above, the ninth amendment course has been urged to be a better one than a loose due process
course, on the ground that it would preserve a continuation of consti471 See, e.g., quote from Prof. Alfred IL Kelly of Wayne State University in

U.S.

News

& World Rep., June 20, 1966, p. 52: "Much of history that the recent court has produced
is of the law-office variety. It fails to stand up under the most superficial scrutiny by a
scholar possessing some knowledge of American constitutional development. The present
use of history by the Court is a marist-type perversion of the relationship between truth
and utility. It assumes that history can be rewritten to serve the interests of libertarian
idealism."
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tutional objectivism. 472 An example of the confrontation between
objectivism and subjectivism can be found in the recent decision of
Griswold v. Connecticut.473 There the Court held that a state statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices violated the right of marital privacy existing under the ninth amendment and applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, utilized implications
derived from other provisions of the Bill of Rights 7 4 in developing this
constitutional right of privacy. Mr. Justice Goldberg in a concurring
opinion appears to view the ninth amendment as a source of constitutional rights independent of the other Bill of Rights guarantees. 47
Mr. Justice Black in dissent remains consistent with his philosophy
of the fourteenth amendment as expressed in Adamson. He urges that
fourteenth amendment due process is an incorporation of the Bill of
Rights which he seems inclined to interpret in accord with the rather
strict common law method.470 It is in methodology that Mr. Justices
Black and Douglas disagree. Both agreed in Adamson that fourteenth
amendment due process results in an incorporation of the Bill of
Rights. Now Douglas is willing to utilize the limitless guarantee of the
ninth amendment to justify development of the specific Bill of Rights
guarantees by analogy to cover a casus omissus. Mr. Justice Black recognizes that one with a sharp mind and a skilled pen has the same
possibilities with Douglas' method as exist under a pure subjective
approach. Black refuses to concur in either of these approaches which
leave so much of the basis for determination of due process content
to the discretion and point of view of the individual jurist. The present
indication is that Black's view will not comman a majority since only
Mr. Justice Stewart joined in Black's dissent in Griswold. There is,
however, the possibility that other conservatives will join in this view,
as absorption becomes finalized, in an effort to preserve the remnants
of federalism. The other two methods really present little difference.
One possible advantage of the Douglas approach is that it would tend
to encourage better reasoned opinions since it depends upon a conceptual development rather than bare assertions of abstract terms.
472 See Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and its Implications
for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina v. Kat.
zenbach, 40 TUL. L. REv. 487 (1966).
473 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
474 Particularly the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments.
475 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
476 Id, at 507 (dissenting opinion).
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Regardless of the method which is ultimately adopted there would
seem to be little doubt but that in our society ultimate protection
of the individual against governmental abuse, both state and national,
will remain under the auspice of the Supreme Court. Moreover there
has developed on the part of the Court a very keen recognition of the
fact that "law enforcement... in defeating the criminal, must maintain inviolate the historic liberties of the individual. To turn back the
criminal, yet, by so doing, destroy the dignity of the individual would
be a hollow victory." 477 Law enforcement is aimed at protecting society
but it must be remembered that "society as such has no rights except
those that are the sum total of the rights of the individuals who com'4
pose it." 78
The role of the Court in particular and the law in general must be
viewed in proper context in relation to the solution of contemporary
social problems. The present contribution to long range social stabilization and improvement being made by the judiciary, should not be
thought of as an end in itself. This contribution cannot alone cure the
social ills at which it is directed. If the desired end is to be reached, the
judicial contribution must simply be one phase, though quite important, of a vast program for the improvement of society. If production of a law respecting society is to be achieved, effective contribution
to this end must come from the other branches of government and
from the private sector of society. Not only must the law project an
image of legality for the purpose of educating society, but the other
social and economic causes of crime must be corrected. The law, under
the active leadership of the Supreme Court, is beginning to make its
contribution. The remainder of the task rests in the hands of others.
477

Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the F.BI., 87 IOWA

L. REv. 175, 177 (1952).
478 ARNALL, THE SHoRE DIMLY SEEN 24 (1946).
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